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ABSTRACT

Author: Schulz, Zachary W. Ph.D.
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: May 2018
Title: The English in the Levant: Commerce, Diplomacy, and the English Nation in the Ottoman
Empire, 1672-1691
Committee Chair: Melinda Zook.

This dissertation examines the English who went to the Levant. Specifically, it analyzes
the merchants, factors, ambassadors, chaplains, and embassy staff members who traveled to the
Near East for either bureaucratic, commercial, or scholastic motivations. During their time abroad,
these men amassed a wealth of knowledge and pecuniary resources, simultaneously furthering the
countless interests forced upon them by the Levant Company and/or the English government. Thus,
this dissertation asserts that the Ottoman Empire acted as a training ground for English emissaries,
providing those who were abroad with the means of returning home to better positions of political,
commercial, and/or diplomatic power. It further emphasizes that the Levant Company was yet
another facet of the State, a formalized collective of mercantile agents acting on the behalf of the
Stuart regime simultaneous to the mundane pursuit of trade.

1

CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

Published in 1603, John Hotman’s The Ambassador provided a guide for a prospective
diplomat, highlighting the type of qualities and behaviors a man should avail himself of when
serving his prince overseas. Hotman prefaced his discourse with a simple admonition,
As in some states there are monarchies, others governed by lords, the last by people, so
that, according to the quality of these governments, and nature of the affairs, it is requisite
to make choice of ambassadors that may be fitting to the place and prince to whom they
are appointed. And not only because of this diversity of states and negotiations, but also
due to the difference of humors. In some countries, they speak only of money and levying
of forces; in others, of sea matters, traffic, and commerce; in others of breaches of treaties,
of inroads and riots on frontiers. But for me, I require no more of him than he may attain
unto himself by use and nature.
Thus, the selection of an emissary necessitated a certain type of individual. He should be able to
act as a scholar when needed, a supplicant when necessary, and above all, be an unimpeachable
man of good character who held his nation’s best interests at heart. Finding and employing such
men as
Consuls in Cairo, at Aleppo, Rosetta, Alexandria, and other towns and havens of
importance… [would] provide a great commodity unto us, for besides the intelligence
which they have from time to time of the prices of all sorts of merchandise, they receive
also by the same means news from all parts of the world. Wherein with which we may
exceed all other Estates and Commonwealths. 1
A study of these men that Hotman describes, tied to the embassies of the early modern world either
through formal appointment on diplomatic duties or trading under an ambassador’s auspices and
protections, offers a rich seam of historical detail that remains underutilized. Relegated to the
traditional background of diplomacy, these emissaries can address the lacunae in our knowledge
of not only international relations in the early modern period, but also political, social, and
economic history. To that end, this dissertation will examine the Levant Company from the
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John Hotman, The Ambassador (London, 1603), 8-10.
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periphery that these men inhabited, tracing the affairs of merchants, consuls, secretaries,
ambassadors, and other embassy members in the Ottoman Empire during the 1670s and 1680s. It
will focus on how they acted as agents of the English State, implementing the various agendas of
the Company, Whitehall, and Westminster. Through their commercial pursuits tied to diplomacy,
these emissaries honed their skills in statecraft, scholarship, and governmental affairs while abroad
in the Ottoman Empire, ultimately furthering both the agendas of their masters and themselves. 2

Although there is a trend in contemporary historical analysis to associate the economic
developments of the late seventeenth century with the advent and growth of New World colonial
possessions, the statistical analysis of commercial returns during the period emphasizes the
unquestionable economic importance of the Old World, specifically the Mediterranean. 3 It was in
the Mediterranean that competition for lucrative commercial markets took place between the
European powers – particularly England, France, and the United Provinces. The thriving
commercial gains made by the English during the 1670s and 1680s, specifically from 1674 to
1688/9, reflect a period of matchless peacetime prosperity for the island nation. While France, the
United Provinces, and Spain warred against one another, England found itself privileged to act as
a neutral faction. During this time, the English transported goods between the hostile parties of
Europe and took advantage of their rivals’ respective withdrawal from the marketplaces of the Old
World’s major commercial ports. Even with peace dawning in 1678, the slow process of
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Brinda Charry and Gitanjali Shahani, Emissaries in Early Modern Literature and Culture: Mediation, Transmission,
Traffic, 1550-1700 (Burlington: Ashgate, 2009), 5, 7; Robyn Adams and Rosanna Cox, Diplomacy and Early Modern
Culture (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), 7-8.
3
Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History: Contours and Concepts (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); John Elliot,
Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007);
Karen Ordhal Kupperman, The Atlantic in World History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); T.H. Breen,
The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American Independence (New York: Oxford, 2004);
John Thornton, A Cultural History of the Atlantic World, 1250-1820 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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recapturing lost marketspace was daunting for the French and Dutch. Economically devastated by
their wars, with the English having netted massive gains compared to their rivals’ expenditures
and deep national deficits, Europe’s major powers were far from ready to compete in the
marketplace. 4 At the forefront of this commercial boom for the English was one entity: the Levant
Company.
Too often the importance that the Levant Company played in the formation and growth of
the English State remains overlooked. Rather than limited to the private pursuit of profit, it is worth
noting that the Levant Company, and other similar institutions, were from the start engaged in
expanding the power of the State. These private companies engaged with the State in a quid quo
pro relationship that determined not only the daily functioning of the Company, but also the
arrangements dictating international affairs, intelligence gathering for State security apparatuses,
and the exertion of State power through commerce. Alongside the study of emissaries, then, this
dissertation seeks to illuminate the lesser explored Levant Company. Specifically, it will note how
the Company provided an important structure in the exertion of power by the Restoration English
State abroad.
One of the premiere institutions of early English commercial imperialism, the Levant
Company provided the formative base for the later East India Company that would eventually
overshadow its Levantine predecessor in both importance and wealth. It was in the Levant
Company that merchants, factors, investors, embassy staff members, and others developed the
skills that would drive its more famous successor. As the competition between the two Companies
tilted toward the more lucrative Indian trade routes during the eighteenth century, many early
members of the East India Company belonged also to the Levant Company, employing what they
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learned in the Levant for further gain in the East. Nonetheless, despite providing a fertile bed upon
which the East India Company grew, the Levant Company remains understudied. To point, the
earliest scholarship concentrating on the Company was first published in 1908. Written by
Mortimer Epstein and focusing exclusively on the Company from its inception until 1640, the
monograph is brief and glancing in its analysis, providing an informal historical narrative. Over a
third of the work is dedicated to the republication of the 1605 Charter and offering various
appendices listing Company ships, ports, and officials. 5
Published thirty years later, Alfred Wood’s History of the Levant Company offers the best
overview of the Company. Updated in a 1964 edition, this general history stands as the
authoritative study of the Company. Regardless, his “aim throughout… merely to suggest the
many-sided importance of the Company’s work” was successful, providing an entertaining and
witty account of various merchant officials and their efforts from 1583 until 1718. With great
sensitivity to other historical disciplines, Wood was clearly aware that his undertaking risked
alienating economic and diplomatic historians if he were to champion one discipline over another.
Consciously written to incorporate both fields, without giving preference to either, he provided a
complex narrative covering everything from basic revenues to tales of high piracy. From the very
general overview, to the minutiae of daily life in the embassy itself, Wood’s scholarship is only
diminished by its size. Covering over two hundred and thirty years of history, the work seeks to
undertake too much in just under three hundred pages. Details may abound in some parts, but are
otherwise drastically lacking in other areas of his study, particularly surrounding the 1674 to
1688/9 period. 6

5
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Mortimer Epstein, The Early History of the Levant Company (London: George Routledge & Sons Limited, 1908).
Alfred C. Wood, A History of the Levant Company (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1964), v.
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Ralph Davis, writing in 1967, broke from previous general overviews by not relying solely
on Company records and pamphleteers. Concentrating exclusively on the epistles of the Radcliffe
family, a prominent clan of merchants in the Levant from the seventeenth through eighteenth
century, he traced the methods that merchants employed to pursue their trade in the Ottoman
Empire. Offering the barest of summaries regarding the Company and its positions in the Levantine
theater, much of his monograph highlights the 1730s through 1760s, when the Radcliffe family
archives are the richest. Interesting for its analysis of the silk trade during a period of relative
decline for the English in the Mediterranean, the monograph serves as brilliant, but limited, casestudy of a singular factory outside of Constantinople. In its emphasis on the procedures and
conducting of business via the Radcliffe family, the monograph fails to connect to the wider
historical relevance of trade in the Levant. 7
Even recent studies of the Company meant to provide a general history remain locked in
periodization, championing one span of the Company’s existence over that of all other embassies,
or ignoring the greater significance of the Company’s existence altogether. Geoffrey Berridge’s
British Diplomacy in Turkey, 1583 to the Present provides a brief introduction of England’s
diplomatic efforts in the Sublime Porte that updates earlier studies with new archival sources and
further contextualization.8 Yet, Berridge quickly moves forward in time, accelerating his analysis
toward 1825 and the Company’s demise, with scant detailing of the preceding two centuries. Once
settled in the nineteenth century, his monograph provides an elaborate analysis of British
diplomatic efforts in the Levant. Indeed, the latter half of the book exclusively focuses on the

7
Ralph Davis, Aleppo and Devonshire Square: English Traders in the Levant in the Eighteenth Century (London:
Macmillan, 1967).
8
The “Sublime Porte” is a reference to the Imperial Gates of Topkapi Palace in Constantinople. Just as British
historians employ the term “Whitehall”’ or “Westminster” to describe the central government, Ottomanists employ
the term ‘Sublime Porte’ to refer to the administration overseeing the Ottoman Empire.
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detailing of Anglo-Turkic international relations from 1914 onwards. The early modern period,
however, is treated only as a small stepping-stone to the contemporary modern era. 9
And, if scholarship regarding the Company itself is lacking, anything focusing on those not
engaged directly in trade itself is even more bare. Biographical work by Sonia Anderson and
Daniel Goffman has rectified some of this disparity, with the former offering a study of Paul
Rycaut and the latter studying Ambassadors Sackville Crowe and Thomas Bendish. However, both
scholars’ monographs suffer glaring deficiencies. For example, Anderson’s scholarship is more
preoccupied with Rycaut’s later literary works than his actual activities in the Ottoman Empire.
Goffman, for his part, becomes entangled in the pamphlet war between the two diplomats he
studies. Hence, he fails to tie the situation in Turkey to wider English political affairs, or indeed to
anything beyond the circumstances of a select few men in the Ottoman Empire itself. 10

These deficiencies in the historical narrative of the Levant Company underscore a wider
problem in the entire field of British history. The study of an English past is inherently archipelagic,
fragmented across various disciplines and traditions. While the historiography of the past thirty
years has moved away from Anglocentric concentrations and encompassed a more international
history, the fields of commercial, political, and religious history remain traditionally, as well as
geographically and nationally, at odds with one another. The study of the great English merchant
companies of the seventeenth century remains essentialized, limiting analysis to a respective
company’s corporate structure or international impact within the region it sought trading relations.
As a result, it is unsurprising that even those historians who have focused on the companies have

9

Geoffrey Berridge, British Diplomacy in Turkey, 1583 to the Present: A Study in the Evolution of the Resident
Embassy (Leiden: Brill, 2009).
10
Sonia P. Anderson, An English Consul in Turkey: Paul Rycaut at Smyrna, 1667-1678 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1989); Daniel Goffman, Britons in the Ottoman Empire, 1642-1660 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998).
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neglected the merchants and ambassadorial staff of these commercial enterprises with arguments
holding that they had no influence in domestic affairs, international policy, or the English State.11
Compounding matters, merchants as a group in England have provided the basis for a
proliferation of equally compartmentalized scholarly works. Scholars analyzing these men have
overwhelmingly focused on their political and/or confessional allegiances during the turbulent
periods of the Civil War, Interregnum, and the Restoration. Academics such as Robert Brenner,
Gary De Krey, and Richard Grassby provide the most exhaustive and influential examinations of
merchants and those associated with the various trading companies. For his part, Robert Brenner
argued that merchants were a mixed lot, polarized into two extremes, either estranged from or
actively advocating for Whitehall and/or Westminster during the Tudor and early Stuart eras.
Motivated by a plethora of reasons for their political activity, he groups merchants into two
collectives. The first collective he envisioned as being “new merchants,” those who explored and
exploited the Americas. The second being part of the “Levant-East Indian combine,” or those who
preferred the Old World and the lucrative trade originating in the Orient. Differing in their
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Richard Grassby, The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995), 206-09; Gerald MacLean and Nabil Matar, Britain and the Islamic World, 1558-1713 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 113; Simon Mills, "The Chaplains to the English Levant Company: Exploration and Biblical
Scholarship in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century England," in Die Begegnung Mit Fremden Und Das
Geschichtsbewusstsein, ed. Judith Becker and Bettina Braun (Goettingen: Vandehoeck and Rupprecht, 2011), 243-66;
William J. Bulman, Anglican Enlightenment: Orientalism, Religion and Politics in England and Its Empire, 16481715 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 44-45, 76. In addition to those discussed above, for example,
Richard Grassby has argued that businessmen played a minimal role in the 1688/89 Revolution, going so far as to
state that demonstrations originating in the business community “often served as an antidote to boredom.” Indeed,
“when merchants entered regional and national politics, it was to defend their particular economic interests rather than
to promote a cause.” Scholars Nabal Matar and Gerald MacLean only passingly mention Levantine merchant Dudley
North, despite the existence of extensive records regarding North’s active role in domestic politics, international trade
policy, and aiding the Finch embassy. For these scholars, his eccentric behavior of growing a long beard, sitting on
the floor in local Turkish clothes, and holding meetings in the Turkish fashion to the great entertainment of his
compatriots is more noteworthy than any contributions he made politically, economically, or otherwise. Finally,
scholars Simon Mills and William J. Bulman have, in their respective scholarship, suggested that the chaplains of
these companies were only collectors of information for Archbishop William Laud’s and others. Beyond data
collectors, these chaplains were also explorers of the boundaries of the Anglican faith, promoting in their
correspondence and research a more inclusive, ecumenical approach to religion that was less critical of Coptic,
Catholic, Muslim, and other confessional practices.
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foundational backgrounds, initial funding, and institutional structuring, he holds that those
companies and men who worked in the New World favored Westminster, which was more readily
available to merchants and willing to support colonial expansion. Conversely, those in the Old
World supported Whitehall and the Privy Chamber, with whom they already had a deeply
entrenched and lucrative relationship. Yet, Brenner’s analysis of commerce stops at the formation
of the Barebone’s Parliament in 1653, with any later examination of the Restoration era never
undertaken by the historian. 12
Analyzing merchants alongside London Dissenters, historian Gary De Krey also focused
on two identifiable groups that he defined as the pinnace of political activism by merchants in
London during the 1670s. According to De Krey, these men accepted political office, despite their
inability to subscribe to the Test Act, in order to oppose the implementation of the Conventicle
Act. 13 While the Dissenters he included should not be taken as representative of the overall
dissenting community, it is noteworthy that several leading Levant merchants in these two groups
were noticeably present. 14 Trade, alongside a resistance to religious coercion, was at the forefront
of these influential London Dissenters’ concerns, with those overseas having nothing to contribute
to the Restoration settlement. Notwithstanding De Krey’s discussion of merchant Dissenters, his
analysis of these men still preferences wider confessional concerns as the major instigator for
political resistance and activism in the 1670s.
By far, Richard Grassby provides the most exhaustive analysis of English merchants
during the Interregnum and later Stuart era. According to Grassby’s scholarship, English
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Robert Brenner, Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas
Traders, 1550-1653 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 48-49.
13
Gary S. De Krey, London and the Restoration, 1659-1683 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 125,
412-13.
14
In his appendix are Levant merchants John Langley, Thomas Pilkington, Henry Spurstowe, Charles Thorold, and
John Jolliffe, all factors or governors of the Levant Trading Company, who all others who Dissented granted Charles
II a loan to attempt some exertion of influence on the religious settlement.
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merchants of the period envisioned politics as “the pursuit of profit by other means just as foreign
policy was an instrument of trade.” He posits that merchants’ casual approach to politics became
even more pronounced during the Exclusion Crisis of 1679-1681, as the growth of opposition
groups in politics fragmented merchants even further into smaller consortiums. Businessmen, more
than ever, “owed allegiance not to the nation, but to his own Company, industry, town and area of
trade.” Thus, Grassby asserts that merchants of the late-seventeenth century entered politics at a
regional or national level to defend their own commercial interests. They remained indifferent to
supporting any wider political cause or in support of the established government independent of
personal pecuniary impetuses. “Businessmen,” he states, “were natural Trimmers with a disdain
for political ideology, willing to function under any regime which did not actively persecute
them… more turncoats and time-servers than martyrs.” Predictably, it follows that merchants and
staff of the great trading companies treated religion as pragmatically as they did politics. Occupied
with commercial matters, Grassby concludes that these men were willing to “delegate
responsibility for keeping the faith to professional ministers,” irreligious and apolitical in their
undertakings. As vying confessions proliferated during the Interregnum and supplied an ample
selection of churches for a Briton to choose from, “the practice of faith became a leisure activity,”
promoting showmanship and status rather than piety during the Restoration. 15 Grassby’s
interpretation of merchants’ political and religious voices is typical of the historiography. The
historical narrative often favors domestic traders over those in foreign postings, holding that profits
unscrupulously drove these men alone. 16
One of the more traditional subfields in the modern practice of history, the study of
premodern diplomacy and early imperialism, has also ignored or unreliably sorted these merchant

15
16

Grassby, Business Community, 83, 191, 209.
Wood, A History; Anderson, An English Consul; Matar, Islamic World; Goffman, Britons.
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emissaries, resulting in the call by some for a multidisciplinary reevaluation of international
relations in the early modern period. 17 For example, historians of the Anglo-Dutch Wars have
continued to diminish international trade’s impact on the commercially motivated Anglo-Dutch
conflicts, preferring to argue politics and religious differences were more important than economic
matters. 18 Despite the wars’ “crucial significance for any proper understanding of the political
culture and ideological preoccupations of the age,” according to Jonathan Israel, the English
associated with the commercial endeavors of the period remain overlooked in recent narratives. 19
Though scholars such as Israel and Simon Groenveld have championed the wars as arising from
economic necessity, others such as Steve Pincus and James Jones have promoted English
ideological motivations, such as patriotism and religion, as root causes for the conflicts. 20 By
consigning commercial interests and trade to the background, Jones and Pincus contribute to the
ongoing archipelagic nature of English history by focusing too narrowly on confessional
motivations bound to an international Protestantism. Indeed, for Pincus, commercialism was but
merely one aspect in the spread of the nationalistic ideology that he envisions as a driving force in
early modern British affairs. 21 In this regard, he is not alone; trade remains relegated to tertiary or

17

John Watkins, "Toward a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe," Journal of Medieval
and Early Modern Studies 38, no. 1 (2008): 1-14.
18
Jaap R. Bruijn, The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Columbia: University of South
Carolina, 1993); Pieter Geyl, Orange and Stuart, 1641-1672 (London: Littlehampton Book Services, 1969); Steve
Pincus, "Popery, Trade and Universal Monarchy: The Ideological Context of the Outbreak of the Second Anglo-Dutch
War," The English Historical Review CVII, no. CCCCXXII (1992): 1-29; "The English Debate over Universal
Monarchy," in A Union for Empire: Political Thought and the British Union of 1707, ed. John Robertson (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 37-62.
19
Jonathan Israel, "England, the Dutch Republic, and Europe in the Seventeenth Century," The Historical Journal 40,
no. 4 (1997): 1119.
20
Simon Groenveld, "The English Civil Wars as a Cause of the First Anglo-Dutch War, 1640-1652," The Historical
Journal 30, no. 3 (1987): 541-66; Steve Pincus, Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English
Foreign Policy, 1650-1668 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); James R. Jones, The Anglo-Dutch Wars
of the Seventeenth-Century (London: Routledge, 1996).
21
Steve Pincus, 1688: The First Modern Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 102-03.
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lower status in the study of English political and diplomatic history during the latter half of the
seventeenth century. 22
These historiographical arguments mentioned above are furthermore indicative of the
period of their writing. Specifically, they seek to answer questions of party formation, radicalism,
and the political and confessional origins of both the English Civil War and Glorious Revolution.
Collectively, they illustrate that historians have approached merchants as a proto-party, with
independent and distinguishable interests in the domestic politics of the period, yet never formally
organizing. These approaches are in line with the historiographical and disciplinary teleology of
those who came to prominence and learned their craft in the 1980s and 1990s. Such narratives
envision the State and merchants in an adversarial relationship, one pursuing power while the other
seeks wealth, and creating assemblages that would categorize participants as belonging to one
institution or the other. Even those who claim to avoid political and confessional considerations in
their scholarship also suffer from this teleological fallacy. 23
To point, early modern economic historians have for several years also contributed to the
various issues inherent to the study of merchants and their companies despite being best placed for
understanding these men’s motives beyond pecuniary concerns. 24 Concentrating narrowly on

22

Richard Grassby, The English Gentleman in Trade: The Life and Works of Sir Dudley North, 1641-1691 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1994); Linda T. Darling, "Ottoman Politics through British Eyes: Paul Rycaut's 'the Present State of
the Ottoman Empire'," Journal of World History 5, no. 1 (1994): 71-97; Anderson, An English Consul; Ben Coates,
The Impact of the English Civil War on the Economy of London, 1642-50 (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company,
2004).
23
Gijs Rommelse, "Mountains of Iron and Gold: Mercantilist Ideology in Anglo-Dutch Relations (1650-1674)," in
Ideology and Foreign Policy in Early Modern Europe (1650–1750), ed. Gijs Rommelse (New York: Routledge, 2016),
243-66; Liah Greenfield, The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2001); Perry Gauci, The Politics of Trade: The Overseas Merchant in State and Society, 1660-1720
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
24
Robert B. Ekelund and Robert D. Tollison, "Mercantilist Origins of the Corporation," The Bell Journal of Economics
11, no. 2 (1980): 715-20; Marvin Jackson and John Lampe, Balkan Economic History, 1550-1950: From Imperial
Borderlands to Developing Nations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); Andre Gunder Frank, World
Accumulation (New York: New York University Press, 2011); Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert, ed. An Economic
and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Andrea
Finkelstein, Harmony and the Balance: An Intellectual History of Seventeenth-Century English Economic Thought
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corporate structures, trade returns, and the development of mercantilism, economic history as a
discipline provides a historiography permeated throughout with Marxist analysis forming “thinly
veiled arguments between Keynesians and Monetarists.” 25 Moreover, when focusing on the early
modern period, economic history has revolved around the concept of “mercantilism,” utilizing the
term as a descriptive label either for an entire era or as a term synonymous for proto-capitalist
economies. 26 Caught in arguments that employ merchants as merely set-pieces, economic history
remains relatively mired, unable to offer further necessary insights into the emissaries of trading
companies.
Nonetheless, some economic historians have begun to redefine the term “mercantilism.”
As a result, economic history has begun to enter a renaissance that seeks to break from the
ideological models and arguments of the past. In the vanguard of this movement to change are
scholars Philip Stern and Carl Wennerlind. Both historians are revitalizing the field by delineating
trade’s importance within the wider domestic and international political culture of Britain. 27 They
have asserted that the old binary poles of power – rulers and the ruled, the State over the
corporation – are more blurred than previous scholars have maintained. Accordingly, the State was
not the monolithic power that earlier historians envisioned, supposedly dictating economic policy

(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009); Ann M. Carlos and Stephen Nicholas, "Theory and History:
Seventeenth-Century Joint-Stock Chartered Trading Companies," The Journal of Economic History 56, no. 4 (1996):
916-24.
25
Philip J. Stern and Carl Wennerlind, Mercantilism Reimagined: Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and Its
Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 4-6. A “monetarist” is one who asserts that the economy’s
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from upon high and independent of merchant input or international influence. 28 Instead, the State
and trade were codependent, deeply intertwined and mutually influential both politically and
economically. Hence, previous sorting of merchants and those involved in commerce as belonging
to either an economic or political directive was not mutually exclusive. The past groupings of these
men is too simplistic. Classifying merchants into geographic or political subcategorizations, or as
a collection unto themselves, did not separate them, or their objectives, from those of the State nor
from their own selfish efforts. Therefore, this dissertation seeks to add to this new approach. By
analyzing merchants, factors, ambassadors, and other Company representatives, it argues that these
men provided a conduit for the exertion of the State’s power abroad and its ongoing domestic and
international growth during the latter Stuart era. The emissaries to the Ottoman Empire both acted
as tools of statecraft and as selfish mercantile individuals wishing to further their own status in
English society.

Before progressing, however, it worth exploring the term “State” and what is meant when
it is employed in this dissertation. The idea of an English nationalism, or simply its existence as a
nation-state, has collectively been established to come into prominence during the late-seventeenth
century, as many historians have come to regard the events of that tumultuous period as a catalyst
to English nation-building. 29 Taking up the criticism toward Benedict Anderson’s Imagined
Communities that holds a national identity can only form in a modern society engaged in mass
media consumption, Anthony Smith was right to postulate a new formation of community. His
definition, asserting that a shared and extended history connected a people in a territory marked
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off by a distinct cultural nature from other communities, allows for early modern historians to
ascertain the rise of nationalism before the advent of mass media. 30 Accordingly, the English
existed as a national community in the seventeenth century due to their shared belief in a
Protestant-based nationalism. That community further united in a wider commercial and militarily
driven enterprise with co-religionists against Catholic states, but differentiated itself from other
civilizations in their national ideology that was uniquely English in economic, political, and
cultural engagements. Further, the transition to a market economy during the Restoration coupled
with the wider social environment in England to create a national community. The social
atmosphere fomented political discussions taking place in taverns, coffeehouses, and marketplaces,
all reinforcing what it meant to be English. In short, the late-seventeenth century encapsulates the
dawning period of mutability as the early modern gave way to the modern in English governance
and society.
Yet, as this definition of the English State became established in the historiography, a shift
has occurred in the past twenty years that moves the analytical emphasis from the building of a
state to the act of governance itself. This change has pivoted upon a reconsideration of the meaning
of the term “State,” as it has become employed, and accepted to having meaning, in a proliferation
of uses beyond political organization or description of a communal body. The exponential growth
in denotations has caused some historians to argue that a more versatile understanding of the role
of a state is necessary in the historiography. Perhaps, as Michael Braddock has asserted, it is time
to analyze the forms of state power, specifically its use in “particular institutional forms” rather
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than the simply focusing on the growth of the State. In other words, historians need to turn to the
study of the mind rather than the body. 31
Thus, the analysis of the exertion of State power and the continual growth of the State is
possible due to the contextualization provided by those involved in it, whether in traditional
stations of governance or not. Hence, the experiences and efforts encapsulated by merchants and
their representatives who pursued commerce in the Ottoman Empire provides one viable path of
investigation. As the Levant Company’s headquarters was in the City and its ranking delegates
held acquaintances, friendships, and even occasional kinship with those in Whitehall and
Westminster, the concept of this new derivation of “State” becomes utterly complex. The “State”
was not limited to those filling traditional roles of political position in the hierarchy of governance.
Nevertheless, it is in this complexity that lies the basis of a new approach to analyzing the State.
The term “State” is best defined here as something beyond a monarch or government, superseding
the societal concerns of the people and their culture. It is a self-referential imperator. The State is
characterized by the exertion of domestic and international power via politics, violence, and/or
economics, as well as having unquestionable prerogative arrived to through the formation of a
community like the one Anthony Smith has theorized. When this dissertation employs the term
“State,” it is synonymous to this ultimate judicator. Or, in other words, that which all others derived
any authority over the commonwealth of its citizenry. The State wields the power of war, the
ability to crush any individual, or, in the case of those involved in the Levant Company, make the
individual and expand the influence of the State outward through violence, diplomacy, or
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marketplace transactions. In essence, the State can be employed and overseen in limited aspects
by other institutions or consortiums, such as a corporate entity involved in commerce. Therefore,
figureheads and governmental institutions do not monopolize the control of a State and/or its
resources.
For this dissertation, the permeability between traditional organizations of government and
other societal establishments is paramount. After all, those associated with trade and economic
matters continually redefined what they owed the public, their investors, their monarch, and the
Commonwealth itself as they pursued agendas both in accord with State expansion and in their
own selfish interests. A brief example of this intermingling regarding the blurring between State
and mercantile concerns was the frequent enlisting of Levant merchant ships to enforce
international blockades and bolster naval patrols. For their compliance, the Company and captains
of these drafted vessels would receive a minimal monetary recompense, as well as the more
substantial promise of future protection by the Royal Navy when convoying between the British
Isles and the Ottoman Empire. Another succinct case is the simple collecting of intelligence for
the development of foreign policy and ongoing State security. For those emissaries engaged in this
semi-covert activity, their reward was anywhere between a feeling of fulfillment for service
rendered to one’s country or a further profit in the insubstantial wage of favors provided in the
future. In these illustrations, the State is as dependent on the overlooked merchant and his
representatives as they are upon the more formalized governmental institutions of public power. 32
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This issue of the unclear delineation between State and private authority runs throughout
the Stuart era, frustrating historians continually with its demarcated boundaries. 33 When the State
thrust its agenda upon merchants and the Company, it also took onto itself a reciprocal relationship
that is far from simple explanation. Naturally, the understanding of what was a private or public
matter proved equally perplexing for contemporaries as it is for historians. Throughout Company
minutes, missives, and logs, one finds that personal relationships defined business relations.
Communicated alongside family affairs was trade orders, discussions of business, and commands
from Whitehall and/or Westminster. Inevitably, all transactions became intertwined and
interchangeable in the discourse, civic and household duties amalgamating. Though formed as a
body of private investors, factors, and merchants to guarantee a monopoly on Levantine trade
against “interlopers,” the Levant Company itself further complicated their standing in society by
proudly declaring their necessity for the “public good.” When needing funds, complaining about
a lack of State protection, or decrying any intercession into its independence, the Company and its
merchants would employ a language of necessity and civic duty. Their complaints and appeals
written throughout with declarations of the Company’s beneficence to the overall English
community driven home repeatedly with the phrase “public good.” For example, a common
seventeenth-century narrative held that Levantine trade offered the supply of popular goods, such
as currants, and allowed the export of ample amounts of English cloth. In turn, these clothes
supported a vast economy of clothmakers across the Isles that would otherwise remain destitute
and masterless. For this trade, the Company would argue further that revenues from these ventures
inevitably supported not only the public, but Parliament, Whitehall, and the governing of the land
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itself. Hence, the Company and its members could reasonably claim that they supported the very
foundations of the State, both physically and hypothetically. 34
Summarily, the investigation of State involvement with, and oversight by, the Levant
Company and its members offers historians several insights that hitherto have been lacking in the
historiography. First, this exploration grants a better understanding of how private and public
concerns of the period combined and operated. Such an investigation yields a complexion that is
necessary to move beyond the essentialized categories and isolated research found in the varying
disciplinary fields of history discussed above. The Company’s very existence arose from an
interest in private enterprise, seeking to capitalize on the markets of the Levant and their exotic
goods. Yet, the Company itself would not exist without the blessing of the government. In this
negotiated existence, the members of the Company’s embassy provided a means to exert State
power, collect intelligence for the State, and provide an apparatus for the State that has hitherto
been underexplored. Second, an exploration of this complexion establishes the relationship
between State and Company, the formal and informal medias of power that enmeshed the two
entities. The wages of trade were more than simply pecuniary profits for those involved. By
reconnoitering the English emissaries to the Levant, a further aspect motivating merchants is
visible when analyzing these unusual State actors. Patronage, extension of kinship networks,
oversight of military matters, and even position in the government after a journey to the Levant
were among the several lucrative outcomes that compounded the relations between private and
public spheres. Finally, a study from this novel approach contributes to the growing analysis of
political activity and State growth in the Restoration era. As the study of the Company during this
period has demonstrably languished, the very real contributions the Levant Company made to the
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coffers and government of the Stuart monarchy remains ignored. The Levant provided wealth and
experience, training the bureaucrats who would take up the reins of power upon returning home,
and allowing them the ability to pay for admittance to loftier social circles in which to express
their new standing. Indeed, as most studies of the Company have focused on the period before the
Restoration, it is high time to undertake an investigation in the middle of the later Stuart reign. 35

For the purposes of this dissertation, the surviving records of the Levant Company, mainly
held at the National Archives in Kew, serve as the richest source of data regarding those men who
went to the Ottoman Empire. Of major impact, the dispatches of ambassadorial staff to the
Company between 1668 to 1697, Company out-letter books from 1662 to 1695, and the register
books of the Company from 1668 to 1710 provided the bulk of the following analysis. The
circulation of intelligence and news within a correspondence network, a principal occupation of
any embassy and encompassing most of the archives mentioned above, conferred a central role on
ambassadorial staff that provides a historian with easy access and an ability to contextualize the
contemporary issues between the emissaries of the Company and their corporate, private, or
governmental correspondents. No doubt, several other scholars have similarly employed these
records in their own studies. However, the voluminous nature of these archival sources is so great
that there likely exist several more potential insights when approached from a novel point of
inquiry. Factor letter books, the Company’s charters, copies of the Capitulations, and other
sundries scattered throughout the archive also added to this dissertation. Alongside these official
reports, the personal letters to and from John Covel, Lord Chandos, Paul Rycaut, and John Finch,
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coupled with Covel’s personal travelogues, provided further necessary insight and data for the
formation of this investigation. Found at the British Library, these documents add yet several
thousand more pages of source material that is rich and relatively untapped, particularly in regards
to John Covel’s memoirs. As embassy staff members and ambassadors wrote in a self-referential
manner, seeking to create an identity arrogating a political agency that justified their time abroad
to their superiors, these sources offer great insight into the personalities and ambitions of those
who composed them. Indeed, one can sense the palpable frustration these emissaries had with the
frequent loss and delay of letters, creating gaps in their news from home or intelligence necessary
to complete their job. In some, a deep sense of resentment is palpable as these men bemoan the
terse communiques they receive from their correspondents, frequently shorter and less detailed
than the accounts they have provided from the Levant. London based communications with
Levantine merchants was an uncertain prospect for those wishing to place orders with their factors
and for those in the Ottoman Empire for delivering news to those in Company administration. With
favorable weather, a ship could cross the Mediterranean from the Downs to the Ottoman Empire
in forty-two days. Typically, however, the trip took anywhere from four to five months. Letters
often were lost in transit, causing correspondents to send repeated messages in triplicate or more. 36
Notwithstanding these personal communiques, biographical works, such as Roger North’s study
of his brother Dudley North, were also employed in this study. Further supplementing these
profiles were familial archives in Kent and, in the case of John Finch, Leicestershire. Thus, the
methodology found in this study is a mixed-methods approach, employing a traditional historical
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analysis of primary source archival materials and forgoing strictly quantitative or qualitative
undertakings. 37
What follows is broken into four thematic chapters, each addressing how Levant emissaries
contribute to the understanding of State authority and offering new insights into their activities
while in the Ottoman Empire. Briefly outlined, Chapter 2 of this dissertation provides a necessary
historical contextualization of the Company for readers as well as a much-needed update to the
historical narrative. Broken into five parts, the chapter begins with a discussion of what those
seeking to go abroad to Levant sought and how the Company came into being from among a
conglomeration of vying interests. It then proceeds to exploring how the Company existed in a
complex relationship with the Crown, completely breaking down during the Interregnum as
factionalism in the Levant mirrored unrest at home. Finally, a synopsis of the Company’s recovery
during the Restoration is delineated, providing necessary background concurrent to this
dissertation’s period of study. The chapter ends by engaging with the Company’s long decline that
began in the eighteenth century, as monopolies became increasingly unpopular in the British
mindset, new competitors gained traction against Company interests, and the gains of the 1674 to
1688/9 period were not followed up by those in the Company’s General Court.
Chapter 3 offers an overview of merchants’ and Company members’ lives in the Levant.
Beginning with an exploration of the established merchant political and religious identity in
London, it moves to investigating how confessional and ideological differences mattered little
while abroad. The fluidity of these men’s identity is apparent in how they emissaries lived in the
Levant, where they lived, and how they interacted with one another and other Europeans while in
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a hostile land far from the British Isles. Lastly, the chapter ends with an examination of the wages
of trade won by these emissaries. The accumulation of wealth was but one wage for these men,
and time in the Levant could also provide position, gaining of favor and help from patrons, or even
allow those involved with Levantine trade to command the direction of Royal Naval policy and
State authority in the Mediterranean.
Engaging more directly with the 1674 to 1688/9 boom period, Chapter 4 establishes the
formal relationship between the Ottoman Empire and England as it existed. The interaction
between a nominally Christian and Islamic power was based on a type of formal diplomatic
agreement, a Capitulation, which had no diplomatic mirror in the European world. Described at
length in this chapter, the 1675 Capitulations afforded new protections for the English in their
efforts to trade with the Sublime Porte. Rather than a simply commercial or diplomatic treaty, the
Capitulations of 1675 established the basis of Anglo-Turkic relations for the next century, defining
how the two powers and their respective subjects interacted with one another. The men who made
these Capitulations possible are noteworthy, colorful in their multitude of backgrounds, and all
crucial to establishing this cornerstone agreement. Thus, an analysis of these men is provided at
length in the latter half of this chapter.
Finally, Chapter 5 will focus on the office of the ambassador itself. Though often referred
to in the study of history, the actual duties of an ambassador to Levant are not directly addressed
or accounted for in the historical narrative. Beyond his limited duty as a formal representative of
his monarch, the ambassador to the Levant did not act in a traditional diplomatic role. Meetings
between the Sublime Porte and any European emissary were exceedingly rare. Hence, an
ambassador fulfilled his responsibilities while in the Ottoman Empire in a myriad of ways, finding
himself spending a considerable amount of his time away from a sovereign’s court. Foremost, the
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ambassador was the primary arbiter of disputes, either between those in the community he oversaw
or between the Turks and English. These disputes were often messy affairs, taking up much of the
ambassador’s time and effort. Nonetheless, when the rare meeting with the Sultan did occur, it was
a grand affair. These meetings became worthy of memory in their grandeur and opulence, and the
conferences between the embassy and the Sultan during the 1674 to 1688/9 period were no
exception. Beyond protecting his own community and representing his nation, the English
ambassador to the Levant held the further duty of sheltering coreligionists, a task the other
European powers in the Ottoman Empire did not provide. Moreover, the ambassador was also to
act as a father to his nation, mirroring the moral patriarchy of England itself. Behavior was
regulated as stringently as trade, lest it become a disruption to the commercial enterprise, and
wickedness was to be policed. Finally, embassy officials, including the ambassador, pursued
quieter work that came to prominence in the later Stuart era under the purview of several successive
Secretaries of State for the Northern Department. Spying and intelligence gathering was a popular
pastime, scarcely mentioned in the study of the Levant Company, necessitating its inclusion in this
dissertation both for its lacking in the narrative and in its supporting the thesis that merchants were
agents of the State.
That the men studied here had multiple political, economic, and intellectual impetuses for
going abroad to the Levant, that their trade experiences and time in the Levant influenced how
they conducted business and pursued their careers upon arriving home, is somewhat self-evident.
However, to remain willfully oblivious of these merchant emissaries’ voices and activities is
myopic, a failure to explore the wider expression of State power and authority through
nontraditional venues. The cosmopolitan environment the Ottoman Empire, its religious
heterodoxy and commercial opportunity, coincided with and influenced English foreign and
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domestic politics in both subtle and obtuse ways. To continue ignoring merchants and their
embassies is a detriment to understanding later Stuart England. Those who travelled to the Ottoman
Empire often returned to London better able to afford and contribute to the various offices of the
Stuart regime and Company, blurring the line between public and private as they acted both in
their own interests and that of the State. The pursuit of profits was equally the pursuit of power.
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CHAPTER 2.

THE LEVANT COMPANY

Writing in 1622, Edward Misselden described the Levant Company in glowing
terms,
The Levant Company likewise by their trade under government, has built a great strength
of warlike, tall, and lusty shipping, which they employ in that trade. And by their industry
have won from the Italians the trade of the Levant. The commodities whereof were before
brought into this realm by Venetians to the increase of foreign shipping, and at dear rates,
is now reduced to the natives of this Kingdom, to the increase of shipping, and the benefit
of the public. Which, without government and good order, had been impossible for them
to have done. 1
His lauding of the Company, as well as the East India and French Companies in the tract, was a
celebration of the English’s ascension in the world of maritime trade. Bringing new foodstuffs and
luxury goods to the British Isles, these emerging companies existed largely thanks to the
beneficence of the reigning monarch and close ties with the government in their foundational years.
Regularly described as a boon to the public good, these companies foremost served their members
and the state officials who oversaw their expansion rather than the community, which only directly
benefited from the diversification in market goods. Nonetheless, without new commercial
enterprises, the rise of the British Naval Empire in the eighteenth century would not have come
about, as the British would have had no impetus to create the Royal Navy’s massive fleets without
mercantile interests to defend. Thus, the juggernaut that would one day rule the ocean waves arose
from the simplest of motivations: material exchange wrought by maritime trade.
This chapter seeks to outline this foundational aspect of British history by focusing on the
Levant Company. It traces the Company’s existence from inception in the Elizabethan period to
the end of the Stuart era, noting throughout its’ interdependence with the State. Before starting,
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however, it is useful to define what type of Company the Levant merchants had organized to
oversee their trading interests. During the early modern period there were two types of companies:
joint-stock and regulated ventures. The joint-stock is perhaps the most commonly known type,
with prominent examples being the Dutch East India Company and East India Company. 2 A jointstock company is one in which shareholders pooled investments, putting their capital toward the
pursuit of overseas trade. The pooling of resources to limit the risk of loss to any one individual
investor made the commercial undertakings of such an organization more tempting to those
involved. Conversely, the sharing of any monetary gains from such ventures equally diminished
the propensity for any one individual to gain a substantial profit. During the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, investors in joint-stock companies were typically aristocrats or other
merchants, with the occasional affluent gentlemen. These companies were low risk ventures and
did not demand much attention from any investor after the initial providing of investment capital.
As a result, stockholders frequently invested in numerous other companies simultaneously and
with little concern. 3
The other type of commercial organization, a regulated company, was one that operated
closer with its principles to form a monopolistic enterprise based upon a more selective core of
investors. While a joint-stock allowed anyone to easily invest, a regulated firm’s membership was
limited by its high initiation fees and its need for a more active participation than just the initial
outlaying of funds. These companies consisted primarily of merchant families, employing their
own capital for trading ventures. A regulated company operated with a license from the
government to control a certain geographic area’s trade. In addition, a corporation had limited
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registers that combined with the geographic limitations of a charter to simultaneously mitigate
competition from outsiders to a manageable, and profitable, level. Members discussed their
imports, exports, shipping, construction of warehouses, and all other facets of trade before a
member-elected General Court. In turn, this underlined the necessity of expertise and fluency in
the business of commerce from all members and their official representatives. Therefore, these
commercial networks consisted primarily of established merchant families who had dominated
trade in their respective regions for several successive generations and could offer the best insights
into the exchange of goods that the company oversaw. Simply stated, regulated companies and
their members were well established in the mercantile field and structured in a strictly hierarchical
basis, with ties to the government and merchant community that ran deep. It is to this latter type
of corporate organization that the Levant Company belonged. 4
However, even with the existence of these chartered and regulated companies, there was
outsiders who sought to trade independent of corporate fees, oversight, and limitations. Widely
disdained by all established merchants within a company, these men are collectively known as
“interlopers.” Unorganized and operating independently from one another and any companies,
interlopers assumed all the risk of overseas trade in the hope of a lucrative windfall. Unprotected
by Royal Navy escorts, they faced corsairs, hostile foreign powers such as the French and Dutch,
and even boarding and royally approved interdiction by English merchants associated with the
trading companies of the local region they transgressed in and offended. 5 Even after a successful
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voyage avoiding these dangers and arriving back in home port, these interlopers could be noted by
company customs officials who would then impose high duties on their goods, seeking to dissuade
further future ventures. Such attempts at regulation would inevitably lead to a thriving smuggling
community along the English shoreline and the occasional quiet bribe to avoid paying such duties. 6
Operating in the shadows, it is difficult to establish how problematic interloping was for the
companies or who these men were that participated in such activities. One merchant would
complain that, “while they pursue nothing but their private interest, they do cover themselves with
the mantle of pretended zeal for public liberties and rights” when caught, repeating the avowed
justification for a company’s existence back at those who sought to end these interlopers’
independent enterprises. Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely that smuggling undermined any
company’s profits to such an extent as to provide a significant drain on resources. Further, it was
ultimately these interlopers who would lead the initial push into new markets. Once established,
they often provided the founding membership of any future company, including the initial registers
of the Levant Company. 7

2.1 The Foundations of the Levant Company, 1500 – 1603

The origins of the Levant Company begin with the foundations of the Tudor monarchy
during the reign of Henry VII. It was Henry who voiced the initial interest of the Crown in
Mediterranean and Levantine trade, in particular the growing market and demand for wine in the
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early sixteenth century. Due to his interests, and his explicit as well as tacit approval of English
merchants of the period to expand into the said theaters, a minor trade war began with the other
European powers that played out predominately in the issuing and expansion of vying tariffs. In
this the English found their greatest rivals to be the Venetians, whom they were seeking to cut out
as an intermediary between themselves and the goods of the Near East. 8
This interest in the Near East would continue under Henry VIII, with trade in the
Mediterranean growing substantially in volume during his reign. In exchange for English
broadcloth, rabbit skins, gems, lead, and tin, Levant merchants began to import from the Levant
alum, aniseed, brimstone, Turkish carpets, caules, cinnamons, cotton, drugs, dyestuffs, figs, indigo,
leather, Moroccan horses, mohair yarn, nutmeg, olives, oranges, silk, and wines. Despite such a
vast offering of goods, though, it was English broadcloth that would be the mainstay of the
exchange of goods throughout the next two hundred years. Cut into two lengths, each cloth-piece
was anywhere from fifteen to thirty-two yards in size, with the shorter pieces being lower quality
fabric and dyed with cheaper pigments. Plunket, a grayish-blue color, would sell for the cheapest,
at about £7 to £10 a piece. Popinjay, a light green, fared better at £10 to £18; camel and rose at
£18 to £22; and miniver, a pure white, going for £22 to £32 along with any blacks or violets.
However, most broadcloth bound for the Ottoman Empire was dyed red, fetching £11 to £12 a
section. 9
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In exchange for this cloth, the most lucrative commodity that traders sought to import from
the Mediterranean theater were blackcurrants from Zante. 10 This foodstuff was much desired for
its flavor, as well as its use in dyes, jams, tinctures, and the production of alcohol. For the majority
of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Venetians dominated the trade for currants. Those from
the Italian city-state would throttle supply to suit demand and to raise their profits. Due to their
traditional control of the market, the currant trade would become the touchpoint of growing
Venetian disgruntlement with English merchants and their growing presence in the Mediterranean.
For example, as early as 1530 the English established a consul in Crete, and later Venice, to counter
the Italian city-state’s control of the trade and ensure that the currants continued to flow to Albion.
Going head-to-head with the growing commercialism of the English would, in time, result in the
dissolution of the Venetian commercial empire and its decline in Mediterranean trade. However,
such a result was not a foregone conclusion and one may trace the rise of the early British
commercial empire to this initial competition with the Republic of Venice. 11
Levant and Mediterranean trade continued to flourish with little incident during the reigns
of Edward VI and Mary I. In 1553, commerce between London and Constantinople had reached
such a large volume that the Turks began to take official notice. It is during this period that the
beginning of formal relations between the two powers started. Merchant Anthony Jenkinson
became the first Briton granted official recognition by the Sublime Porte with a grant to trade in
the major ports of the Ottoman Empire. This initial encounter, under the auspices of Suleiman I,
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provided the same liberties given to the French and Venetians. Specifically, it granted the English
ostensible protections of the Turkish government from depredations and personal attack. 12
In practice, these protections and guarantees by the Sultan proved empty. While safe in
Constantinople, the overseas journey to Anatolia was fraught with danger and not guaranteed the
same securities found on land. The powers of the Barbary Coast, who avowed adherence to Turkish
foreign policy and domestic politics, operated independently of the Sublime Porte. Indeed, the
states in North Africa supported their respective economies via corsairing activities that targeted
the English’s and other Europeans’ shipping counter to Turkish dictates. Differing from pirates,
corsairs received a letter of marque that allowed for a bearer to attack and capture “enemy” ships.
The exact definition of “enemy,” though, constantly shifted as Barbary states made peace or war
with European nations on a rotating basis. In exchange for their marque, a successful corsair
captain provided his crew with shares of the captured plunder and split the profits with the issuing
Barbary nation. In turn, the Barbary power would then send a portion onward as a small tribute to
the Ottoman court. However, more lucrative than cargo or the ship itself was a ship’s crew and
passengers. Ransoming off their hostages proved to be very profitable for the corsairs and Barbary
powers, and between 1575 and 1800 corsairs enslaved around 100,000 to 1,000,000 Europeans.
Between 1600 and 1640, the English lost 12,000 subjects to this ransom economy, with an
additional 6,000 lost between 1660 and 1730. In just the six years between 1681 and 1687, the
European slave population of Algiers is estimated in conservative models as between 5,000 to
17,000 slaves and, in more pessimistic models, between 30,000 to 400,000 slaves. Slavery
provided the best commodity in the Mediterranean for those who engaged in its practice. 13
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In response to such ransoming practices, a novel commercial system developed which paid
for the ransoming of Europeans held in the Al-Maghrib. The Italian city-states organized their
slave ransoming of subjects through a confraternity overseen by the Church. Such intermediate
agencies were characteristic of every nation that had contact with the Barbary powers. For their
part, the English relied on their trading companies to provide the organization necessary in
redeeming captured sailors. Like the Italians, the local Anglican church of the individual slave’s
family typically collected ransoms. Those parishes in port cities frequently carried the financial
burden the most as it was their sons and husbands who manned the ships of trade. Passed on to the
management of a trading company, it then fell to the corporation to restore captured English.
Unsurprisingly, the Muslim slavers had no qualms with taking money from these institutions,
caring little if the money came from aggrieved families, churches, companies, or an occasional
affluent aristocrat. These intermediaries streamlined the process of enslavement and ransom
payments, effectively contributing to the financing of the Barbary states and the perpetuation of
the economic status quo in the Mediterranean. Regardless of the danger of enslavement, the trade
with the clearinghouses of the Levantine theater was well worth any risk to merchants and their
agents, with slaving and ransoming practices continuing well into the nineteenth century. 14
Notwithstanding the occasional loss to corsair activity, by 1575 English merchants moved
to cement their earlier contacts with the Sublime Porte. At that time, a delegation of Levantine
merchants formed and approached Elizabeth I to confirm a bilateral communication between the
two respective sovereigns and formalize diplomatic relations even further. Initially acting
independent of Whitehall, merchants Edward Osborne and Richard Staper sent agents, Joseph
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Clements and John Wight, to the Sublime Porte requesting further trade contacts with the Turkish
government that they could then present for Elizabeth’s approval. Following this initial exchange,
Elizabeth’s court tasked factor William Harborne with finalizing any official Capitulations. 15
Harborne set out overland in July 1578 and arrived in the Murad III’s court in October of that same
year. Murad proved amenable, reissuing previously granted privileges to the English in the more
formalized manner consistent with Capitulation agreements granted to other European powers.
Elizabeth proved well pleased by this turn of events. Such a formalized relationship afforded her
a means to further press the Spanish. With Turkish and Barbary aid, Elizabeth hoped the Levantine
powers would attack Spanish ships in the Mediterranean, as well as providing a means to free
English trade in the theater from French consular oversight. For his efforts, Harborne was
appointed as the first English ambassador to the Ottoman Empire upon his return to England, and
the foundations of the Turkey Company were established. 16
From its inception, the embassy at Constantinople had a dual purpose. The ambassador was
both a royal representative, commissioned by the sovereign and charged with diplomatic duties,
and a commercial representative paid by a company of merchants, pledged to promote their
business interests, and protect their agents. In return for this arrangement, the Crown received
monetary recompense in the form of duties paid by the Turkey Company. Conversely, the
Company became the overseer of the office of the ambassador, acquiescing to royal prerogative
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when required, but otherwise left alone to finance the embassy in its early years. 17 As a beneficial
consequence of an ambassador’s dual roles, it became apparent to the ambitious merchant that
Turkish trade could also prove an entry into English politics and political circles. Indeed, the post
of ambassador quickly became reserved for the domain of merchants from gentrified status, able
to afford the pursuit of political position upon return to England after an ambassadorial tour in the
Levant. 18
Thus, by 1581, trade with the Ottoman Empire rapidly evolved into a monopolistic
enterprise under the purview of the Turkey Company and its limited pool of members. Initially,
the Company registers tallied twelve members. Of those twelve, nine shared dual membership in
the Muscovy Company, three of whom were previous governors of the Muscovy Company. These
men’s prior establishment as successful merchants were essential to early trade in the Levant.
Facing hostilities from the Spanish and Barbary powers, Levant merchants travelling to the
Ottoman Empire needed extensive protection that only the Royal Navy could provide the Company.
The ability to command the attention of the Admiralty and ensure the supply of warship escorts
required the Company to work closely with Whitehall. Such a relationship aided the Company in
gaining easy acquiescence to any requests for protection. In return, the General Court offered to
provide their own heavily armed ship when conscription into the Naval service became necessary.
For these twelve men, and subsequent members of the Company, the providence of such ships was
a non-issue. Many of the Company’s leaders and senior members were the principal ship-owners
in England. Hence, Whitehall was more than accommodating to Company requests of aid. After
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all, they were already relying on these men to provide vessels to the Admiralty when needed and
appreciated their continuing contributions to the coffers of the Privy Chamber. 19
Having enjoyed a successful start, seven years after its foundation the Turkey Company’s
first charter lapsed. Sensing opportunity, Harborne entered new negotiations with the Privy
Council and Lord High Chancellor, a process that would last for the next three years. Harborne
sought to rectify in a new charter the fact that the Turkey Company faced difficulties in maintaining
its unchallenged hold over Levant trade. In competition with the Harborne and other Levant
merchants was the Venice Company. Inconveniently for the Levant community, the Venice
Company’s own license granted privileges that overlapped with the geographic regions specified
in the Turkey Company’s charter. 20 Yet, this only proved a minor nuisance. In the summer of 1589,
the Venice Company’s charter lapsed. Shrewdly, Harborne then joined forces with his former
competitors, putting forth a joint consideration for combining the Companies. By July 1590, the
Privy Chamber surveyed merchants of both companies, seeking further information regarding
members’ respective incomes in duties, goods, routes and ports, and other sundries. Alongside this
survey, Harborne also had members note the current political situation in Europe. Specifically, that
the Turkey and Venice Companies had been frustrating peace procedures between the Turks and
Spanish for some time, tying up over 30,000 Spanish troops in the Levant. Such efforts garnered
great favor in Elizabeth’s court and smoothed the way to a new charter.
However, after putting forth a combined membership of forty merchants, the organizations’
finalized draft negotiations met with controversy as merchants outside of either Company
protested. Of greatest concern was that initial membership of the new Company consisted of
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already established members of the Turkey or Venice Company. In effect, the wider merchant
community feared that the lucrative trade in the Mediterranean remained closed to further
merchants. Finding the Crown hesitant to grant the new charter immediately due to the raised
objections, Harborne and associates were content to wait out a result. Increasing pressure, they
further threatened to leave trade altogether, withdrawing any supporting revenues they may
provide the cash-strapped government and Privy Chamber in the future. Negotiations languished
until January 1592, when all parties came to the agreement to form a new Company, the Levant
Company. The new Company would have fifty-two initial members, increased from the forty
originally proposed, to alleviate accusations of unfair monopoly by merchants outside of the
Turkey or Venice Company’s membership. In addition, membership to the Company became open
to any merchant, a further submission to anti-monopolistic feelings in English trade. However, in
practice, this opening of the rosters was still restrictive, with a substantial entrance fee of £130 in
1592. For his part, once more the post of ambassador went to Harborne, his shrewd tactics
garnering great favor to those he represented.
Trade grew during the next eight years. By 1600, as the Company sought to renew its
charter again, the Crown stipulated a further requirement for the merchant members. Specifically,
as returns had been so lucrative for those involved, the merchants had to agree to a £2,000 biannual
fee payable to the Privy Chamber in addition to any occasional duties that may arise beyond normal
customs. Facing dissolution and lacking any real reason to fight against such a demand, the
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Company agreed, funding this biannual levy by increasing fees for membership while
simultaneously seeking new members with promises of ample revenue from abroad. 21

2.2

The Jacobean and Carolean Levant Company, 1603 – 1642

With the 1603 coronation of James I, the Privy Chamber decided to increase the tariffs and
taxes of the Company once again. As a result, the Company raised the entrance fees charged to
secure an individual’s bid for the ambassadorship. Initially, as in the past, these new levies proved
to be a nonissue. Yet, while no longer facing the threat of Spanish attacks due to the ending of the
Anglo-Spanish War in 1604 and the signing of Treaty of London, merchants soon found that they
still faced the threat of corsairs in the Mediterranean. With the withdrawal of so many military
vessels from the Mediterranean as Europe entered a status quo ante bellum, corsair activity
dramatically expanded in the vacuum left behind. The increase in taxes and tariffs stressed the
Company’s finances more than they had ever faced before. In addition, trade revenues declined as
corsairing increased in the theater. By 1616, the Barbary powers had seized over four hundred
English vessels. The port of Plymouth alone lost over a thousand sailors and merchants. The
Company pleaded with the Court and Admiralty for assistance, but the Crown seemingly turned a
deaf ear and left the Company to their own devices in restoring captives. Moreover, the Treaty of
London alienated the Sublime Porte, which continued its war against the Spanish until 1606. The
Turks voraciously complained that the English were ignoring their previous ministrations put forth

21
Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, 63-65; Epstein, Early History, 25-30; Wood, A History, 18. Interestingly, this
new charter extended the area of the Company's monopoly “by land, through the countries of the said grand signior
into and from the East India lately discovered.” Thus, eight years before the foundation of the East India Company,
the Levant merchants linked India and the Spice Islands by commercial claims. The Levant merchants would never
forget this when, in 1600, the East India Company was chartered. The two Companies would become dire rivals over
the centuries, arguing over resources, funds, and allocations of manpower in the subsequent centuries.

38
by the English ambassador in 1603 for joining the English in the war. As a result, the Sublime
Porte restricted trade with the English and implicitly encouraged corsairs, much to the delight of
the Dutch and French. 22
Complicating matters further, the position of ambassador was soon closed to the ranks of
merchants in favor of special consuls and appointed ambassadors negotiated with the Privy
Council’s input. Frustrated at losing their power to decide on representation in the theater, the
Company threatened to stop paying their biannual fees to the Crown. Nonplussed, James I rebuffed
the Company by asserting he would allow their charter to lapse in 1605. Concurrently, he also
expressed his lack of interest in maintaining international diplomatic relations with the Turks or
supporting merchants who were not willing to finance the English State. To underline his threat,
James temporarily farmed the Company’s duties to the Earl of Suffolk. Suffolk guaranteed the
Crown an annum of £5,500 for the honor of overseeing customs. Forced by this turn of events, the
members of the Company returned to the negotiating table with James. They agreed to match
Suffolk’s annum as well as generalize the wording of the charter to a more egalitarian model. Such
new language not only allowed for ambassadors who did not come from Company registers, but
also grew the membership of the Company further. The General Court hoped that the increased
admittance fee for new members of £200 would offset the new annum that replaced the cheaper
biannual fee. Thus cowed, the Crown awarded the Company’s acquiescence with a new charter,
asserting that the Company was “to uphold and maintain the trade and traffic of Our kingdoms for
the increase of Our navigation and the benefit of Our subjects.” Furthermore, the new charter noted
that the Crown, and not the Company, reserved the right to approve the appointment of an
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Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, who “had duties in the field of politics as well as in that of
commerce.” This charter would stand, with few revisions, until the early nineteenth century. 23
Despite these setbacks, the Company quickly recovered. In 1617, it imported £180,000 of
goods, mounting to £250,000 worth of imports by 1626. Likewise, with the increased income
provided by the new charter and the Company’s docility, James helped Levant merchant members
by having the last loophole closed which was allowing non-members to pursue Turkish trade. The
Merchant Adventurers, a Levant Company competitor that predated the Company’s foundations,
was still actively trading in the Mediterranean via proxies. These proxies were foreign-born
merchants, plying their craft with ships not of English origin, who had set up distribution centers
in northern European ports. The Adventurers would then send out these non-English ships and
merchants to these ports, ostensibly picking up goods that the Adventurers already owned. With
James decree that only English ships could carry imports to England, the Adventurers were finally
crippled beyond recovery. The Levant Company became the only trade organization working in
the ports of the Mediterranean and Levant. 24
With the death of James I in 1625, the Company’s meteoric halcyon days continued
unabated during Charles I’s early reign. Guaranteeing its unchallenged ascendency among
domestically-based traders was the Crown’s blessings to add more customs officials to the houses
of England. These officials enabled the Company to further curtail interlopers and encourage the
collection of duties more assiduously. Reassured of their good domestic standing, the General
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Court began to employ the sheer industry of textile production available in the British Isles to drive
out European competitors in the Levant by flooding the theater with as much cloth as possible.
The Dutch, then the Company’s only viable rival in the Mediterranean, found their trade quickly
diminished despite their ability to float an equally efficient maritime fleet. 25 With the textile
manufacturers behind them, the Levant Company easily out-produced and out-traded the better
organized Dutch by a three-to-one margin. Moreover, as the Dutch focused their efforts on their
foothold in the port of Smyrna, the English diversified into the major bazaars of Aleppo,
Constantinople, and Smyrna to further control the market. 26 Their other major competitor, the
Venetians, were also finding continuing trade with the Sublime Porte was difficult when faced
with the growth of Levant Company oversight in the region. Actively undercut on the price of their
goods, the Venetians could not absorb the losses at the same rate as the English could with their
zealous overproduction of cloth. Realizing this threat, the Venetians began to take an even more
active concern regarding English trade practices. The Italians began to lobby Parliament, Whitehall,
and even local English consuls in the Mediterranean for better standing in the face of the increased
production of English broadcloth. Regardless of their efforts, the Venetians too were worn down
to the status of a minor player in the marketplaces of Anatolia given enough time. 27 As a result, of
these labors, Levantine trade accounted for over one-third of London’s imports in the 1630s. One
contemporary described the Company as, “the most flourishing and most beneficial company to
the commonwealth of any in England.” 28 Indeed, in 1640 alone, it was exporting over £175,000
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of cloth and importing 48,743 pounds of currants, dominating the Levant and Mediterranean
market with no end in sight for ambitious traders striking it rich. 29
Yet, despite these increased fortunes and the sharing of profits, the Company’s relationship
with Whitehall began to deteriorate during Charles’s late reign. As noted, under the original charter
the responsibilities of an ambassador were left somewhat anomalous. The ambassador was to
receive his salary from the Company, encouraged to promote trade before diplomacy. However,
because of his corporate and not royal pay status, other nations’ ambassadors and the Sublime
Porte thought less of the English. This placed the ambassador at a distinct disadvantage in pursuing
his diplomatic obligations when charged by Whitehall to act. Furthermore, as the Levant Company
charter stated that the appointment of an ambassador rested on the recommendation of the
Company and the approval of the sovereign, his diplomatic efforts were further undermined. The
splitting of his preconceived loyalties created an ongoing point of contention between the
Company and Whitehall. Growing tired of these issues and disregarding the charter, Charles in
1628 began to assert his royal prerogative more forcefully over the Company. He plainly requested
that the Company choose Sir Thomas Philipps to replace Sir Thomas Roe as ambassador. 30 After
some resistance, the Company agreed, rationalizing that it was easier to go along with the Crown’s
wishes as it shared a common interest of profitability with the Company, rather than fight back on
the premise of the previously agreed charter and potentially upsetting future dealings with the
Privy Chamber. Unfortunately, their decision to submit to this request set a precedence they would
later regret.
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Nonetheless, fortunes for the members of the Company swelled alongside the corporation’s
coffers. Such prominent figures in domestic politics and international trade as Sir Maurice Abbot,
MP and Lord Mayor of London in 1638; Sir Henry Garraway, Lord Mayor of London in 1639 and
Master of the Drapers Company; Sir Hugh Hamersley, Lord Mayor of London in 1627, Governor
of the Levant Company and Russia Company, and President of the Honorable Artillery Company;
and Sir Paul Pindar, renowned as a barrister and educator; among others, became quite rich thanks
to Levant commerce and turned their incomes toward providing Charles any fiscal allowances
when he asked. However, by 1640, Charles went further than overriding the Company’s privilege
to appoint their own officers. He demanded that the Company grant him additional funds beyond
the agreed annum and the infrequent generosity of individual members, going as far as
appropriating funds without asking the merchants’ consent. 31 Such actions only alienated the wider
merchant community, turning opinion against the Crown and providing an early basis for
criticisms against the regime during the tumultuous years of the Civil Wars.

2.3

English Civil Wars and Interregnum Levant Company

With the outbreak of the war in 1642, the Company faced a bleak future while Whitehall
and Westminster directed all their efforts toward their conflict with one another. The Company
was at first an ostensible supporter of the Crown, but quietly hedged bets on both sides of the
struggle by remaining officially noncommittal. Indeed, as events began to progress against the
interests of the Stuarts, it is with little surprise that the Company provided a loan to Parliament in
1643 for £8,000 in support of their ongoing conflict with the Crown. As royalist losses mounted,
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particularly after the defeat at Nantwich in January 1644, the Company escalated its courting of
Parliamentarians. Seeking to win favor, the General Court appointed Isaac Pennington, an avowed
Puritan and former Lord Mayor of London, to the position of Company governor in February 1644.
That March, the General Court then entered a dialogue with Parliament. They sought reassurances
that the privileges granted to the Company by its charter with the Crown would continue under a
new government overseen primarily from Westminster. However, seeking to maintain a via media
between appeasing the Crown’s prerogative in Company affairs and the reality of Parliamentary
ascension kept the Levant merchants on edge. All the while, trade suffered as political survival
took center stage. 32
Beyond these domestic concerns, the Civil Wars opened the Company up to external
pressures as well. Having lost the support of the Royal Navy, the Admiralty distracted with
pursuing Parliament’s war in the Atlantic and unconcerned with guarding overseas commerce,
losses to Barbary corsairing escalated to horrific magnitudes. Corsairing proved such a concern
that in 1654, Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell would dispatch official correspondence to the
Sublime Porte. In his epistle, he threatened the Sultan that “the seizing of any English vessel
whatsoever,” whether by Turks or Barbary corsairs, as well as “any obstructing, or interposing any
English man whatsoever, in their free trade and commerce” would result in the “pain of death.”
The Sultan’s response to this letter is unknown, although it probably was ignored or waylaid before
rising beyond a middling Turkish official. 33
And, while not only threatened by corsairs, Levant commerce was also under attack by
French privateers during this tumultuous time. In December 1649, the French had sunk eight
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Company ships, sinking another twenty ships in 1650, and an additional twenty-one ships in 1652.
In total, these vessels’ sinking, not including their cargo or crews, cost the Company a reported
£1,458,000. One contemporary in England stated that losses were so great that, “none goes for the
Straits [of Gibraltar] as formerly because the French take many of our ships, so that there were
never so many designs for Bilbao as now.” 34 Seeking retribution, the Commonwealth itself
authorized privateering against the French and banned the import of French goods – much too late
to do the Company any good. With the mercantile fleet in disarray, communication to and from
the Levant all but ceased. The lack of shipping meant that no new funds came into the Levant,
forcing merchants in the factories of the Ottoman Empire to borrow sums from local moneylenders
at exorbitant interest rates. As a result, the factory of Smyrna ceased to collect consulage fees and
reported $50,000 of debt in February 1650, moving the factory’s books to Constantinople and
closing the warehouses and customs in Smyrna temporarily. 35 Seeking aid from Parliament,
representatives for the merchants asserted that financial losses during the Interregnum were “so
great” that they were “almost a total declination in our trade.” Indeed, the Company had become
so desperate that it sold off its jewels of office for the pittance of £76. 36
Yet, the Civil Wars were not entirely catastrophic for the merchants or the Company as it
would first seem. In 1646, Levant merchants succeeded in once more establishing their own voice
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in Company affairs by appointing their own ambassador. Needing to replace Sir Sackville Crowe
as ambassador to the Sublime Porte due to his ignoring of Company orders, as well as hearing of
vociferous complaints from Levant merchants regarding seized goods and other abuses by Crowe,
the General Court created a short list of potential replacements that included Sir Thomas Bendish.
However, their attempts at replacing Crowe with Bendish proved initially problematic. When the
Company extended its suggestions of a new ambassador for approval by the King and Parliament,
those in the Long Parliament took issue with Bendish’s earlier declared royalist sympathies.
Moreover, as Charles refused to confer a royal appointment to anyone elected by the rebellious
MPs, the appointment of Bendish stalled. While waiting for a confirmation that issued his recall,
Crowe continued to operate on his own initiative in the Levant, seeking his own profit and ignoring
that of the men he represented. As Crowe’s seizure of goods and funds of other English merchants
became increasingly bold, diminishing any potential revenues from the Levant, Bendish’s former
expressions of royalist sympathies seemed the lesser of evils to MPs. Hearing of the chance that
he may be awarded the position, Bendish immediately distanced himself further from his former
royalist statements, enough to assuage Parliament, but not as far as to alienate the Crown. As a
result, MPs tentatively complied with Charles I’s wishes for a candidate he viewed as acceptable,
the continuing disruption to trade and its revenues proving a powerful catalyst to all involved. The
subsequent approval of Bendish as the ambassador by the Company, Westminster, and Whitehall,
though, proved yet another erosion of royal prerogative and power over the Company in a period
of Stuart decline. 37
Nevertheless, Crowe did not abdicate his position willingly when his formal recall orders
arrived in the Levant. He launched a public relations campaign in pamphlets throughout London
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that vehemently protested Bendish and the Company, justifying his actions in the Levant as
necessary to funding the embassy and not grounds for his dismissal. In response, the Company,
through proxies, responded to Crowe’s assertions of unfair treatment by the General Court.
Published anonymously in 1646, Subtlety and Cruelty criticized Crowe’s impounding of English
ships in the Levant as justified by “false pretenses” while he “was obliged both in conscience and
in covenant to protect the Nation, and advance their trade.” The pamphlet continued, discrediting
his claim that the Levant Company had unfairly seized his English estates because of his actions,
stating that such a move had never taken place. As such, Crowe was independently defaming the
Company, ignoring both Parliament and the King, and was acting only in a selfish interest contrary
to the public good. 38
Upon Bendish’s arrival in Constantinople later that year, Crowe immediately sought to
undermine his replacement’s embassy. Claiming the documents that Bendish possessed from
Charles were invalid and coerced, Crowe was successful in his endeavors for a limited time.
Turkish officials, an established representative of known quality, preferring sided with him
temporarily. Yet, this did not dissuade Bendish. The new ambassador immediately contacted the
Grand Vizier directly rather than first seeking further guidance from home. The Turks, agreeing
that commerce was suffering for both their nations’ interests, interceded on Bendish’s behalf as
Crowe was only proving to be a further obstruction to mutual profitability. In November 1647, a
group of janissaries acting on the Grand Vizier’s orders seized Crowe and Sir Henry Hyde, his
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personal agent and crony, placing both men on an English ship bound for Portsmouth, effectively
expelling them, and giving Bendish the embassy. 39
Crowe and Hyde arrived home in England with little fanfare, but with a great disdain for
those they viewed had wronged them. Thus, due to their efforts the debacle surrounding Crowe
and his expulsion from the Levant became more public and added to the Company’s woes. For his
part, Bendish felt the need to explain his own role in the affair. Employing similar rhetoric to
Subtlety and Cruelty, he published his own pamphlet in 1648 to court the English public and those
in power. Bendish denigrated Crowe, asserting his predecessor’s behavior was a “deviation from
that special trust which was reposed in him” for the “protection and advantage” of the English in
the Levant. Moreover, Bendish condemned Crowe’s slandering description of those who issued
his recall as “rebels.” Instead, the men who ordered the erstwhile ambassador’s return are best
described as “the King terms them… His subjects and merchants.” Crowe and Hyde, Bendish
concluded, were only cantankerous individuals, greedy beyond all measure, and unworthy of the
status afforded to those who truly served the public. 40
With his ongoing public appeals not resulting in any foreseeable change in his status,
Crowe attempted to further fight his removal as ambassador and Bendish’s appointment in a more
direct manner. To that end, he lent support to Sir Henry Hyde’s own short-lived bid to usurp the
ambassadorship with documents signed by Charles in 1648, but not endorsed by the Company or
Parliament. Armed with the papers, Hyde returned to the Levant to claim the ambassadorship for
himself. Bendish, with the support of the nationals he protected and the Turks who recalled Hyde’s
aid in supporting Crowe’s tyranny, organized an immediate resistance to the claim. However, with
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the deposition and execution of Sultan Ibrahim in 1648, the resulting regime change in the Ottoman
Empire and subsequent chaos allowed the disagreement among the English factors to erupt into an
even more costly and embarrassing episode. Open violence quickly erupted between Hyde’s
supporters in Smyrna and Bendish’s in Constantinople, splitting the English nation in the Levant.
Eventually, after a daring raid in which Bendish’s agents and janissaries, finally able to offer
organizational aid and manpower with the establishment of the new Turkish government,
successfully seized Hyde, they expelled Crowe’s agent to London once more. Upon arriving in the
British Isles, Hyde was immediately detained and imprisoned for treason. After a short trial,
Parliament had the agitator executed by hanging on 4 March 1651. To the end, Crowe’s confidant
and crony affirmed that he was a loyal citizen and had attempted to protect trade in the Levant, not
disrupt it. 41
Parallel to Hyde’s efforts, Crowe published a final anonymous pamphlet in 1650. In it, he
justified his actions in the Levant through a claim of authority as granted within his royal
appointment as ambassador. The pamphlet stated that he “might justify the imprisonment of any
English man under the charge, or the sequestration of any of theirs’, or their factors’ estates, on a
lawful occasion.” Therefore, the impounding of merchant ships was in line with his rights as an
ambassador, his deposition and expulsion an illegal action. Consequently, “the Company’s
resistance, in such case, was not only unlawful, but destructive to government itself.” His
confiscation of merchants’ ships, notwithstanding his argument, remained a significant problem to
those in the Company’s General Court and the government. Any impounded ship was a major
disruption to trade. It made adherence to a time-table impossible, risking perishable goods and
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cascading into further delays in serial contracts. Thus, despite Crowe’s justifications, he had hurt
the coffers of both the State and the Company. In addition, the hypocrisy of his position was
apparent: defending his claim to his position on legal precedence, he must also obey his legal recall
order, whatever the rationale given for it. His public relations campaign was ultimately to no avail,
Hyde had been expulsed and executed, and Crowe only continued to incense those in power by
further public outbursts. His career never recovered, trade in the Mediterranean resumed as best as
it could without him. 42
Even so, successfully weathering Crowe’s criticism and Hyde’s attempted usurpation,
Bendish was eventually forced to raise funds for his own embassy through similar means as Crowe.
As a result, Levant merchants once again voiced their concerns with officials in London. With
promptness, the Company recalled Bendish in 1655, the Company fearful of a repeat of the
previous strife. Bendish’s recall ended a period of embarrassing intrigue and failures for the
Company. In total, the Bendish-Crowe and Bendish-Hyde affairs had cost the Company
approximately £100,000 and an unquantifiable loss of standing with those in Whitehall and
Westminster when considering the Company’s ability to manage its own affairs. In addition,
embarrassingly, never had the Company’s affairs been so publicly aired before these incidents.
Nonetheless, despite these setbacks in trade – from infighting, the Civil Wars, or the international
conflicts Cromwell pursued – the Company was posed for a massive recovery with the return of
Stuart rule in 1660. 43
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2.4

The Restoration and Revolution Levant Company

The Levant Company charter was renewed once more in 1661, the first time it had been
evaluated since the reign of James I. The new charter changed little, but it did continue a trend
toward making the Company membership more elite while concurrently addressing concerns that
had arisen during the previous decades’ conflicts. Specifically, it added a clause that forbade all
persons, other than noblemen and gentry “of quality” who resided in the corporation of London,
to be admitted to the membership unless they became freeman of the City. Moreover, the new
charter asserted that the Company would manage jurisdictional matters in the Levant regarding
merchant disputes and transgressions, rather than Turkish or common-law courts in England.
Refusal to follow these Company courts’ orders and judgments would result in expulsion for the
contravening merchant, a swift trip back to London, followed by punishments ranging from fees
to revocation of membership. 44 Furthermore, customs agents were to pursue their occupation once
again, allowed back into the customhouses of London for the first time since the beginning of the
Interregnum. Finally, the 1661 charter required an oath affirming that all goods and consignments
would not be misrepresented on shipping or warehouse inventories and that a doubling of duties
could be imposed on foreigners trading under the Company’s purview. Failure to take the oath or
violating the oath resulted in potential denial of future trade and forfeiture of twenty percent of the
value of goods seized from violators.
Initially, merchants met the oath with some hesitation. In Smyrna, merchants discussed the
pledge openly, asking for clarification from officials before subscribing. Conversely, Aleppo
factors willingly accepted the new terms, without any quibbling. With these changes, the vetting
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process of future Company required potential officers to have served in the Company for the last
year, continuously, before appointment. However, the short-lived return of Company control of
the ambassadorship was quickly overruled in practice, with royal prerogative taking precedence
and the required year of service being waived when necessary. This setback led to much
consternation among Company officials, who criticized the override of their authority with great
vehemence and candor. Notwithstanding this minor squabble, Levantine trade began to recover
from the depression of the past two decades, returning to its previous volumes and beyond. 45
The Navigation Acts of 1651 and 1660 further helped the return of trade, as well as the
successful prosecution of the First Anglo-Dutch War. Due to the war, the Dutch turned their
commercial efforts to the East Indies, where they faced little competition and threat from other
European powers, particularly the English. Indeed, in 1666 the Dutch consul permanently left
Aleppo, with English agents estimating Dutch trade was over fifty percent diminished when
compared to the preceding twenty years. To discourage a return of competition based in the United
Provinces, the English opted to initiate a new, constrictive tariff simultaneous to the Dutch
departing from the theater. Moreover, with the loss of the First Anglo-Dutch War, the costs of the
Third Anglo-Dutch War coupled with the Franco-Dutch War of 1672 to 1678, the Dutch found
that most of their maritime fleet was destroyed, the English’s ascendant position in Old World
trade proving insurmountable. 46
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Within the Ottoman Empire itself, the Restoration ensured the stabilization of affairs for
the English factories. With the death of Ambassador Sir Daniel Harvey in 1672, and the
appointment of Sir John Finch, his first cousin, in November 1672, the Levant Company entered
a hitherto unseen period of expansion and profit. Finch proved to be a virtuoso, a man of society
and science. As an anatomist, he possessed sufficient skill to teach the subject at both the
University of Padua and at the Accademia del Cimento in Florence, serving concurrently as the
English Resident there prior to his arrival in Constantinople. Finch came from an extensive and
powerful clan, his network of friends and kin populating the halls of Westminster, Whitehall, and
the Royal Society. He was the brother of the philosopher Anne Conway; the younger brother of
the first Earl of Nottingham and Lord Chancellor Heneage Finch; a colleague and contributor to
the work of the scientist Robert Boyle; and the former pupil of Cambridge Platonist, Henry More.
In his journeys, both in Italy and the Levant, fellow Cambridge graduate and anatomist Sir Thomas
Baines always accompanied Finch. Baines and Finch were lifelong companions, eventually buried
together at their request in Christ’s College under a joint ledger that reads in the artistic vocabulary
of a marriage monument. 47
When it came time in 1675 for the English to renew their Capitulations with the Grand
Signior, the English, and by proxy Finch, stood ready. 48 With an amicable Grand Vizier in power
and the English positioned as the foremost commercial power in the Levant, Finch could win
concessions in the Capitulations to impressive acclaim. In short, notable highlights of the
Capitulations were its successful ending a three percent duty on imports and exports at Aleppo and
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Smyrna, giving the English a further edge over Dutch, Venetian, and French rivals. Further, it
established a uniform anchorage fee for all English ships in port in the Ottoman Empire. The
Capitulations also permitted Christian witnesses in Ottoman court cases against Muslims and
renegade Christians. Finally, it expanded the protections for the English against extortion when
litigating cases in Turkish courts. Yet, the situation did not last, the appointment of a new Grand
Vizier in 1680 proving a portent of the future for the English. At the direction of the Sublime Porte,
the Capitulations were temporarily rescinded and Finch became embroiled in a local political
dispute. Wrongfully accused of bribery by a group of English merchants and Turks, Finch
appeared before an Turkish magistrate. After protracted negotiations with the Grand Vizier, the
Turkish court agreed to drop the charge of bribery and the Sultan enforced the English
Capitulations once more. 49
After the Finch embassy, commerce in the Levant began to slow down. With the Treaties
of Nijmegen ending hostilities between France and the United Provinces, both powers began to
rebuild their maritime trade again. Subsequently, the period of relative unopposed trade for the
Levant Company began to end in the years preceding the Glorious Revolution, the Dutch
reestablishing themselves in the Levant and the French increasing their own presence in the area.
Seeking to explain the increasing trade deficits, Company officials and merchants moved to place
blame on their domestic rival, the East India Company. Joining the Company merchants in this
endeavor was parliamentary Whigs. The Whigs viewed the East India Company as a dependent of
the Crown and a continuation of royal prerogative in a time of growing opposition to the Stuarts’
political authority and prerogative. Thus, this impromptu alliance between Company officials and
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the Whig party resulted in a series of complaints and defenses presented in both Parliament and
the Privy Chamber, with the coinciding publication of accounts in the pamphlet presses. Ultimately,
the Company’s attempts to curtail their rivals in the East India Company met with little sympathy
or lasting result. Both Parliament and the Privy Chamber concluded that the East India Company
had the right to trade in Persian silks, even if that trade was encroaching on the Levant Company
charter, the coffers of State surpassing the concerns and complaints of its agents. 50
Still thriving, if not growing, the beginning of the 1690s proved to be another taxing period
for the Levant Company. With the Nine Years’ War starting immediately after the 1688/9 Glorious
Revolution, merchants in the Mediterranean once more faced the threat of piracy and attack from
European powers. French privateering returned, with the French fleets at Toulon and Brest
providing the greatest threat. As a result, maritime commerce required naval escorts. The
formation of convoys through the Mediterranean, though, remained dependent on the Admiralty’s
schedules and ability to provide warships. Yet, the Admiralty was not accommodating to the
merchants’ needs, as the defense of supplies to and from the United Provinces became essential to
the war effort and trade only a secondary concern. In the first year of the war, no English convoys
through the Mediterranean to the Ottoman Empire took place. Commerce in 1690 was slightly
more successful, with the English only able to trade around 30,000 textiles, the average volume of
the previous three years combined, before the Battle of Beachy Head ended even these middling
efforts.
Trade once again resumed with some volume after the Battle of La Hogue in 1692, as the
French fleet no long proved a threat to commerce in the English Channel. The absence of French
warships, however, was short-lived. The destruction or capture of one hundred merchantmen and
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the sinking of two Dutch ships-of-the-line at the Bay of Lagos in 1693 was an enormous setback
for the Allied forces and the merchants seeking the wealth of the Near East. Indeed, total vessels
lost at the battle cost over £4,000,000, with the Levant Company down over £600,000 in ships
during the costly exchange. Exacerbating the losses in shipping, the renewal of the East India
Company’s charter in the same year was another determent to the Levant merchants. The new
charter for the East India Company stipulated that the India-bound merchants, under the purview
of their Company, must export £100,000 of cloth annually. Joshiah Child, then Governor of the
East India Company, publicly argued that Levant Company objections arising from this clause in
the charter were nonsensical. In a widely circulated pamphlet, he quipped, “The truth of the case
at bottom is but this, the importation of better and cheaper raw silk from India may probably touch
some Turkey merchants’ profits at present, though it does benefit the kingdom and not hinder the
exportation of cloth. What then? Must one trade be interrupted because it works upon another?”
Consequently, India-bound merchants began to flood the markets of Asia with English broadcloth,
undermining a need for cloth in the Levant. Further, in their trade, East India merchants
commenced to corner Silk Road trade goods before they could reach Smyrna for redistribution
back to England by Levant Company members. As a long-term result, the East India Company
staunched trade in the Levant by diminishing goods traveling from Asia to the Ottoman Empire
and cementing their own position as the primary and most profitable trading company of
England. 51
Compounding these losses further for the Levant Company, in 1694 an attempt to send a
sizeable Levantine trade convoy failed when caught in a storm off the coast of Spain, damaging
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the ships and forcing the surviving vessels to port. Affairs slightly improved for trade in 1695,
with the successful sending of two convoys of merchantmen to the Levant under the renewed
auspices of Admiralty protection. However, once again, this protection was recalled in 1696 when
the assassination plot of George Barclay and Sir John Fenwich became known, and panic grew in
England over a potential French invasion. Interestingly, it was former Levantine Ambassador
William Trumbull who unmasked the Jacobite conspiracy, acting on rumors he had gathered from
informants during his tenure as Secretary of State for the Northern Department. The plan was
simple, in that the Jacobites were to ambush William III on his way home from his habitual weekly
hunt in the woods. However, the primary conspirators appeared at the prearranged rendezvous on
separate days. Hence, the plan proved unfeasible as they lost their nerve and were caught by state
security apparatuses.
Summarily, by 1697 and the end of the Nine Years’ War with the Treaty of Ryswick, the
Company was not in good shape. Recovery was slow coming, as the replacement of ships
happened slowly and commercial networks tediously reestablished. Domestically, the 1688/9
Revolution resulted in the Company losing any remaining voice in influencing the choice of an
ambassador. As international politics became more important to the Crown, William III took it
upon himself to nominate and appoint his own ambassadors without any input on the qualifications,
or lack thereof, from the Company. Responding to this, the Company would begrudgingly comply
with royal authority. However, the General Court begin to limit the ambassador’s allowance from
10,000 pieces of eight to 8,000 pieces of eight, with a later switching of currency to the less pure
Dutch leeuwendaalder, effectively cutting this allowance’s value by another third. To make up
this shortfall, ambassadors began to explore other potential sources of revenue. Ambassadors
redressed their funding issues by trading in jewels, engaging in currency speculation, and selling
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the duty-free wine provided to the embassy. 52 Alongside domestic losses in oversight and
diminished revenues, the French took advantage of the English retreat in the Ottoman Empire.
French ambassadors began to establish stronger relations with the Sublime Porte, fostering a
renewal of trade unseen in the past and providing the dawning of foreign competition on a level
unseen since the earlier part of the century. 53

2.5

The Eighteenth Century

The Levant Company maintained a moderate trade with the Turks throughout the early
eighteenth century, with the 1661 Charter serving as the Company’s basis for the entirety of the
century. Nonetheless, the Company’s existence came increasingly under attack by those opposed
to monopolies, prompting a public relations campaign to address growing concerns over this
unpopular commercial arrangement. 54 Company representatives released various broadsides, such
as that written in 1720 that defended the merchants of the Company as, “honest men trading fair
and above board under the favor and protection of a government that abhors monopolizing.”55
Even so, by the 1730s trade returns, and thus membership, began to decline. Company registers
dropped from the heady days of the 1670s to just under ninety members, with only forty-two
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Levantine factors actively engaging in international commerce in 1734. Come 1754, membership
was less than forty merchants actively trading. In addition, the Company’s charter was revised to
officially end its monopoly over trade. Accordingly, to boost its registers, officials decided to do
away with a clause stipulating that only citizens of London may join its merchant ranks. 56 Any
citizen of the United Kingdom who could afford the substantially lowered £20 fee was now
enrollable. As a result, new member enrollment boomed, growing to eight hundred individuals by
1815. Yet, very few of these new enrollees participated directly in Levantine trade, their
intermediaries and agents remained undocumented by official registers. Complaining about such
lackluster returns, Company secretary Henry Lidell lamented the proliferative growth of the
Company’s rolls. As the register expanded, he could not keep track of all members’ residences,
unable to contact them regarding unpaid duties or statuses of ongoing ventures. 57
Despite the economic downturn, the General Court of the Company decided to expand the
number of consulships. In particular, Cyprus was pursued as a possibly lucrative and new area for
the trading of broadcloth for currants and other goods. Thus, in 1722, the consul and factors of
Aleppo were directed to establish and support, by all means necessary, a new posting on the
island. 58 By 1758, and again in 1769, further factories were established at Acre, Beirut, Jaffa,
Lattakia, Thessaly, Iskenderun, and Tripoli. 59 However, Company revenue continued to decline to
a relative pittance, down from £290,000 in 1714 to £88,000 in 1783. Simultaneous to this period,
the factory of Smyrna burned to the ground, all warehouses and goods lost, the infrastructure of
commerce destroyed in this essential market. 60 Caught in a reactionary cycle that moved from
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disaster to disaster, the General Court intervened again, opting to change a bylaw which prohibited
the use of gold bullion in the Levant for purchasing goods. This archaic stipulation, originally
created to keep gold in England and prevent the debasing of bullion in the Levant, worked to the
detriment of those trading in the Ottoman Empire. While the English had maintained such practices,
the French, Dutch, and Venetians had long abandoned such limitations by 1791 and the Company’s
decision to join the wider merchant community in this regard. 61
Beyond membership declines and growing deficits, the State also began to hinder the
Company, changing its relationship with the institution and intervening more forcefully into its
governance by century’s end. Prompted by the growing public and private disenfranchisement
with perceived, Whitehall and Westminster increasingly sought to intercede in all English
corporations and their respective affairs. Famed economist Adam Smith, sensing the growing
disillusionment with past economic models, actively criticized the Levant Company as one such
institution of ongoing monopolistic tendencies, bringing further governmental attention to the
besieged Levantine merchants. 62 As governmental favor waned, for the first time in Company
history, Westminster and Whitehall began to detain entire flotillas departing from the Levant in
the 1720s. Ostensibly, these detainments were undertaken as quarantines to counter the outbreak
of plague in the Ottoman Empire. However, such epidemics were nothing new in the commercial
theater, the Company allowed in the past to direct the movement of its ships dependent on their
captains and consuls, free of government oversight. Understandably, the Company vehemently
complained to Parliament for the costs associated in performing such restrictive actions. The
General Court bemoaned not only the trade lost, but also the compensation of inspectors,
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merchants, crews, and others associated with the procedures of quarantine. 63 These protests
remained ignored. Seizing a moment in 1790, members of Parliament further moved against the
Company, finding fault with the Company’s decision to increase in duties on Turkish cotton.
Roundly condemning the move as overly burdensome, Westminster pressured the General Court
to such an extent it surrendered near immediately to Parliament’s demands. Tariffs on cotton were
quickly adjusted to an exceedingly lesser rate than that previously collected. 64 Nonetheless, the
damage was done, as the public fiasco gave further ammunition to detractors, including the East
India Company, which had come to juxtaposition itself as a better model for mercantile activities
by publicly criticizing the Levant Company for being inefficiently managed a monopolistic
corporation. To point, the East India Company promoted a narrative that envisioned itself as
forward thinking, with open registers, willing to pursue risky ventures, gather new commodities,
and sell in new markets that its regulated competitor avoided. With its de jure monopoly no longer
valid and lacking a substantial income, the Company was taken over completely by the government
in 1821, its 1661 Charter finally discontinued. Deeply in debt and antiquated in both its
organization and initial purpose, it was dissolved in 1825. The era of the great trading companies
would not live through the end of the century. 65

63

Anonymous, The Case of the Levant Company, in Relation to the Bill Now Depending before This Honourable
House, for Performing Quarentine (London, 1721), 1-2; John Baskett, By the King, a Proclamation Requiring
Quarentine to Be Performed by All Ships and Vessels Coming from the Levant, the Isles of the Archipelago, Zant,
Corfu, Veniza, Cephalonia, St. Mauro, or Any of the Adjacent Islands, or Any of the Ports or Places of Morea (London,
1728), 1.
64
Allan Cunningham, in Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution, Collected Essays, ed. Edward Ingram
(London: 1993), 70-72.
65
Wood, A History, 126-27, 40-41; Davis, Aleppo and Devonshire, 61; Walsh, Account of the Levant Company, 216.

61
2.6

Conclusion

Beginning in the Elizabethan era, flourishing in the seventeenth century, and surviving
through the eighteenth century, the Levant Company served as major player in the early formation
of English State power and the dawn of its maritime commercial empire. As this chapter has
established, from its very inception the Company acted as an apparatus of the State, its fortunes
tied to the kind allowances of those in Whitehall and Westminster. Taking the simple English
broadcloth and exporting it throughout the Mediterranean world, the Company could reap massive
profits and import popular goods from throughout the Orient, establishing a taste for Asian goods
that drove the later East India Company to pursue trade in the Indian Ocean that would cut off its
erstwhile rival. The Company’s decline and demise during the eighteenth and early nineteenth
century was not a foregone conclusion, but a fight for English ascendency in the Mediterranean
that pitted the Company against its domestic competitors and foreign powers. The Company
survived the tumultuous years of the Interregnum, bringing profit for Cromwell as surely as it did
for the restored Stuart monarchy after. Fighting, both literally and figuratively, against the French
and Dutch, the Company’s success would be one of the reasons European powers turned their eyes
to the Atlantic, seeking new goods and untapped potential. Not simply a facet of trade history, the
Company provides a vehicle in which to explore the dynamic cultural exchanges taking place in
the Mediterranean between all concerned powers, Western European and Turkish, Christian and
Muslim. Though far removed from the confines of London, the enterprises that the English partook
in Constantinople, Smyrna, and Aleppo had very real ramifications for the entirety of the nation.
It is through these Levantine emissaries a new means of looking at diplomatic and political history
may be provided.
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CHAPTER 3.

THE LEVANT MERCHANT COMMUNITY

The Grand Signior possesses such vast territories… It being a great mistake to say that his
territories lie waste, and are not populous. Asia Minor… that is now entirely in his
possession, is as full of people, as ever it was. Smyrna is very populous; and Aleppo counts
within its walls thirty thousand fighting men. Constantinople, its advantageous situation
being more convenient and suitable for so great a monarchy, then any other city of the
known world, has its number of inhabitants answerable to its vast extent… As for his
treasures, they are very considerable, for he is the most absolute monarch in the world, and
disposes sovereignly of whatever his subjects, or rather his slaves, are possessed of. The
trade of Constantinople brings him in vast sums of money… The Christians, to get favor
with the Grand Signior in order to promote their trade with the infidels, are often at
exceeding great, and sometimes unwilling, expenses. For nothing is done at
Constantinople, but by money. And money, which is powerful everywhere, is their
Almighty. 1
Those seeking to trade with the Turks found that they entered a relationship with the
Sublime Porte to their disadvantage. The Levantine theater placed all Europeans in a submissive
role, The Ottoman Empire confounding them with its sheer power, opulent grandeur, and
enormous size. To understand the men who went abroad seeking diplomatic ties and new
commercial markets, one must first understand who they were at home. Throughout the
seventeenth century, the Levant Company’s membership roster consisted of the wealthiest men of
London. Registers became increasingly tangled by kinship relationships over the span of the
century. On average by the 1640s, two-fifths of the Company’s members had fathers, brothers, or
in-laws actively trading during or before their own enrollment in the registers. Hence, the
Company’s richest members were all related to one another, having learned their trade while
abroad in the Ottoman Empire. These men, in turn, formed a close-knit network that exerted
powerful forms of influence and prestige in both City politics and national economics. 2

1
2

David Abercromby, The Present State of the German and Turkish Empires (London, 1684), 51-53.
Gauci, The Politics of Trade, 63; Brenner, "Politics," 56, 61-62.

63
This chapter will outline the politics and religious proclivities of these merchants, both at
home and abroad during the Restoration era. The Levant provided the first long-distance trading
venture undertaken by the English, as they contested with one another and foreign powers for
goods in an unfriendly and unfamiliar environment. In addition, the following will also trace the
reasons these men travelled abroad and where they lived. From there, the chapter analyzes their
relations with locals, other Europeans, and their superiors while in the Mediterranean. Finally, it
concludes with an examination of the gains such trade provided for these men, whether it be wealth,
position, and/or the power of the State once their time abroad was over.

3.1

The Politics of the English Merchant Community – London

There was no politically ideological consensus for the merchant community in the City of
London and it is wrong to claim such a unified stance existed. 3 Indeed, Steve Pincus is correct in
noting that to study this period as the dawn of “mercantilism” belies this important complexion,
wrongly envisioning the period through a simplified prism of political economy, international
commerce, and diplomacy. 4 However, what could be considered a unifying principal for the
merchant powerbrokers of London was money itself. Money provided the means of distributing
“energy and nourishment to all society’s various parts,” akin to blood circulating throughout the
human body. 5 To contemporary advocates of foreign trade, merchants were the “stewards of the
Kingdom’s stock.” 6 Their private gains served the greater public good, their money essential to
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“improve the price of [English] lands.” Concurrently, that same capital provided “the nursery of
[English] mariners, the walls of the kingdoms, the means of treasure, the sinews of [English] wars,
and the terror of [England’s] enemies.” 7
Nevertheless, while money was essential to governance, the strength of the political ties
between merchants and Whitehall or Westminster was tenuous and constantly under negotiation.
The standing between the two entities only neared a state of stability within mutually drafted and
agreed upon Company charters. Yet, even at the best of times, these documents were not examples
of collusion, but documents of protection that safeguarded the merchants’ rights from the State
itself. Therefore, it should prove unsurprising that the merchant community’s politics were
generally conservative and traditional. The business of trade endorsed the status quo rather than
progressive agendas or radical promotion of change. 8
Merchants pursued their politics not through necessarily active, widespread participation
in holding government offices, but through the soft-power approaches of kinship and exertion of
influence via patronage networks. An important tool for this politicking were the pamphlets
produced after the commercialization of the presses alongside the laxity of censorship arising
during the latter Stuart era. Possessing the necessary funds to support mass media, and the literacy
to partake in a print culture, merchants were naturally positioned to engage with the ongoing
discourse regarding the contemporary political environment. 9
Merchant-sponsored broadsides spoke of varying political ideologies, offering no
consensus, but they underline the fact that merchants did try to influence public opinion and
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Parliament’s view regarding commerce. Unfortunately, these efforts often ended with some
readers reaching the same conclusion: commercial pamphlets were not worth the read. Hence,
those that merchants sought to influence with their pamphlets remained entrenched in their
established positions. Prominent writer, Sir Francis Brewster, summed the popular view of
merchant tracts best, expressing his distaste for the commercial subjects in 1695, stating that
nothing “has been more writ on and worse handled than that of trade.” 10 As a result, trade
polemicists spent an inordinate, and ultimately unprofitable, amount of effort on constructing a
narrative of trade that envisioned merchants as essential to the character of the nation, or as
fundamental to creating wealth based on their profession which employed exceptional individuals
with specific skill sets. 11
Beyond the use of mass media, merchants also pursued their collective political agenda
through lobbying and petitions. Lobbyists became more prevalent during the Restoration era than
any time before. Accordingly, with their considerable wealth, merchants employed more lobbyists
than other political grouping. Members of Parliament became so mired by lobbyists and their
petitions that in 1667 the Cavalier Parliament attempted to ban, unsuccessfully, the passing of
petitions by lobbyists to its members at the entrance of Westminster. Not dissuaded, merchants
continued to employ ever-increasing numbers of lobbyists, resulting in another attempt by
Westminster in 1671 to limit the practice. Members of Parliament criticized the forcefulness of
lobbyists and their circumnavigating of established processes. One MP admonished the more
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forceful supplicants, explaining to them that “the great reason why you have Representatives is,
because your people in numbers should not come to disturb the Councils.” 12 Threats became
commonplace between lobbyists and MPs, prompting investigations such as that seen in 1689
against an East India Company agent for suggesting bodily harm against an unreceptive MP. Of
greatest efficacy for lobbyists than approaching MPs openly was the employment of bribes and
other similar incentives. As several MPs had ties to trade through kinship or investment, the act of
collusion between the two groups was commonplace. Resultantly, the passing of bribes proved
easy. The method of these inducements varied, with some merely being a minor, limitedly
objectionable incentive such as providing stock in a Company to MPs who seemed malleable.
Although after a more obtuse fiscal inducement became exposed to the public and other MPs,
officials in Westminster acted swiftly. For MP John Ashburnham, a £500 bribe from French
merchants resulted in strong censure, with the press painting him and those involved as “like the
Devil, both tempters and accusers.” Ultimately, Ashburnham was expulsed as an MP, complete
with dramatic theatrics such as “kneeling to receive his sentence… an acknowledgment that the
censure of the House is just.” 13 Or, in the case of open bribery and the Company of Scotland,
impeachment of its directors and members in 1696 after Company officials intentionally misled
Parliament regarding clandestine trading ventures. Their subsequent attempt to buy their way out
of accusations and recriminations only further infuriated members of the government. Admittedly,
however, many of these soft-power tactics remained unreported and undiscovered, despite the best
efforts of MPs and competing companies to out bribers and their ilk. 14
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When these softer approaches did not work, some merchants began to realize by the end of
the Stuart era that the only way to influence domestic politics was to become part of the very
machine they had been avoiding. In short, a limited number of merchants became active members
of Parliament. Between 1660 and 1690, only 3.7 percent of MPs had been overseas merchants,
with three percent of those serving as first time MPs. Conversely, between 1690 and 1714, the
number of MPs who had been overseas merchants more than doubled to 7.9 percent, with 6.3
percent serving for the first time. Though still a minority within the halls of Westminster, this
growth is indicative of a wider participation in political processes. Likewise, this faction came to
influence the increasing legislation of international trade matters. For example, during these same
periods, the number of bills concerning overseas trade not only grew by one-hundred and sixtyfive percent, but the passage rate of those bills also increased. Between 1660 and 1690, MPs
introduced only ninety-five bills in Parliament that focused predominately on overseas commerce
and the lowering of duties to stimulate trade. Of these, Parliament ratified only thirty-two bills.
For the period between 1690 and 1714, however, merchant MPs introduced one-hundred and fortyfive bills, with fifty-six successfully ratified, or a six percent increase in the rate of successful
passage. 15
Beyond Parliament, merchants in London sometimes pursued political power and influence
on a local level. The various Companies, existing as “miniature states” within the State, provided
for these merchants an entrée point into municipal politics. 16 Beginning in the 1670s, as a response
to growing anti-Catholicism and dissatisfaction with Whitehall’s leadership in confessional
matters, the formation of a loose alliance among disgruntled political elites, known as the “Country
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party,” came into existence. The Country party promoted Protestantism and anti-popery, popular
liberties such as annual parliamentary elections, an end to the system of patronage they envisioned
existed in Charles II’s court, and international trade. By 1678, those associated with the party
imagined that the greatest ongoing threat to Protestantism and Westminster was the Stuart regime
itself. Expectedly, the Country party found support in the corporation of London, where merchants
proved sympathetic to the party’s promotion of trade and hostility toward Catholicism. Such
sentiments were widespread among London’s merchants, especially its Dissenting traders whom
envisioned the French, and not their co-religionists the Dutch, as the greatest threat to overseas
commerce. Unfortunately, for these men, the dominant political agenda of Parliament and most
English in the 1670s and 1680s was not the search for religious accommodation and expanding
trade, but rather a strengthening of the confessional exclusivity of the Restoration state. 17
It is unsurprising, then, that City political authority rested on wealth and overseas
merchants. Having gained advantage due to the booming growth of trade during the 1660s and
1670s, Levant merchants felt a need to protect their new position, engaging in politics in hitherto
unseen levels. Consequently, of those active in City politics, Levantine traders made up one-fifth
of the whole. Only these elite rich, whether ennobled for their commercial efforts or the cream of
merchant society, could afford the costs of political office. For example, they could satisfy the
property qualifications for a sheriff in London set at £10,000 in 1631. Or, the qualifications for an
alderman at the same amount, rising to £15,000 for the same positions in 1711. With the advent of
party politics by the end of the seventeenth century, many of these political traders identified as
Whigs rather than Tories. This advent of a dawning, but limited, political consensus among
merchants reached its height in the 1690s. At that time, the Tory base consisted of an aged
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demographic, able to recall the strife of the earlier half of the seventeenth century. The Whigs, by
comparison, enamored the younger merchants. Prominently parvenus and unable to recall a time
before the Restoration, these young men stood unified by their growing discontentment with
political leaders not addressing international trading concerns adequately. Still, one must be
cautious not to be too reductionist when including trade in the wider political culture of later Stuart
England, explaining the period in crude pecuniary or market driven terms. Nevertheless,
commercial concerns mattered. Overseas merchants did engage in politics to guarantee their
interests, able to afford positions of political power whatever party they officially joined or other
subtle methods they employed. 18

3.2

The Religion of the English Merchant Community – London

Overall, the City merchant community before 1660 held to the conservatism that defined
their politics: obedience to the Crown and adherence to the establishment. In the instance of
religion, this obedience meant following the episcopal hierarchy of the Church, supporting its
orthodox views and proceedings. For some, this meant going so far in their devotion as to sponsor
Archbishop William Laud’s rebuilding of St. Paul’s Cathedral. The fact that several Laudian
bishops were the sons of prominent City merchants likely made such support even easier. Many
merchants, however, remained less outwardly devoted. They relied instead on their respective
Companies’ strong ties to the Church of England. For instance, these trading organizations allowed
and encouraged the placing of theological texts in their factories’ libraries for the perusal of their
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agents and staff. The selection of specific texts shrewdly planned, all in the hopes of influencing
behavior and further defending their fealty to the confessional establishment. Merchant company
officials also supported the placement of ordained chaplains in those same factories, for similar
reasons. 19
It follows that the proliferation of choice that came out of the Interregnum led many
merchants to hold a plethora of differing confessional opinions. After all, the dominant political
agenda of Parliament and most English in the later Stuart era focused on the strengthening of the
confessional exclusivity of the Restoration State. The search for religious accommodation and
expansion of trade distant concerns for those in power. For London merchants, four-fifths to ninetenths of the majority nominally continued their adherence to the Church. 20 Yet, Dissenters made
up a significant number of the minority. The wealthier elements of this community generally
aligned with Presbyterianism, perhaps agreeing with the Presbyterian call for conservative civic
reforms. The larger proportion of those merchant nonconformists joined with those who sought to
reform the Church from within. Like those in other professions, these religious traders occasionally
conformed or, rarer in the archive, outright dissented from Church doctrine. Merchant dissent was
often a family affair, passed down generationally and reinforced through marriages between
families. Those who did dissent the strongest often engaged in colonial trade, such as the famed
Robert Boyle who was governor of the New England Company. For those involved in the more
established commerce of older companies, evangelical views preempted nonconformity.
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Nonetheless, there existed no strict binary of those who conformed or did not, with the confessional
line being ever fluid and difficult to define. 21
Among these London Dissenters, it is worth noting their political efforts in the face of
adversity during the latter Stuart era. Examining London Dissenters during the Restoration, one
can find one-hundred and fifty-five men who sought to influence religious policy by lending funds
directly to the Crown. In 1670, Charles II faced a budgetary shortfall and approached City
magistrates to request £60,000. Suffering their own deficit arising from the aftermath of the Great
Plague of 1665, the Great Fire in 1666, and the loss of the Second Anglo-Dutch War in 1667, City
officials could only raise a meager one-third of the requested amount for the Privy Chamber.
Seizing the moment, these one-hundred and fifty-five Dissenters, of which fifty-four were
merchants, granted Whitehall the remaining £40,000. Another grouping of fifty-one Dissenters,
nineteen of whom were merchants, served as common councilmen from 1669 to 1671. These men
accepted office, despite their inability to subscribe to the Test Act. While these two-hundred and
six men should not be taken as representative of the overall Dissenting or merchant community, it
is noteworthy that several leading Levant merchants in these two groups were noticeably present,
including the families of the Ashursts, Jolliffes, and Sambrookes. Why this concentration of
Dissent exists in the families of the Levant trade remains unknown. Nevertheless, despite religious
differences within the community and between State and Company, those interested in trade were
willing to negotiate their convictions in the face of preserving their livelihood. The merchant
community in 1670s London was highly pragmatic. Those men involved in commerce considered
politics and foreign policy, whether initiated in Whitehall or Westminster, the pursuit of profit by
other means. Religion existed for merchants as a tool of statecraft. Restoration era merchants
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championed the ideals of property rights, opposed an arbitrary governance that disrupted smooth
transactions, and favored the rule of law – regardless if the law came from Parliament or the Privy
Chamber. Most merchants had extremely limited or no formal means of seeking redress for their
political grievances. This was no different for confessional matters, as these men had a
tremendously minor voice in the established government. That they preferred to pursue their own
commercial interests rather than political appointments or loftier convictions is clear. Thus, when
merchants entered politics or religious debates, it was typically to defend their economic, and not
ideological or confessional, interests. 22

3.3

The Geography of the English Merchant Community – Levant

The Ottoman Turks asserted that the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean was their own
personal theater of trade, defended by their extensive navy and vassal states. To manage commerce,
they separated their commercial zones of control into three distinct regions. The first was based on
the land itself, focusing on the movement of trade goods – prominently lumber, silks, and spices –
from the Mid-East to Anatolia. This zone encapsulated Aleppo, Baghdad, Constantinople,
Damascus, Tabriz, and the trading ports of the Persian Gulf. The second zone centered around the
maritime commerce in the eastern Mediterranean and the northern Indian Ocean. Roughly, it
extended from the port of Alexandria to Constantinople and from Jeddah to Malacca. The zone
itself concentrated on the trade of copper and spices. Finally, the third zone encompassed the
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Aegean and Adriatic Seas. This area captured in its boundaries the archipelagos of Greece and the
grain trade so essential to supporting Constantinople and the Empire. 23
It is unsurprising, then, that the English also had factories and interests across these three
zones. The earliest English consuls in the Ottoman Empire arrived in the Turkish vassal-state of
Algiers at the end of the sixteenth century. Beginning in 1583, the consulship in Algiers existed to
negotiate both commercial contracts as well as the release of English hostages taken by corsairs.
However, the consul himself was frequently absent during the seventeenth century and the post
remained unreliably maintained. Although his absence in Algiers was not due to a lack of interest
in the local commercial matters. The posting to Algiers was exceedingly dangerous. A consul
suffered the whims of Barbary hostility and aggression dependent on the prevailing view of the
locals in regarding the English as enemies or allies. Not even the Royal Navy’s presence could
indemnify the posting, as seen in 1620 with the unsuccessful efforts to pressure Algiers to release
English captives through a naval blockade. The expense of one’s life or freedom for the pursuit of
trade was not a sufficient inducement for these early, intrepid individuals. 24
Expanding their consular postings in 1621 and 1628, Levant Company officials established
new stations in both Leghorn and Zante. Leghorn was an ideal spot for a consul for a variety of
reasons. It was a stopping point for any European moving to or from Anatolia, providing a
bottleneck for all Levantine, North African, and Venetian trade. Additionally, the Dutch had also
established a consulship in Leghorn. This created a need for the English to counter their
competitor’s influence over the lucrative movement of goods. To point, the English and Dutch
consuls became so successful in Leghorn that the Venetians futilely, but with great zeal, attempted
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to encourage the English to relocate to Villefranche-sur-Mer in southern France. The Italian citystate’s representatives even pursued extensive lobbying of the French on the behalf of the English
when the consul suggested any interest in such an idea. The Zante consul, on the other hand, did
not prove a ready threat to Venetian interests. The island post only provided local agency for the
English when purchasing currants. In addition, the Venetians viewed the English as a stopgap
against Dutch encroachment in Zante’s currant trade, asserting that, “No one will believe that the
[English] people here will suffer themselves to be deprived of a commodity which has become an
inveterate habit.” 25
Beyond the plethora of minor postings throughout the Mediterranean, the Levant Company
held the factories in Aleppo, Constantinople, and Smyrna in particular prestige. Constantinople’s
primacy needs little explanation. One of the largest cities in the world during the seventeenth
century, its 700,000 inhabitants provided an enormous market for all trade goods. Conquered by
the Turks in 1453, Mehmed II renamed the city “Istanbul” to break from the past and provide a
new beginning. Loosely, the matronymic translated from the old Turkish Islambul, “find/be Islam.”
The name “Constantinople” is interchangeable with Istanbul into modern times. This designation
is used widely in the correspondence, journals, and descriptions of the English in the seventeenth
century, perhaps as a convenience or as a lexiconic stand against Islam. Regardless of its eponymic
distinctions, it was in Constantinople that the redistribution of goods from overland routes in the
East, and overseas routes in the West, took place. English cloth arriving in the capital city would,
for example, travel into Safavid Persia and the coastlines of the Red Sea, providing the raw
materials for garments, furnishings, and floor coverings. 26
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Constantinople sits astride the Bosphorus Strait, linked then by kayik ferries, and split into
three districts: Constantinople, Galata, and Üsküdar. Üsküdar lay across the Strait, in Western
Anatolia and Asia itself. The district was comprised of Muslim residences and provided a stopping
point for those coming from Asia to Europe. The City proper was situated in Europe, its districts
holding the centers of politics and trade. Within lay the apparatuses of the state and military,
imperial palaces, mosques, bazaars, and baths. Infused throughout the city was a vibrant
cosmopolitan milieu of Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, Sephardic Jews, Sufis, and Sunnis. Across the
Golden Horn, to the north of the City, is Galata. It is there that foreigners lodged, establishing their
nation’s respective embassies in the neighborhood of Pera. Exempted from sumptuary laws in Pera
were drink and dress. Fashion in the quarter took a distinct stance that contrasted with Turkish
dictates limiting certain colors and articles to specific millets or officials, all the while wine flowed
in its neighborhoods, consumed in public spaces. Occasional crackdowns ensued, often when the
Turks felt the irreligious nature of the district had become too much. Nevertheless, separated from
the City center, the Turks cared little for what outsiders did amongst themselves within the confines
of the district, and its wanton neighborhood, across the bay. 27
Established as a factory in 1583, Aleppo served the English as a profoundly important
lynch pin in Levantine trade. Only conquered by the Turks sixty-seven years before, the cityscape
was still in flux by the late seventeenth century. Predominately Sunni Muslim, the Mamluks who
had controlled the city at the start of the sixteenth century had expended considerable resources on
the construction of numerous mosques in their own honor. As a result, Sultan Selim and his
successors funded extensive construction projects, building tower monuments, new mosques, and
public fountains, to Ottomanize the city and give its denizens a view to the greater glory of the
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Turks. As the city center had a dual purpose as the main trading corridor and its religious heart, its
fortified caravansaries alongside the newly constructed, massive mosques were suitable for larger
than normal markets. Serving as another ending point of the Silk Road, Aleppo has a rich history
of international commerce. Though, unlike Constantinople and Smyrna, Aleppo was landlocked
and English merchants had to organize caravans to move goods to the nearest port, modern
İskenderun. 28 These caravans were often massive, taking three days to reach the coast, with over
two thousand camels in transit between Aleppo and İskenderun on any single day. Such large
concentrations of goods proved to be lucrative targets and attracted raiders, “robbing [the English]
in sight of Aleppo” with many of the goods left “mangled and abused and scattered for some miles;
the finest with all the camels [the raiders] carried away.” 29 As a result, merchants often felt that,
“if occasion require it to accompany their goods themselves the most dangerous part of the way,”
they would bring “mules with a strong guard… and servants… as several of the factory did.” 30
Despite the importance of the Aleppo factory to the Company, many of its merchants were isolated
by their location from the internecine politics of the other factories and those in England. New
news of ongoing rivalries and complaints in Constantinople or Smyrna arrived infrequently and
with little regard. 31
Yet, not even the capital city or important terminus of Aleppo proved as lucrative as
Smyrna to the English. 32 Established as a location for a consulate in 1619 after the factory in Chios
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relocated, the English found the site had an excellent harbor that provided a closer foothold to the
trade for ships to dock. Situated at the east end of a peninsula, protected by the promontories of
Karaburun, and sandbanks off its northern coast, the area had been an often-used port since
antiquity. For centuries, though, it languished. Ignored by the Byzantines and Turks as both
concentrated on their holdings closer to Constantinople, the area would not have been developed
if not for the interest of Western Europeans seeking new markets and a deep-water harbor to land
their goods. With the power of the Ottoman court waning after the death of Mehmed III at the
dawn of the seventeenth century, the Empire became provincialized. The Sublime Porte focused
its efforts on expanding into Europe and securing the surrounding country around the capital rather
than domestic governance. As regionalization came to typify the Ottoman Empire, cities such as
Smyrna began to assert themselves as new centers of power. Seeking opportunities, immigrants
flooded the city, seizing on the new trade brought to the hinterland via the English and Dutch. The
city proved accommodating for the English with its heterodox society. Muslims, Christians, and
Jews – the latter being important as middlemen for trade – coexisted in more peaceful terms within
the urban center than in other parts of the Empire. It was not unusual to see Europeans drinking in
public, joined by Armenians and Jews while Turks took their leisure alongside these strangers in
their lands. In 1649, the volume of Smyrna commerce had surpassed Constantinople. By 1660, the
number of factors was over twice that of the Turkish capital. The city’s population swelled by
1670, with roughly 80,000 inhabitants and 1,000 foreigners at any one time. 33
Smyrna did suffer two glaring dangers that the other factories did not: extensive seismic
activity and drunken disorderly conduct. Earthquakes were common around Smyrna, with three
major quakes between 1667 and 1678. And despite imperial edict that sought to protect the major
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buildings of the city by enforcing a code requiring glacis walls, it was the fires from these quakes
that would destroy the port seven times between 1600 and 1800. The pluralistic city also had a
propensity for mob violence. Inebriated Europeans often provided the spark point for these riots
as they gathered in groups, marching through the streets at night and raising such a ruckus that
many newcomers assumed a carnival was in town. John Covel thought the Smyrna’s social
atmosphere welcoming, enjoying “rambling about the town” and taking dinner with friends at “a
rich Turk’s house… which we sat at supper cross legged” finding “all things being so quite
different from our own way of living did very much surprise me with wonder and delight.” Dudley
North, conversely, concluded that Smyrna’s atmosphere was dangerous. As North timed a
ropewalker’s performance, the cord broke and a Turkish mob accused him of witchcraft. The
crowd envisioned his pocket watch, a rarely seen implement in Turkey, as an instrument of black
magic employed against the man’s balancing act. Perhaps predictably, Smyrna’s primary domestic
industry was winemaking, it being the home of Pramnian wine. Expectedly, demand often
outpaced supply, requiring the importation of grapes from Chios and Magnesia. Even those in
London soon developed a taste for the Anatolian grape, with factors trading their wine surpluses
directly with the embassy for bacon or, like Consul Paul Rycaut, sending “the best sort here” back
home. 34

3.4

Levantine English Interacting with Others

Within the Levant, the English were a distinct minority. They shared their status with other
Europeans who lived across the Bosphorus alongside them in Pera, or in the commercial factories
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throughout the Empire. Isolated from Europe, the men trading in the Levant forgot the prejudices
of the continent in the face of a wider segregation from general Turkish society. The English joined
with the other Europeans for entertainment and camaraderie, even when their respective home
countries would be at war with one another. Parties, social gatherings, drinking, and hunting all
served as past times for Levantine Europeans. The English were particularly famous for and
championed their greyhound hunts as the best form of entertainment to in the Ottoman Empire.
One visiting Dutch participant noted his experience with a hunt, stating that he “had the happiness,
with several other Dutchmen, to assist at this pleasant ceremony, and to drink to the health of the
Capo, with an Huzza, after the English manner, in those sorts of merry makings.” 35 Confessional
differences too proved no boundary to interaction between Europeans. Ambassador John Finch
and Thomas Baines entertained local Jesuit priests frequently, inviting the Catholics over on
multiple occasions to discuss religion over dinner and drinks. Moreover, the English’s parties in
general were so well known that even perennially traditional enemies such as the French spoke
lovingly of the English. French Ambassador Arvieux discussed one such party, stating that “one
can add nothing to the magnificence of the feast, nor to the quantity of the wine drunk. They smash
and break everything to do honor to those to whom they drink, and the debauch is sometimes
carried so far that finding nothing more to break, they light a great fire and fling on it hats, wigs,
coats, even shirts.” 36 Seen by the Turks as but part of the indistinctive grouping of “Franks,” the
English abroad found that they were frequently freer and more forgiving of differences than their
compatriots back home. 37
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Nonetheless, interactions with locals was less jubilant and decidedly more reserved. Living
apart from Turkish society kept the English, and other Europeans, separated from the Ottoman
ruling elites. What interactions that existed with Turkish oligarchs focused almost exclusively on
business, frequently through intermediaries and rarely in direct contact. As the Ottoman state was
diffuse and noncentralized, cultivating relationships with the middlemen of the Empire was
essential for the successful English merchant. Originally mistaking the Sultan as the ultimate
power, the English quickly learned to keep the de facto head of the government, the Grand Vizier,
happy to enable the easy exchange of capital for goods. Hence, the English actively acquired and
cultivated many locally supplied servants and associates to provide proper insight in the current
political atmosphere of the Empire. 38
These middlemen were the Armenians, Greeks, Jews, and other intermediaries who often
crossed paths with the European officials in Pera. Providing the mediators necessary for business,
with their fluency in the Ottoman Turkish language and the intrigues of its government, many of
these individuals would befriend the visiting English dignitaries. Despite the stratification of
Ottoman society, it was in actuality an incredibly cosmopolitan empire. Diverse in its ethnicities,
religious confessions, and more accommodating than the powers of Europe, the heterodox
environment enamored many English and others. The traditional demarcations of religion broke
down considerably, as Capuchins, dervishes, Eastern Orthodox priests, Franciscans, imams,
Jesuits, mullahs, and rabbis mingled, discussing religion and the pedestrian concerns of their lives
without the prejudices inherent to Western Europe. Expatriates joined the local English community,
discussing custom, politics, and religion while sometimes engaging in proscribed bouts of drinking
and the occasional smoke. Many commentators would draw from these conversations while abroad
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to expound on the supposed cruelty of the Turk, employing the complaints of the Jews and others
as prime examples of “barbarity” among the Turks. Nonetheless, assimilation and friendship
proved so strong that some Europeans “went native” while in the Ottoman Empire, adopting the
garb of Turkish society in all but the most formal of occasions. 39 Such behavior was also defensive,
minimizing the risk of offending the average Turk on the street and increasing the ability of an
emissary to blend into society by dressing as a local. In short, the Ottoman Empire provided a
liberality for English expatriates that was unseen back home. 40
For their part, the Turks held the English and other Europeans in disdain, showing scorn
when forced to interact and labelling Europeans collectively as “gâvur.” 41 Grand Vizier Kara
Mustafa laid plain the Sublime Porte’s most cynical view regarding Europeans, stating to
Ambassador John Finch that all ambassadors were “sent hither by your representative princes to
answer for the lives and estates of all Muslims all over the world that are damaged or suffer by
your respective subjects, and you are here a hostage to answer for all damage done by English all
over the world.” 42 The protections granted in the Capitulations, as Finch and his predecessors
found out, were hostage to the Grand Vizier’s proclivities. Sir Paul Rycaut would lament this
situation, noting in 1675 that “a Turk is not capable of real friendship towards a Christian.” 43 Yet,
friendships did even occasionally grow between the rare Turkish official and the English,
temporarily bridging the gulf separating the two peoples. 44
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3.5

Living in the Ottoman Empire

The living spaces of the English abroad were equally isolated from the rest of Ottoman
society, sparse in furnishings and communal. When possible, Europeans had their houses in the
Levant built to their own tastes. Such accommodations were allowed in Constantinople and
prosperous Smyrna, but were granted on a case-by-case basis frequently limited to the ambassador
and his staff. For everyone else, there existed “khans,” a type of dormitory-like establishment
located in ghettos. The khans had a central court, unseen from the streets, which allowed Europeans
some form of sanctuary from the hustle and bustle of the city. The bottom floors of a khan were
reserved for storage and housed the stables, as well as the occasional library. At dusk, Turkish
officials would lock the entryways, effectively containing the Europeans overnight in their
respective buildings. Unable to leave and only having access to miniscule windows, many
Europeans took to sleeping under the stars on the flat roof of the khan in hotter temperatures.
Fourteen to fifteen merchants would live in a single khan, often joined by expatriates who had
chosen to remain abroad despite lacking employment by the Levant Company. 45
Relegated to ghettos and locked in at night, love and sexual liaisons still occurred between
Europeans and Turks despite the best efforts of officials. Legally, only the ambassador could bring
his wife with him. For many of the merchants and embassy members, predominately young
bachelors, the limiting environment proved stilting. In addition, the sexual activities of both
Turkish men and women - or lack thereof if one was a eunuch - fascinated English travelers to the
Levant. Often, this fascination led to extravagant conjectures regarding harems and the proclivities
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of Turkish women in their private residences. 46 While most of these depraved tales are hyperbolic,
one could find anything to suit their tastes in the Levant. For example, tales among merchants
commonly extended to include discussion of the prevalence of homosexuality and even pedophilia
in the Ottoman Empire. One contemporary Scot noted that an attractive boy was the same cost as
a girl on the streets due to the preference of Turkish men for “handsome boys wanting a beard.” 47
With such sexual desires existing among the English and other Europeans, the Turks made
extensive efforts to curtail licentious behavior. One such effort was that the Turks made it illegal
for any Turkish woman to marry a European, preventing courtships with beatings or arrests when
possible. Additionally, seeking to keep business relations prosaic and avoid any distractions, the
Company itself also banned these marriages. Nonetheless, young English men in the Levant did
all they could to invigorate their celibate residency while abroad. 48
While Europeans often adjusted well to their limited dwellings in the cosmopolitan and
alien environment found in the Ottoman Empire, there still existed the occasional confessional
strife and denominational differences so intrinsic to one’s national identity during the period. The
English, for their part, sometimes sought allies with the Turks against European Catholics,
simultaneously attempting to convert Turkish subjects to Christianity. For example, Church of
England divines and Company chaplains actively sought dialogue with Eastern Orthodox
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Christians in the effort to both understand and convert their co-religionists while living in Turkey.
Churchmen such as Edward Pococke, John Covel, Robert Huntington, and others, led this
exploration of what it meant to be part of the English Church. Through the study of other religions,
they hoped to establish a more accurate interpretation of the Biblical past while proselytizing the
Anglican faith, justifying the Protestant religious undertakings in Europe as a continuation of
Christ’s mission. For their efforts, these men felt confident in celebrating their own confessional
understandings simultaneous to their reaping a better position in society for themselves upon return
home. The Qur’an was translated into English, Muslim and eastern Christian traditions interpreted
and criticized, and even the Book of Common Prayer, as well as Hugo Grotius’s De veritate
del'religionis Christianae, were translated for dissemination in the Levant. Publications of John
Foxe’s Acts and Monuments proved quite popular in the Empire and further encouraged the
exchange of information and efforts toward conversion. Offering striking descriptions that
provided sensational entertainment while simultaneously attacking Catholics for their brutality
against Protestant martyrs, Foxe’s book played into Turkish prejudices against Catholics arising
from the time of the Crusades. The woodcuts found in Foxe’s work proved particularly popular in
courting Eastern Orthodox Christians against Catholics. 49
Yet, the employment of Acts and Monuments resulted in little effect at winning Muslim
converts. Fundamentally, Western Europeans and the English viewed Islam more akin to a political
ideology than a religious confession. Such a perspective completely undermined any serious
efforts at conversion. For example, amicable Christian-Muslim interactions confused
contemporary commentator Paul Rycaut. The popular writer was unable to understand how the
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Turks could freely approach and beseech the Patriarchs of the Greek and Armenian Churches to
join Muslims in praying against an outbreak of plague. The sheer idea that Allah represented a
shared God was alien to the English. This failure in understanding ultimately proved untenable,
with later chaplains not even putting forth an effort to convert Muslims, as many found the Turks
accommodating to religious differences more readily than the missionaries understood. 50

3.6

The Wages of Trade

The men who went abroad to the Ottoman Empire did so for a variety of reasons. For most,
it was a pursuit of immediate capital wealth that proved the siren call to travel eastward. With little
challenge arising from any European rivals in the Levantine theater, the period of the 1670s and
early 1680s offered a booming economic opportunity. Seizing the initiative, merchants ensured
that the export of English cloth during the period rose dramatically. For example, production
between 1666 and 1671 averaged 13,672 pieces, growing slightly less than one-hundred and fifty
percent, to 20,075 pieces per annum during the period from 1672 to 1676. Volumes of this level
continued into the early 1680s, dropping only by an average of five hundred less pieces from 1677
to 1682. 51 In purely economic terms, then, the combined value of all merchantmen bound to the
Levant in 1672 totaled £2,000,000, the inbound fleet from Smyrna worth £1,000,000, with the
average consignment at £5,000 per merchant in the Levantine factories. One could become quite
wealthy in his time in the Ottoman Empire. Thomas Baines, drawing upon no familial fortunes

50
George Townsend and Stephen Reed Cattley, ed. The Acts and Monuments of John Foxe (Andesite Press, 2015);
Matar, Islamic World, 25-30, 168-70; Paul Rycaut, The Present State of the Greek and Armenian Churches (London,
1670), 21; Christopher Toenjes, Islam, the Turks and the Making of the English Reformation: The History of the
Ottoman Empire in John Foxe's "Acts and Monuments" (Frankfurt: Peter Lang GmbH, 2016), 9-10, 170, 243, 322.
51
SP 105/145, 308, Sloane MSS 2902, 118.

86
and having no higher standing within the Company beyond membership brought through his
friendship with Ambassador Finch, accumulated an estate worth £3,690 by his death in Turkey,
with a further $600 in cash available. Company Treasurer Dudley North garnered the substantial
estate of £50,000 by his own death, largely derived from his gem trade and usury in the Levant,
coupled with shrewd investing upon arriving home in England. Even Consul Paul Rycaut turned
his time abroad into a decent surety, his history of the region published well after his death, and
his own investments totaling £5,700 upon his own demise. 52
Beyond the revenue the cloth trade offered merchants, the gem trade provided a further
lucrative income while in the Ottoman Empire. The sale of these jewels took place in one of the
early modern world’s largest gem and jewelry markets, with its wards accessible only through four
double-doored gates, reinforced by six-feet thick walls, and the shops themselves secured
underground alongside the vaults. 53 The trade in jewelry and gems also provided English nationals
with the capital necessary to finance loans to locals and merchants in need of capital. Edward
Smyth, chaplain at Smyrna from 1689 to 1693, and later bishop of Down and Connor, proved
particularly astute at this occupation in precious stones. Due to his acumen, he returned to England
with a fortune raised in sales and supplemented by usury. 54 And, as the Company banned the use
of credit, this lucrative side business allowed a stable means of securing easily disposable, and an
easy to carry, fiat currency off official books.
Enriched by the cloth and gem trades, the local population soon discovered that the English
merchants proved approachable for requests of personal loans. These loans provided the Turks
who took them with the necessary funds used to buy official position within the Ottoman Empire.
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Offices were available to those who could afford it, both in England and the Ottoman Empire.
Quickly, shrewd merchants found that they could employ their lending relationship with local
Turks for profit, both in future favor and repayment of funds. However, such pecuniary advances
were a high-risk venture, with many factors ending in destitution once engaged in this activity.
The need to circumvent official accounting meant that an English factor wishing to avoid violating
English law and Company policy had to resort to a dangerous technique to turn a profit.
Specifically, they would charge their Turkish creditors for the purchase of goods that were
available in a respective lender’s warehouse, and at a rate higher than current market value. Of
course, this practice was wholly at the mercy of a sometimes-volatile market, resulting in losses if
ill-planned. Moreover, for those merchant lenders without standing in the Levant who allowed
Turkish officials to borrow in pursuit of a better station also faced a high risk of the newly
appointed official conveniently forgetting a loan ever took place once they rose in status. 55
Outside the capital wealth gained in Turkey, one may also harvest more insubstantial
profits while working for the Company: a better position in English society itself. These higher
positions in both the social order and the government became more available to those who could
afford the entry fees. Time in the Levant, then, gave a prospective individual the both the means
to afford title and standing otherwise denied to them, and the skills necessary to hold a higher
position in society. Dudley North, Company treasurer in the Levant, provides a wonderful example
of this successive rise in society and status after his time abroad.
Much of Dudley’s views of his time in the Levant are known due to his biography, written
by his younger brother, Roger North. The surviving correspondence in the archives focuses
entirely on Dudley’s accounting while in the Levant, augmented only by the occasional orders he
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sent as part of the Company’s General Court after his return to England. Thus, Roger’s biography
serves to illustrate the political and social gains Dudley attributed to his time abroad. To that end,
Roger wrote extensively about his brother's skills in working in an oppressive, heavily bureaucratic
environment in the Turkish controlled Levant. Such skills would suit Dudley well in his life after
the Levant when pursuing a civic career in London as a sheriff, and later as an MP. Regardless of
its value in providing insights in Dudley’s personal thoughts, though, one must approach Roger's
biography cautiously. Roger is idealistic at times, seeking to always portray his brother in a
favorable light and counter the partisan campaign against him starting with the London shrievel
elections of 1682. Nonetheless, the biography remains a powerful tool of analysis. Roger diligently
records Dudley’s musings and opinions with a sense of authenticity, particularly when compared
to surviving correspondence. Believing that “private behavior revealed the real man,” Roger wrote
extensively about his brother’s commonplace habits and eccentricities. Further, despite its positive
slant, the biography does checkout for authenticity where it can be individually verified against
the archives that survive in Kent and the British Library. Summarily, the biography allows a view
into the political opinions, professional development, and voice of Dudley North.
What becomes apparent to the reader of the biography is Dudley’s close association of
politics and trade. Dudley was a Tory. However, unlike his brothers, he was not highly partisan in
his political behaviors. When called to appear by the aldermen of London in regards to his own
supposed role in the 1678-1681 Popish Plot and his contested election as a sheriff of London,
Dudley behaved himself admirably. After it became apparent to both Roger and Dudley that the
proceedings against Dudley were fallacious, he did not avail himself to start naming those who
had so wrongly assailed him. Roger recounted, “It was hoped that [Dudley] would be substantially
terrified that he might bite at the bait of taking some of his enemies off” and provide a further “trap
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and snare” for other aldermen in Guildhall facing charges. As Dudley did not stand to accuse
anyone, the committee dismissed him from its presence. 56
This unusual intransigence against disrupting the orderly conducting of governance and
skillful engagement in partisan fights likely stemmed from Dudley’s time in the Levant. Taken
together, his tenure in the Levant required a base knowledge of English property law, Turkish law,
and Sharia. A frequent litigant, as any factor in the Mediterranean was, his successes at recovering
debts suggests a remarkable aptitude to operate effectively within the narrow dictates of both legal
and political propriety. 57 It was during his time in Constantinople that the older North familiarized
himself with political intrigue, making sure he knew the laws of the land thoroughly to navigate
around the minutiae of bribery and corruption, legal and illegal means to various ends. For instance,
Roger details at length his brother’s relation of Turkish laws and customs for several pages in his
biography. Often these passages touch upon trade matters, navigating the legal system to a
successful and profitable outcome. It is not too far to assume that the efficient, diligent Dudley
familiarized himself further with English law and custom upon his return from the Levant in 1679,
particularly after becoming sheriff. Embroiled in contentious shrieval elections and accused of
being a gerrymanderer, Dudley resorted to employing his skills honed in the Levant and courts to
defend himself against his accusers, much to the utter frustration of his opponents. 58
For his assiduous service as sheriff and conduct in the face of false accusations, Dudley
would eventually win election to Parliament. While there he sculpted Charles II’s and James II’s
fiscal policies, with Charles II unofficially consulting with North regarding Turkish foreign affairs
and their frequent wars in Austria. As a highly successful merchant, trained in the Levant, he was
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equally an expert in commerce. Though passing heavy tariffs on foreign trade, North won wide
respect by both Tory and Whig for his guiding of an efficient fiscal policy even with the increased
cost of some luxury items. Considering his time in the Levant - where he was exposed to royalist
and republican, Tory and Whig factions in the Levant factories coexisting - this is not surprising. 59
Even while in the Levant, Ambassador Finch and Baines held a begrudging respect for Dudley
despite the latter’s frequent denial of requested funds. Facing imprisonment by the Turks in
October 1680 for a false charge of bribery and manipulation, Ambassador Finch wrote to his
nephew, Daniel Finch, favorably about his Company treasurer. The Ambassador was proud that,
“when the trial was over, coming to dinner, Mr. North threw down fifty zecchins, which he had
tied up in a handkerchief, saying these words with an antecedent oath – “’ I took this money and
these old cloths thinking to go to with your Lordship to prison.’” 60
Dying a wealthy man in 1691, Dudley had gained a position far above his station of birth.
It was his time in the Levant that had made him such a political contender that he was able to
weather the storms of Exclusion and Revolution so successfully. His skills at political infighting,
employing the law rather than being a victim of it, and striking a balance amid factionalism were
all honed and learned while he was abroad in the Ottoman Empire and helped him considerably
with his rise in station upon returning home.
Similarly, John Covel’s travels and time in the Levant, collecting various Arabian and
Oriental tracts alongside his wider scholarship, resulted in his own successful return to England in
1679 and subsequent rise in status. Restless, Covel moved from parish to parish once home in
England, finally settling into the role of personal chaplain to Princess Mary in 1681. Finding fault
with William of Orange’s “tyrannical behavior” toward his wife in 1685, Covel wrote bitterly
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about William to his friends. Unfortunately for him, Covel’s letter to Bevil Skelton, English
ambassador to The Hague, was intercepted by William’s agents. Dismissed from Mary’s retinue
as a result for his letter and sent back to England, by 1687 Covel’s fortunes were on the mend, his
status as a scholar assured by his research in the Ottoman Empire. Instituted as vice-chancellor of
Cambridge by James II in 1688, he became known as a conscientious, if strict, master. However,
with the Glorious Revolution of 1688/9, Covel was again in a difficult position. As vice-chancellor,
it fell onto him to present William III the university’s address of loyalty. With his previous
dismissal from William’s court, Covel was exceedingly agitated by this turn of events. He shared
his anxiety in letters to his friends, which included Sir Isaac Newton, John Mill, and other
prominent figures that he had been in correspondence with while in the Ottoman Empire. For his
part, in drafts Covel sent to Newton before the formal address, Newton was critical of Covel’s
Latin translation of the Oath of Supremacy. The famed luminary characterized the passages as
“imperfectly rendered in Latin, ought to be omitted, and both your new oaths administered in
English.” To that end, he continued, “You will see these oaths in the end of the declaration I have
enclosed.” In addition, Newton added suggestions in his epistles to Covel that recommended he
should not issue new degrees from Cambridge until William III and Mary II formally visited. He
further offered a list of didactic propositions and catechisms to counter any “scruples” university
members might have against swearing fealty to the Prince of Orange. 61 Finally, Newton, on the
behalf of Covel, had Sir Owen Wynne approach William regarding Covel’s trepidation. To the
relief of Covel, the King was reputed to have stated, “That if Dr. Covel came with the body of the
University he would be admitted to kiss their Majesty’s hand” and that William “could distinguish
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between Dr. Covel and the Vice-Chancellor of the University.” 62 Clearly, Covel’s heterodox
leanings and time in the Levant did affect his position of influence. Though initially costing him
his status as Mary’s confessor, it ultimately won him the role of a leader of Cambridge, as well as
the friendship of several enlightened thinkers such as Sir Isaac Newton. Regardless of William’s
initial beneficence, however, Covel did later continue to occasionally conflict with the Crown.
Covel’s 1690 published volume The Interpreter of Words and Terms was ordered destroyed due
to his questioning of “the supreme power of this Crown.” 63
In addition to Dudley North and John Covel, the likes of John Jolliffe, Paul Rycaut, and
Robert Huntington also landed positions of higher professional standing and social status upon
arriving home from the Ottoman Empire. In brief, Jolliffe became a merchant in the Levant
Company in 1650, rising to the position of Company Treasurer in 1659 and Company Governor
in 1672. Beyond the Levant Company, after arriving home from the Levant he also became a part
of the East India Company’s ruling committee in 1657-8 and a deputy governor from 1665-67; a
London alderman in 1658; and Governor of the Muscovy Company from 1663-1674. In 1658, he
was tasked to talk to General George Monck and succeeded in dissuading the commander from
destroying London’s defenses. 64 As he was moderately active in the Cavalier Parliament, Jolliffe
was also named member of a parliamentary committee in 1662 commissioned to fight customs
frauds. His continual contact with Sir William Coventry, Secretary to the Admiralty and confidant
of the Duke of York, afforded Jolliffe a continual voice in Whitehall. For example, Coventry saw
Jolliffe as an “oracle” in matters of commerce, carrying some influence with those in power and
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consulted with Joliffe frequently. 65 As a result of his time with the Company, Paul Rycaut became
not only an internationally renowned author and a member of the Royal Society, but also an official
government consultant on Ottoman affairs. Moreover, his time abroad won him the position of a
diplomat to Algiers in 1682 sent on a secret mission to negotiate a peace before the French could
do more than bombard the city from the sea. After, he continued his diplomatic career and became
a Resident in Hamburg, promoting the League of Augsburg’s efforts at hampering Louis XIV’s
expansionist policies from 1689 until his death in 1700. Finally, Robert Huntington would profit
from his own confessional and philosophical studies in the Levant by winning successful positions
in the Church’s hierarchy. His own ascendency mimicking the comparable rise of his friend Robert
Frampton and that of his contemporary, John Covel. Helping with the earliest formalization of
Oriental studies in England, Huntington would turn his fruitful research into subsequent
appointments as the Bishop of Raphoe and Provost of Trinity College. In short, these men and
others profited from their time in the Ottoman Empire with the advent of new standing upon
arriving home in England. 66
Besides title and wealth, though, the wages of trade also allowed merchants to buy
increased favor by providing goods lacking at home, yet much desired by those in charge of affairs.
For example, in May 1674 Thomas Baines sent a chiefly glowing, and unsolicited, letter to Edward
Conway, first Earl of Conway and then Master of Ordinance in Ireland, as well as a future
Secretary of State, describing Ambassador Finch’s undertakings in his new position as ambassador
to the Sublime Porte. Likening Finch to “Julius Caesar the Warrior,” Baines discusses how the
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Turks are a “crude” people that Finch “navigates through” so well that it is akin to Caesar after
conquering the Gauls. Having established Finch’s bona fides, Baines wrote again that June to
Conway, this time without subtlety or honeyed words. “If your brother[-in-law] leaves this charge,”
began Baines, “without being in possession of a fair and convenient post in England, I shall think
that he has not a friend there, or at least very few, and those of no influence.” Slyly shifting topics,
he then begins to discuss Conway’s “lofty intentions concern the having of horses from this place.”
Horses were exceptionally expensive gifts, requiring substantial affluence for upkeep, the expenses
of maintaining a stable constant and ongoing. Yet, as the demand for horses soared during Charles
II’s reign, their role as an elite’s evidence of wealth, leisure, power, and even glory fed a horse
culture that demanded exotic stock from around the world. English elites would stable a wide
variety of horses: riding horses, for both the men of the house and those specifically trained for the
ladies; horses for hunting fox or boar; warhorses; horses for the track, dressage, coach and carriage;
even those for the most banal work around the estate. Therefore, Baines’s shift to discussing
Arabian horses, famed for their hot-blooded temperaments and physical form superbly built for
speed, would have touched a nerve on any gentleman of worth and garnered considerable favor if
one could provide such a specimen. A horse of such good breeding could attract the eye of Charles
II and win its owner incredible status. To that end, Baines noted that, “My lord [Finch] has at this
day a very fine horse, I think as good as most I have seen in Turkey,” perhaps, he suggests, for
Conway. Baines elaborates further with details regarding the selection of Arabian horses and the
fine qualities of the specimen in question. “It is too big to fit, as I understand, between the decks
of any ship” in the Levant. He concludes that such a horse would be a fine gift for the King,
especially if it were to come from Conway. 67
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Thus, the act of gift giving supported by one’s time in the Levant was yet another
worthwhile wage for those seeking to gain favor when arriving home. Dually, gifts also provided
the means of maintaining one’s standing or prospects in the Levant as well as earning new
courtesies while abroad. For example, several embassy chaplains sent numerous gifts to their
respective ambassadors and his family, knowing full well that it was under his graces they found
room and board easily in the Levant. John Covel was noteworthy in this regard, beginning his
gifting before Finch had even arrived in the Levant. In one generous instance, Finch wrote Covel
to thank the chaplain for purchasing the late Daniel Harvey’s mare, “set at a very high value” and
to the benefit of the late ambassador’s widow. Covel continued his practices, like other chaplains
before and after him, with those gifts going to Ambassador Finch including Covel’s wishes that
they occasionally be passed on to his brother, the Lord Chancellor’s, family. 68
Favor and standing were also earned through the simple act of letter writing and
maintaining correspondence with those in power. In 1674, John Covel and Ambassador Finch sent
separate congratulations to Joseph Williamson upon his appointment as the new “Private Secretary
of State to his Majesty of Great Britain.” Covel, in his epistle, noted, “it must seem strange indeed
that it [his congratulations] should be made by one who perhaps is altogether as remote from your
knowledge as he is from your person.” Nevertheless, “although I dare not arrogate myself the least
pretensions of any familiarity,” Covel included a small package of spices in a forthcoming
shipment to London. He concluded his letter with an assertion that, “I very well remember that I
have received so many favors from you as may justly entitle me to this present duty.” For his part,
Finch begged Williamson “his remembrance of favor” for supporting Finch and Baines, with a
promise to continue gathering “intelligence” to the benefit of the new Secretary’s position. 69
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Correspondence could also work as lever of ensuring one had influence over others, either
in the granting or offering of favors while in the Levant. For example, Ambassador Chandos sought
to promote his friends and colleagues in the Company while abroad. Typically, his extolling of the
virtues of those he wished to champion were often long-winded, intricate in their appeals to
previous favors and acquaintances. For example, in April 1684 Chandos wrote to Oliver Stiles, a
ragione master in Smyrna, seeking a position for a friend’s son. He began by detailing that, “last
shipping brought me several courteous letters from England, for one where of I am debtor (and so
intend to remain, until I hear from you) for a worthy friend of yours, and mine.” This “old friend…
desired [Chandos] to promote” his son to Stiles’ organization, “a most just and reasonable [request]
for you to condescend unto.” Chandos then continued, subtle in his intimidation, “In the next place
it is desired, that you will permit certain worthy, prudent, and intelligent gentlemen of your own
nation and factory (to whom for your purpose I have wrote and authorized by my order)” to join
the ragione. He concluded in a lengthy appeal to his authority,
I think it becoming me to assure you, yet you are now, and in your whole transacting on
my part of the business (between our friend and yourself) shall be considered, and treated
by me as a gentleman of a more than ordinary family, and repute, all your favor, I wish for
from you on this occasion, in return, is only that you will forbear hard thoughts and distrust
of me, until I deserve the contrary at your hands. I am in friendship to advise you, which is
yet my public capacity relates to the person of your King, my master, whose honor I will
not, nor cannot, dispense with at all, and therefore I do pretend yet my orders in his
Majesty’s name are to be obeyed in the Levant Company’s factories. 70
Finally, the ultimate wage of trade for those in the Levant was rewarded to the Company
itself. With such substantial revenues and gaining of the ears of those in Whitehall and Westminster,
the Company could afford to influence the highest positions in the land through similar methods
to the individual merchants discussed above. In the Company’s case, empowered by the King via
prerogative and blessed by Parliament, the General Court would employ the favor it had won
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through wealth and standing to control the Royal Navy, dictating the formation of fleets and
ordering admirals as it saw fit. The continuance of the commercial gains of the 1670s and 1680s
were wholly dependent on the Company’s ability to command such power. Independent of
wartime actions and advances against the Dutch and others, it was in peacetime that the Navy
worked to the great advantage of merchants, protecting convoys and maintaining free trade. The
granting of such command power to the Company is unsurprising, considering the Levant
merchantmen also served as an auxiliary force for the Navy when needed. To point, like many
fifth and sixth rate ships, the average Company ship in 1677 weighed anywhere from two hundred
to four-hundred and fifty tons, armed with at least twenty guns of various caliber. Further, out of
nine ships conscripted into the Navy’s service in 1672, three were East Indiamen and the remainder
all Levantine Merchantman. The Levant Merchant and Mary and Martha, each about three
hundred tons and owned by the Company, even helped retake St. Helena in May 1673 from the
Dutch. However, little has been printed regarding the Levant Company’s control over the convoys
during the peacetime period of 1674 to 1688. Contrary to Samuel Pepys memoirs, the English fleet
of the period was in vigorous health. Its more powerful first- and second-rate ships perhaps
“deplorable” and rotting in dock, but the third- through sixth-rate ships in a constant circuit
throughout the Mediterranean as they escorted English merchantmen. Even if markedly reduced,
the commissioned fleet accounted in its 1678 mobilization was no less potent or effective when it
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was brought to bear against Barbary corsairs, to intimidate the Turks, or challenge other European
merchantmen in the Levantine theater. 71
Hence, the Company did command considerable attention from the Office of the Admiralty
with the blessing of the English government. At its most basic, this relationship alleviated the
Navy’s paymasters from some of the burden accorded to paying their captains. For example, as
early as 1673, the Company gave orders to its consul in Leghorn to pay Captain Richard Rooth
twenty guineas per ship that he was to escort back to England. These payments were, accordingly,
passed on to the captains of the merchantmen Mary and Martha and John Bonaventure to fulfill.
In turn, the captains raised the payments from Robert Boddington and Edmond Sherman, the
English factors whose cargo was in the ships’ holds. 72 The recruitment of seamen along the routes
was also easy for Naval masters, as the booming trade ensured that a need to press men into service
was unnecessary. Many seamen volunteered for service, pools of professional sailors abounding
throughout the Mediterranean. These men made their way for foreign ports such as Alicante, Cadiz,
or Smyrna, seeking their fortunes either in trade or manning the ships that brought goods
throughout the Old World. 73
The Company’s payment for services rendered by the Navy continued throughout the early
1670s, with inbound convoys netting two-hundred dollars as an occasional “gratuity” for “the
kindnesses” of the men-of-wars’ captains who provided escort. 74 Beginning in 1675, however, the
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two-hundred dollars gratuity became official policy. Moreover, in addition to two-hundred dollars
for the captain’s troubles, the General Court should furnish a man-of-war “with $500 to buy
provisions and taking his Bills of Exchange for the same.” 75 Even with such funds, the Navy still
bitterly complained about the quality of provisions supplied by the Company in the region.
Admiral of the Fleet Edward Russell, first Earl of Orford, wrote to Heneage Finch, first Earl of
Nottingham and Lord Chancellor, that the beef was so full of grizzle that the sailors “mistook it
for poison.” Throwing it overboard, they also found that the beer had “great heaps in it, not unlike
men’s guts, which alarmed the seamen to a strange degree.” A few days after Russell dispatched
his concerns, a Captain Priestman also wrote to Nottingham, stating that, “the beer, cheese, and
butter is all bad, and in some casks of pork, ulcers are found thrust into the flesh; the men are very
concerned, and think that the Papists have found means to poison them.” Two years later, the
provisions allowance was increased again, to seven-hundred dollars and potential bonuses of an
additional three-hundred dollars as “gratuity.” 76
By the end of 1677, the Company sought to supplant the Admiralty’s autonomy in the
Mediterranean in totality. Meeting on 12 January 1677/78, the General Court noted that,
his Majesty having been pleased, by Mr. Pepys, Secretary to the Lords Commander of the
Admiralty, to signify unto Mr. Deputy and other merchants trading into the Mediterranean,
his resolutions to send out convoy to secure the trade of those seas against the Algerines…
desiring the Company to declare their pleasure whether they would have the Scanderoon
ships to go in April, and the Smyrna ships in August, or whether it might not be more
convenient, to go all together. 77
Accordingly, having gained the unconditional support of Charles II on the matter, the Company
wrote directly to Sir John Narborough, Rear-Admiral in charge of the Mediterranean fleet, rather
than working through Samuel Pepys or other middlemen. Thanking Narborough for his labors in
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protecting Company ships over the years, the Company dictated that he was to create a convoy to
Scanderoon. Throughout the letter, the General Court repeatedly acknowledged it is “his Majesty’s
fleet” and Charles had given orders to Narborough to respect the Company’s authority in the matter
of its command in the Mediterranean. In a series of letters, the General Court further suggested
that the new convoy begin its journey to the Ottoman Empire before the advent of winter,
particularly as a recent diplomatic “breach with the French” portended a potential war. The breach
in question concerned the marriage of Princess Mary to William of Orange in November 1677,
and had incensed the French to no end. Writing to his uncle, Daniel Finch explained that Charles
II had arranged the marriage “partly for the reasonableness of the thing, partly for the interest of
England, and partly in affection to the Prince [of Orange]” over the French Dauphin Louis. 78
Whatever the reasons for the breach, however, the Company urged Narborough to “conduct as his
Majesty desires you to provide” in defending the Company’s ships and adhering to their timetable,
rather than waiting until the spring and better weather. The Company was dictating Naval policy.
As it became clear that Narborough was not acting immediately, the Company sent more desperate
and haranguing correspondence to the admiral. As winter fast approached, they asserted that, “we
suppose by information given from Whitehall your honor may have received his Majesty’s
instructions to go down with a squadron of ships to Cephalonia.” 79 The same letter goes on to give
instructions on how to proceed with the convoy, what routes to take, and what information is to be
passed to various general ships and port authorities along the way.
After an additional intervention from Charles II on the Company’s behalf, Narborough
finally deigned to send his fleet in the fall, with the Company only demanding last minute changes
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regarding some of the captains of the men-of-war. 80 Writing, to both Richard Munden, consul of
Smyrna, and Ambassador Finch on 8 August 1678, the General Court boasted that Charles had
granted the Company Narborough’s fleet to provide security and that he was underway. However,
they stressed to Munden that, “We desire you to be very private in these orders, least they should
any way come to the knowledge of the French which might happen to be of evil consequence.” 81
Having informed the embassy members, the Company did its upmost to provide intelligence to the
Admiral’s fleet. To that end, they sent a letter on the 12 August, notifying their consuls that a large
French fleet, consisting of twenty-three French men-of-war, was positioned off the northern coast
of Italy. In addition, they stated that both Narborough and Company ships were to avoid the area
lest a confrontation occur and tensions erupt into war. If necessary, any ships that had to progress
onward to London were expected to join with Dutch convoys, their “amity to England” to be called
upon in the threat of losing perishable goods. 82 The Company further promised “more intelligence”
as it became known, sending successive orders to Narborough and fleet captains along the route,
ordering delays to allow for other vessels to join the convoys. 83 Though war did not break out
between the powers of France and England, and the breach was being addressed diplomatically as
possible, the Company further advised its consuls to be wary of the incoming sailors of the fleet.
Thus, in a 23 September letter to Consul Nightingale they encouraged that,
we see the animosities between us and the French did still continue, but we hope we shall
hear no more of them, his excellency very prudently met with the French Ambassador and
found that… although a war should happen between the two crowns, to live amicably
together, which you are to promote all you can, and to give the strict charge to the factors
to do the same themselves, and also to be very careful to prevent all discord amongst
seamen. 84

80

SP 105/154, 51, 61. Why the Company opted for a change in the personnel is unspecified in the archive.
SP 105/114, 108, 112.
82
SP 105/154, 71.
83
SP 105/114, 113-14, 116.
84
SP 105/114, 119.
81

102
The war with France avoided, Narborough’s command of the fleet fell back to Admiralty
oversight, with no further interference from the Company until 1681. By that time, the Company
once again gained the blessings of Charles II to dictate orders to the Mediterranean fleet. Writing
to Rear-Admiral Arthur Herbert on 6 March 1681, the Company repeated its reliance on “the
enclosed orders from the right honorable commission of the admiralty,” informing Herbert, “you
will understand that it is his Majesty’s pleasure that one or two of his Majesty’s ships under your
command be sent to Tunis.” 85 Thus the supplanting of the Royal Navy continued until the end of
the century, as the fleets became more professionalized, with men of rank losing position in the
fleets to those of merit and skill during the Nine Years’ War. Beyond the shadow of a doubt,
though, the orders given to naval commanders during this period exemplifies that the navy’s
principal occupation was to safeguard English merchant vessels, either in convoys or through
patrol duties in the Mediterranean. Moreover, the wages of trade could garner the ability to
command State power itself.

3.7

Conclusion

The reasons Europeans went abroad, particularly the English, are many. Coming from
varying political and confessional backgrounds in London, these merchants had a pragmatic sense
of unity based around commercialism only. They did not represent a unified body or voice in
politics or religion. Therefore, at its base the impetus to undertake such hazardous overseas
ventures was the search for wealth, new goods, and new markets. Many of the men who pursued
these broader horizons were not saints with high moral visions, or even interested in pragmatic
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concerns such as learning. Instead, these men were on the take, seeking fortunes and subsequent
elevation in status. The Levant offered a means to quick pecuniary wealth for those willing to take
risks. A dumping ground for English cloth, men would take their new-found fortunes to establish
themselves back in England, sometimes into positions of political power, often into positions of
influence over the wider merchant communities. The wealth gained in Turkish commerce also
allowed for the exertion of State power in the form of naval command by the Levant Company.
The directing of fleet formations and acting as paymaster for the Navy itself highlighting the
institution as an apparatus of the State while also being a broker for private gains. The period of
1674 to 1688 uniquely positioned the English and the Company to take advantage of the fleet
without any external European opposition. Dedicated to protecting merchantmen from Barbary
corsairs and ensuring an efficient timetable via a system of convoys, the English reaped massive
profits from their Mediterranean ventures. In turn, these funds would also continue to enable
cyclical nature of purchasing the intangible goods of favor and influence.
In short, while merchants lacked a unity in voice or agenda, they were unified as an
ambitious body that sought affluence in its plethora of forms. The Ottoman Empire provided an
ideal location to accumulate wealth and power, compare religions, and explore vying political
systems via its cosmopolitan heterogeneity of Arabians, Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Moors, and
Turks. The environs of Constantinople, Aleppo, and Smyrna allowed for a libertine lifestyle that
enamored young English abroad for the first time in their lives. It was a religiously heterodox
society, concentrated in sprawling urban environments, alien to those from the British Isles. The
community abroad in the factories of the Levant, or at home in London, shared in their interest of
trade, not a conviction of religiosity or politics that dominated the narrative in England. To
continue to try to determine their political standing, religiosity, or relations with the State as a
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grouping juxtaposed to the government is counterproductive. What is apparent is that the Levant
offered a veritable smorgasbord of opportunity for those willing to take the risk of travel and a
proving ground for those who came back. The Levant gave those who travelled to it the means and
tools necessary to design a complex existence of their own devising once they arrived home. 86
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CHAPTER 4.

ANGLO-OTTOMAN RELATIONS, 1672

In the days of Sultan Mehmed III of famous memory (unto whose soul be granted divine
absolution) it being desired, that the subjects, merchants, and their interpreters, might freely
and securely come, merchandize, and negotiate through all the parts of this imperial
dominion, and that such Capitulations, and other privileges, and imperial commands, as
had been granted unto the Nation of the Kings and Princes in peace and amity with this
high port, as France, Venice, Poland, and others, might also be granted to the subjects of
the said English Queen, and all others coming under the English banner; in confirmation
of which request, were given and confirmed. 1
The renegotiation of the binding diplomatic document between the Ottoman Empire and
the English was long overdue by 1675. Its preamble, seen above, relied on prior diplomatic
contracts between the two powers dating to the time of Elizabeth I and called into its accounts
similar dispensations given to other Western European powers. At a distinct contractual
disadvantage when compared to their rivals in the Mediterranean by 1675, the English sought to
make up for the losses of the previous decades with a bold, new treaty. The resulting Capitulations
won in 1675 lowered the duties incurred to less than those of other European powers. In addition,
it combated Turkish infringements on English shipping and appealed to a joint approach between
the two civilizations in redressing the piracy that was rampant in the Mediterranean theater.
Succinctly, then, the new Capitulations were ambitious while also a continuation of the past
practices of holding trade predominate. Given that Anglo-Ottoman relations crossed cultural,
political, and religious boundaries, a brief exploration of the formalization of these relations is
necessary. Though not unique among European powers seeking to capitalize on the wealth of the
Levant and its terminus of the Silk Road, the English relationship with the Sublime Porte that
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began during the late Restoration defined ongoing diplomatic ties with the Turks for the
subsequent century.
This chapter will investigate the aspects of the Capitulations won by Ambassador Sir John
Finch in 1675. It begins with an exploration of the term “Capitulations” and the general diplomatic
standing between Christian and Islamic powers of the early modern period. Often proclaimed as
pivotal in their structure, the Capitulations are further rarely detailed, lacking substantial analysis
in the historical narrative. Thus, the contemporaneous praise for Ambassador Finch’s success is
better understood once the Capitulations itself are analytically established. Finally, the chapter will
conclude with a study of the 1672 embassy. Focusing on the men who made up the embassy, it
will highlight their contributions to the English’s achievement in 1675. Alongside those efforts,
this chapter studies their own individual labors, noting how their time in the Levant made these
men successful on their return to England and how their accomplishments contributed to the wider
political, cultural, or commercial environment of the period.

4.1

Capitulations

The term “capitulations” refers to the formal diplomatic agreement between two
governments in the early modern period, specifically a European and an Islamic state. The
agreement typically held that all disputes and concerns within a European trade community were
the responsibility of the respective community’s ambassador. Every major European power
present in the Ottoman Empire – the French, Dutch, Venetians, and other minor states – adhered
to their own, independently negotiated capitulations. The novelty of capitulations, as opposed to
traditional diplomatic treaties, were that they existed between a European Christian power and an
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Islamic power, influenced heavily by the perceptions an Islamic civilization held regarding proper
interactions with non-Muslims.
According to the Islamic worldview in the early modern period, the world was divided into
a dichotomous entity. One part of this splitting was the dār al-Islām, translated as “house of Islam”
or “adobe of peace.” For those residing in the dār al-Islām, the enforcement of Islamic law was
paramount, with clear expectations on proper behavior, societal hierarchies that preferred Muslims
over other Abrahamic faiths, and a government controlled by Muslims. Mirroring the dār al-Islām
was the dār al-Gharb, the “house of the West” in Ottoman sources, or the “adobe of war” in more
literalistic translations. Though presented in a language of conflict, the dār al-Gharb has become
more associated with describing an area lacking enforcement of Islamic laws, with Muslims being
in the minority or nonexistent. Though a hypothetical state of war could exist between the dār alIslām and dār al-Gharb, it was often the most intransigent of ulema, or religious scholars, who
held to such Manichean worldviews and not the general populace.
To bridge the gap between the worlds, a form of agreement came into existence that would
provide the basis of future diplomatic relations that are ongoing to today. Dār al-Sulh, “the adobe
of conciliation,” created a state of being that allowed for truces between Muslims and non-Muslims.
Tracing its origins back to the 633 Najran Treaty between Muhammad and the Christian
community in Medina, Islam has always been willing to accommodate interactions with ostensibly
adversarial outsiders. 2 Although adherents to the religion could view Islam as in continual conflict
with nonbelievers, these conflicts did not have to take the form of violent war. Thus, the suspension
of open and violent hostilities was possible so long as those in the dār al-Islām felt unthreatened.
A circumstance of détente proved perfectly acceptable, preferred over open warfare. The state of
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Dār al-Sulh also recognized the necessity of according formal emissaries from non-Muslim
civilizations with protected statuses. However, viewing it unnecessary to formalize relations in the
form of an embassy that the Europeans so cherished, Islamic powers rarely deigned to debase their
believed position of superiority over religious opponents by sending emissaries to the West. For
example, the Ottoman Empire only dispatched reciprocal ambassadors to Western Europe in the
1790s. Arriving in Berlin, London, Paris, and Vienna, these men were not even Muslims. Instead,
they were Ottoman Greeks selected due to their expendability, ostensibly Christian and therefore
not at risk of converting from Islam to an Infidelic system of beliefs. Relatively unsupported by
the Turks, these embassies failed and were revived in the 1830s only by necessity. Nonetheless,
ambassadors from the West were the nominally recognized embodiment of a ruler and treated with
restraint otherwise not afforded to other nonbelievers. 3
Foremost, trade drove the European desire to interact with an Islamic state. Hence,
capitulations granted by an Islamic power often formed around the pursuit of marketplace
enterprises. The drafting of capitulations, however, differed from other trade agreements.
Capitulations were a unilaterally decreed and nonnegotiable document, the Sublime Porte viewing
treating with envoys from the dār al-Gharb as an act of lessening the power and prestige of the
Sultan. In its view, a European ambassador was merely as a leader of another millet, or
semiautonomous Christian community that owed taxes to the Ottoman government for its
continuing freedoms. From this belief, any capitulation extended the position of amān mu'aqqat,
or safe conduct for a millet representative, to the ambassador and the European community, or
mustaʾmīn, an embassy represented. Coached in a language of imperialistic hümâyun, the Turks
viewed the decrees as majestic dictates. Contrariwise, the English would describe the Capitulations’
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terms in a language of divine right, or “sacred” and inalienable guarantees tied to their own
monarch’s divinity and independent of any decree given by another earthly imperial overlord. 4
The mutability of language in the translation of the Capitulations is significant and further defined
relations between the powers. For the English, the terms were amendable and fluid. They viewed
capitulations as a negotiated diplomatic agreement between two equal rulers despite decorum to
the contrary. Ambassadors, from all European powers, would continually strive to alter the decrees
of the Sublime Porte, seeking a better position in the marketplace than their respective rival powers
had won in similar capitulatory decrees. On the part of the Turks, the decrees could easily be
retracted or declared with significant changes, arbitrarily arranged and at the behest of the Sultan
alone. The rights of the mustaʾmīn could be ignored and imposed upon by the immediate needs of
the Ottoman state. Therefore, unlike the treaties of the later eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries between Mughal India and England, or the Ottomans and Britons at that later date,
capitulations

were

granted

4.2

privileges

with

little

to

no

concessions.

5

The Capitulations and Articles of Peace, 1675

The Capitulations of 1675 were important in establishing the strictures and provisions of
Anglo-Ottoman relations for the next century. For the English, the primary negotiator of the
Capitulations was Ambassador John Finch, who employed previous Capitulations as a blue print.
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His Ottoman counterpart was to be the Grand Vizier. However, it often fell to the Reis Effendi,
the Ottoman equivalent of a foreign minister, to design the decrees. Furthermore, like everything
in the Turkish government, the lubricant of money, liberally shared with the Grand Vizier and his
entire staff, aided Finch throughout. Thus, the 1675 Capitulations came about as the tenth issuance
of formalized relations between the Turks and England. Ambassador Finch’s achievement in
garnering a new draft would stand for more than one hundred years. 6 His rendition of the
Capitulations would encompass many previous articles and add new aspects to the relationship
between the two states. For example, the 1675 agreement provided a new trust in English
accountability as the Turks opted for the discontinuance of Ottoman oversight of the Company’s
books in the Levant. Broken down further, the 1675 document would also continue the practices
of ensuring protections for English merchants. It additionally detailed how interactions with
Turkish courts should proceed regarding the pursuit of lawsuits, rectifying abuses, and repaying
debts. Finally, it guaranteed the right of due process for English subjects under the purview of the
English ambassador and the assignation of the rates for customs, tariffs, taxes, and duties. 7
Foremost in Finch’s renegotiation was the establishment of free trade via the freedom of
movement. Specifically, the English “nation, and the English merchants, and any other nation or
merchants which are or shall come under the English banner and protection… may always pass
safe in [Turkish] seas, and freely in all security may come and go into any part of [Turkish]
dominions.” In exchange, the two monarchs agreed to strict observances of “friendship” in the
formalized language standard of the period. Enshrined throughout was the freedom of movement
in the agreement, as ships, “goods and faculties shall not receive any hindrance or molestation.” 8

6

The granting of Capitulations occurred in 1580, 1601, 1607, 1612, 1618, 1621, 1641, 1647, and 1662.
Capitulations, Article VIII, IX, XV, XVI; The Librarian and Keeper of the Papers in the Foreign Office, ed. Treaties,
&C. Between Turkey and Foreign Powers, 1535-1855 (London, : 1855), 269-83; Wood, A History, 98.
8
Capitulations, Article I.
7

111
To protect English merchants and shipping, the Turks agreed that “beglerbegs, begs, captains,
masters of Imperial ships… and all [Turkish] ministers, subjects and slaves, shall always obey and
keep the tenure of the sworn capitulations.” Thus,
If the pirates… who infest the seas with their frigates, shall be found to have taken any
English vessel, or to have robbed or spoiled their goods and faculties... [Turkish] ministers
shall with all diligence seek out such offenders, and severely punish them, and cause that
all such goods, ships, moneys, and whatsoever hath been taken away shall be… presently,
justly, and absolutely restored to the English. 9
Such caveats regarding corsairing acknowledged the professed power that the Ottoman Turks
claimed to have had over the Barbary powers of the period. Therefore, the Turks extended a
claimed guarantee that,
All English men, or subjects of England, which be found slaves in our state, or shall be
demanded by the Ambassador, or Consul, the cause shall be duly examined, and such
persons as are found truly to be subjects of England shall be set free, and delivered to the
Ambassador, or Consul. 10
Additionally, “at any time safely and securely” English vessels to the Ottoman Empire could
“come and harbor in any of the scales and ports of [Turkish] dominions, and likewise may from
there depart at their pleasure, without detention or hindrance of any man.” 11 In practice, however,
the Sublime Porte often impeached upon or completely these latter three articles as it saw fit.
Frequently, the embassy would appeal to the powers of the English state to intervene in such
instances, either via threat of naval intervention, or by bribing the Grand Vizier, or other Ottoman
officials, to the Company’s cost and chagrin.
In addition to guaranteeing securities for the pursuit of commercial enterprises, the
Capitulations also proclaimed an extension of assistance in the form of Turkish help to English
shipping in distress whether engaged in trade or not. The Turks agreed that, “if it shall happen that
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any English vessel, great or small, fall into any misfortune, danger of sea, or any other necessity,
all the Imperial vessels… shall give [the English] help and succor.” Further, if any English ships
“shall have suffered shipwreck… all beglarbegs, cadis, governors, ministers, and other [Turkish]
slaves, shall give them all assistance… [and] make sufficient search and examination to find out
and recover the goods, and restore them to the English.” 12 Nonetheless, in the fear that asking for
help from the Turks may result in extensive assistance fees and the loss of goods through theft, the
English often opted to have comprehensive inspections of their ships before entering Turkish
dominions to prevent such scenarios. Held at Leghorn, repairs of those vessels found wanting in
their maintenance were at the expense of the ship’s captain and not the Company. Moreover, when
weather was a concern, the Company also would enter extensive dialogues with local agents to
ascertain if profits outweighed the risk of running into a storm. Unsurprisingly, profit margins
often won out over concerns of shipwreck, the minor insurance of Turkish assistance likely aiding
the General Court in reaching their decision. 13
The Capitulations likewise established the geographic boundaries of the English factories
and Turkish control over them. In addition, this enshrined the rights guaranteed to the ambassador
in overseeing the nation and creating a household for himself. The ports of Constantinople, Cyprus,
Smyrna, and Scanderoon provided official Turkish docking points, with the English to pay duties
on all ships upon landing. Any other docks were considered prohibited sites to offload goods into
Turkish markets. 14 English factories outside of Constantinople were to be allowed, or officially
confirmed for the first time as existing, at Aleppo, Alexandria, Algiers, Cairo, Smyrna, Tripoli,
Tunis, “or any other parts… where the English, may at their pleasure establish their consuls, and
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in like manner remove them, or change and appoint others in their places, and none of [the Turkish]
ministers shall oppose, or refuse to accept them.”

15

Such an allowance allowed for previous

clerical oversights in accounting for factories and the growth of new markets. Additionally, this
critically emphasized the English desire for free trade and granting the Company a right to expand
English influence in the region independent of Turkish approval. The embassy itself was allowed
the novelty of taking “into their service any janissary, or interpreter, at their own charge and choice.”
Nevertheless, no janissary or other Turkish subject could “intermeddle with [the embassy’s]
service against their [the English’s] liking or consent.”

16

In practice, this allowed for

intermediaries such as dragomen. However, it would also permit the independence of the
ambassador from Turkish oversight so feared in the establishment of the unruly janissary corps. 17
These postings were coveted by Turkish subjects, as the ambassador was also granted the right to
exempt his servants from any taxations on their income or their estates – a rare concession owing
that all estates of Turkish subjects were not private, but theoretically owned by the Sultan to
feudally dispense as he saw fit. 18 Known as avanias, the English widely abused these tax credits,
often selling the right to Turks for a substantial kickback. Indeed, they proved so popular among
the Sultan’s subjects, that Paul Rycaut would recount that Turkish officials “would tell [English]
merchants that in case their estates were seized and one of their hands cut off, and they expelled
from the country… that the next year they would return again… so wedded were they to their own
interests, and to the delights of the Turkish air.” 19 In addition, the embassy was officially allowed
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a waiver on the import and consumption of alcohol. 20 A prohibited practice in Islam, the imbibing
of alcohol among the Europeans was accepted under the law, so long as it remained ostensibly
behind closed doors in the embassy. Moreover, such allowances for the importation of alcohol
simultaneously allowed its consumption by those Turks who came from a distinct, and thus
privileged, ruling class.
In regards to the oversight of fellow nationals, the Capitulations gave the ambassador new
extensive powers to act independently of the Ottoman legal system. As with any commercial
pursuit, disputes arose and redresses sought out via the courts. Accordingly, the Turks sought to
diminish their involvement in these disputes, fearful of becoming entangled in burdensome
litigation. If any Turkish subject “shall accuse any English to have done him wrong, and shall
therefore raise any pretense upon him by violent or partial witness,” Turkish officials were to “not
give care unto them, nor accept them, but the cause shall be advised to the Ambassador or Consul
Resident of the English Nation, to the end that the business may be decided with his knowledge,
and in his presence.” Continuing the deference of grievances relegated to the English, the
Capitulations go on to explain that, “if there happen any controversy amongst [the English]
themselves, the decision thereof shall be wholly left to their own Ambassador or Consul, according
to their own right and laws.” 21 Such sentiments did diminish attempts by merchants to seek the
Turkish courts as a point of retribution. Yet, simultaneous to preventing Turkish entanglement, the
Articles complicated the Ambassador’s duties by forcing him to oversee the complex disputes
merchants may present at any given time. Indeed, a significant portion of ambassadorial
correspondence during Finch’s, Lord Chandos’, and William Trumbull’s embassies revolved
around the collating of affidavits, verifying accounting, and seeking testimony to redress any
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claims. One can sense a growing frustration in their correspondence regarding some cases, as
proceedings and counterclaims continued for years on end. Nevertheless, Article IX clearly
outlined the processing of claims, requiring sworn testimony from witnesses to either clear or
collect a debt. 22
Finally, the Capitulations defined the limits on specific imports and exports. Beyond a
tallying of goods, the articles that focus on commodities establish insights into both English and
Ottoman goals in their pursuit of diplomatic relations. For example, of concern for the Turks was
the importation of “arms, gunpowder, and other such prohibited commodities.” 23 Fearful of
rebellions, such as the 1648 Atmeydanı incident that resulted in the death of Sultan Ibrahim, or the
1659 Abaza Hasan Revolt, the Turks were acutely aware of their tenuous domestic standing arising
from unpaid janissaries or overzealous viziers. 24 Infrequently, the import of guns did occur despite
these prohibitions, and much to the consternation of the Company. When caught, Company
officials would only censure the merchant in question, imposing a punitive taxation, and strongly
condemning such dangerous trade in future transactions. 25 The continuance of popular imports to
England, such as figs, raisins, and currants were further guaranteed in the Capitulations, a yearly
allowance of exportation assured for “the use of his Majesty's kitchen, if there be not a dearth and
scarcity of such fruit in the country.” 26 Silk was also granted a tax waiver, allowing the English to
avoid the obligatory three percent custom rate found on all other goods and corner the silk market
for a brief duration to the loss of their European competitors who still owed customs. However,
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only in Smyrna could the English purchase duty-free silk. Cleverly, the Turks would then not
charge the English any taxation on the popular material, but instead derive elevated duties from
local dealers. 27 Specifically mentioned alongside silk are chilies, cloth, cony skins, cordovans,
drugs, lead, tin, and rhubarb, and all are price controlled within the articles. 28 Yet, consistency of
customs on these goods seemed to be a frequent issue. Found throughout the Capitulations is the
extensive description of equal enforcement of duties at all ports of entry and at a rate equal to, or
below, that charged to other European powers. For example, Article LI dedicates a significant
portion of its passage to discussing this concern, stating that
for the time to come when the said merchants shall desire to load such goods, and it be true
that they have already paid their custom of such merchandise, they shall not demand any
second or new customs, provided that the loaded merchants do not mingle their goods,
which have not paid custom with those which have already paid custom.
Repetitively, Articles LII, LVI, LX, and LXI further state the prohibition on double payments and
combining of product containers to confuse customs officials.

As a cornerstone of future relations, the Capitulations of 1675 enshrined the English as
supplicants to the Sublime Porte, but in better standing than other European powers of the time. In
the immediate period after the signing of the new agreement, Ambassador Finch proudly and
rightfully celebrated his achievement. He wrote in his correspondence with the General Court that
he believed the Capitulations would save the Company $60,000 a year while simultaneously
positioning the English above their perennial Dutch rivals. For their part, the Dutch were forced to
pay three times more than the rate the English paid. 29 Consequently, traders from the United
Provinces found they could only afford to concentrate on Smyrna markets, trading in cloth as at
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about 7,000 pieces per annum, or thirty percent less volume than the English. 30In the next decade,
the success of its passage would likewise further help the English overshadow the Venetians in the
Levant. The Italian city-state became an insignificant competitor that limited trade increasingly to
the confines of Constantinople with a focus luxury goods such as damasks and silks. However,
while overwhelmingly a document for the establishment of relations regarding commercial
interchanges, the Capitulations also hint at the wider political processes involved in their formation.
The interplay between Turkish and English officials is clear, particularly in regards to the oversight
of their respective nations’ subjects, interactions between peoples, and the freedom of movement
guaranteed within its passages. Disputes were constant between the English and Turks regarding
the diplomatic settlement found in the decrees, challenged by the English as they attempted to
widen their influence in the region. Redressing these concerns were amendments and deals made
with the Grand Vizier. Such additions required the occasional epistolary intercession from the
Privy Chamber, Whitehall, and/or other English officials, sometimes aided by bribes and general
threats backed by the Royal Navy’s presence. Nonetheless, what change that would occur in
diplomatic relations owed to the dynamics of interaction between the ambassador and the Sublime
Porte’s officials. Eventually, these interactions evolved to a status of perceived equality among the
monarchs in later centuries rather than a submissive petitioner before an imperial court. Finch’s
embassy, then, was a new beginning and pivotal event, a defining moment in Anglo-Ottoman
relations that was possible thanks to those who had participated in it.

30

Wood, A History, 99.

118
4.3

The Personalities of the 1672 Embassy

The men who made up the 1672 embassy, and its breakthrough in renegotiating relations
with the Ottoman Turks, came from a variety of backgrounds. From the meanest of beginnings
and clawing their way up the ladder of mercantile conquests to a status of success, or being born
into a prominent family and granted the leisurely life with which to explore the world as they saw
it, these men are essential to contextualizing the historical narrative. They contributed to the
embassy’s success, the resurgence of English power in the Mediterranean that would continue into
subsequent centuries, and provide new insights into a world that remained relatively unexplored
by fellow, contemporaneous Europeans. Whereas previous embassies focused exclusively on the
pursuit of trade, the 1672 embassy was the shifting point in English ventures abroad in the Levant
to more than commercial initiatives. For example, focusing on some of these men’s activities in
the Levant, it quickly becomes evident that the embassy had cultural contributions to make
alongside its fulfillment of the Articles and mercantile concerns it undertook. On the embassy’s
widest periphery were the embassy chaplains, sent to regulate the behavior of the men trading
abroad. Frequently these holy men have been portrayed as cloistered and sedentary. 31 However,
beginning as early as 1631, the embassy chaplains fulfilled various requests for scholars and
divines living back in England. Archbishop William Laud was the earliest such solicitor,
requesting that Aleppo-based Chaplain Edward Pococke obtain Arabic and Persian manuscripts
for Laud’s Divinity studies. 32
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Working in the 1670s, Chaplains Robert Huntington and John Luke acted on orders from
John Locke and Robert Boyle to collect further manuscripts, artifacts, and assorted data to expand
the sciences and humanities, both at the universities and for these individual men’s libraries. For
example, in 1670, Huntington sailed to Aleppo to take over Pococke’s appointment. Before
departing, Huntington received correspondence from both Robert Boyle and John Locke
encouraging him to continue Pococke’s practice of collecting manuscripts. In his reply to Locke,
he asserted that he was eager to fulfill the “commands” and “instructions” both luminaries made
of him to obtain various eastern tracts. 33 Moreover, Pococke, Luke, Huntington, and other
chaplains went as far as to learn Arabic while in Aleppo. With these language skills, these men
sought to better understand the confessional differences that existed between Eastern Christians,
Muslims, and Protestants in England. Moreover, they provided them with the ability to further
comprehend the society they had immersed themselves in. All the while, these chaplains
continually reported their findings to John Locke and others. 34
Upon reading these men’s observations, it is clear that they found the most startling and
significant part of their journey was the religiously heterodox inherent in Turkish society. John
Luke, chaplain at Smyrna, extensively recorded how much he interacted with local Muslims and
Eastern Christians. Through these interactions, he sought to understand the respective religions of
those around him, and better integrate their own confessional doctrine into Anglican beliefs. Luke
left an extensive diary in which he recorded that many Muslims and Eastern Christians would
attend the religious services of the English factories. In his observations and mingling, Luke was
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not alone. Several chaplains in Constantinople noted the same heterodox environment and interest
of locals in foreign confessional practices. 35 Summarily, rational study of competing faiths
predominated these men’s concerns. Their scholarship remained free from the prejudicial reactions
ingrained in English society regarding those who were not of the Protestant faith. They hoped that
by understanding the diverse confessional communities of the Levant that they could return home
and improve English society and the religious settlement.
Yet, even with the extensive contributions Huntington and Luke made to the libraries of
universities and luminaries, foremost among these chaplains was John Covel in Constantinople.
Educated at Cambridge, elected as a fellow in 1659 and graduating with his MA in 1661, Covel
was a trained scholar. Appointed chaplain of the English factory and embassy in Constantinople
in 1669, Covel was eager to go to the Near East. The opportunity to travel to the Ottoman Empire
allowed him to study eastern Christianity while also permitting him to turn a profit at trade. 36
Guaranteed a salary of £100 per annum, an allotment of £100 cloth to trade upon arriving in the
Levant, food and room provided by the ambassador’s household, and granted entry to the factories’
warehouses for storing any goods, the position of chaplain proved far too tempting to pass for the
young scholar. 37 In the historical analysis surrounding the embassy, he is noted predominately for
being present at the 1675 negotiations of the English Capitulations, offering a rare, surviving
eyewitness account of the proceedings. Though, despite being present that day, he did not enter
the final royal chamber and approach the Sultan. This was deeply disappointing for Covel as

35

Ibid., 246-47.
Elisabeth Leedham-Green, "Covel, John (1638-1722)," in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. H.C.G.
Matthew and Brian Howard Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Sir Eliab Harvey, Assistant to the
Levant Company, wrote Covel in 1669 that he “got [him] chosen to go Chaplain to Constantinople.” It seems that
Covel was writing Eliab to petition for the position of ambassador, with Daniel Harvey seeking a recall at that time.
Nonetheless, Covel sought his position in the Levant rather than merely appointed to the Levantine theater.
Interestingly, with the death of Ambassador Harvey in late 1672, Covel temporarily acted as ambassador until John
Finch arrived in 1674.
37
Laidlaw, British in the Levant, 82-84, 89.
36

121
Thomas Baines and Ambassador Finch had assured him three days before that he would
accompany them in their audience. Nonetheless, Covel recorded what Company Treasurer Dudley
North, Ambassador Finch, and Baines had to say regarding their own accounts of that fateful
meeting. For example, he offered delightful minutiae regarding the meeting. Diligently counting
the length of the English’s audience with his own heartbeat, he concluded the audience lasted
“about two hundred of my pulses, so that in in all he [Finch] could not be there much above four
minutes at the most.” 38
More important than being a witness to the 1675 meeting, Covel also collected data for
scholars back in England. He was the first Briton to visit far away Nicomedia, providing a detailed
collection of observations and tracts about the city of religious fame. While in Nicomedia, his diary
particularly highlights his disgust with English and French “experts” of religion. In it, he stated
that there was an “abundance of Whiflers in those scrapes of learning.” Indeed, by the end of his
time in the Levant he wrote to a colleague that he “joined absolutely with you in your opinion of
that part of learning, and in your censure of professors of religion.” The “Whiflers’”
understandings of the foundations of the Christian faith far from the reality he had seen at sites he
had visited while abroad. 39 Thus, like other early Enlightenment thinkers, Covel was engaging in
a wider European intellectual arena that was fast becoming more complex, fragmented, and
uncertain than it ever had been in the past. 40 Like his fellow chaplains, he championed the rational
study of other faiths, never condemning them in a reactionary, xenophobic fashion.
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Beyond being an eyewitness to the successful Capitulations, a collector of data, or a critic
of entrenched confessional scholarship, Covel stands out for his promotion of religious heterodoxy
in his own worldview. Like other chaplains in the Levant, he was extremely interested in the Greek
Church. He spent much of his diaries comparing Anglicanism and Orthodoxy, in both doctrines
and practices.

41

For example, in one entry he focused on the ceremony surrounding

transubstantiation and the washing of feet by a Greek patriarch for a procession of beggars
portraying the apostles. In that procession was the inclusion of Judas, much to the interest and
shock of Covel. He sympathetically recalled the man playing Judas as a “wretch.” Out of all the
apostles, Judas had his feet washed first, followed by the others in ascending order and ending
with Peter. To Covel, this was an astonishingly backward procession, having started with the “great
traitor” and ending with the famed saint. The water used for this ritualistic bathing, now
consecrated, was quickly distributed among “the rabble” who wished to dip their handkerchiefs in
it. 42 Rather than being disdainful of the ritual, Covel was actively engaged in it and questioned it.43
His inquisitiveness was likely a result of the growing change in the intellectual climate of Europe
during the 1670s, with a widening of philosophical speculation and a new emphasis on scientific
study. 44 Breaking from the confessional and political assertions of his forefathers, who disdained
ceremony as idolatrous, Covel was participating in the growing critical thinking brought on by the
early Enlightenment. A practice that undoubtedly influenced his later tenure as Vice Chancellor of
Oxford.
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Joining Covel in his growing heterodoxy and enlightened approaches was Thomas Baines,
whom Covel recorded as being particularly open to comparing Muslims favorably to Christians.
Both men often shared each other’s company when possible, forming a bond that allowed both to
further analyze what it meant to be English. According to one incident in Covel’s diary, Baines
discussed his religious views with Vani Effendi, personal religious consultant to the Sultan. The
passage is worth quoting at some length, stating,
Baines told what kind of Christian he was, that he would rather die than worship
either cross, pictures, images or the like. He adored only one true God, and lived in
his fear only: he believed a Muslim, living up to the height of his law, may be
undoubtedly saved. He though himself obliged (though it was never so absolutely
in his power to do it) not to touch a hair of a Muslim’s head for his difference of
religion, but rather to help, assist, relieve, cherish them in every good office that he
was able to do for them. Here Sir Thomas Baines says he wept, and said he could
not believe any Christian came so near true Muslim, but they had all been idolaters;
and the standers by… cried out “Ah Adam - he was a good man.” 45
While Baines was clearly being politically astute in this instance, aware of the diplomatic
niceties in dealing with a highly placed Turkish official, it is a striking passage in how far Covel
notes that his companion goes in his opinion. Baines need not have been so emotive or
complimentary in his discussion with Vani Effendi. For his part, Covel does not offer any criticism
for his friend’s behavior. The environment in the Ottoman Empire catalyzed some, such as Baines
and Covel, to question their doctrines of faith and explore further what it meant to be Christian.
Indeed, Covel seemed equally impressed as Effendi at such open views regarding Islam,
questioning the surety Christians had regarding their religious path. This challenge to previous
doctrinal authority was also a common trait of the early Enlightenment thinkers.
Baines himself was the lifelong companion of Ambassador John Finch, both acquainted at
Cambridge while going through medical school together. During this time, the older Baines
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quickly became fond of his younger companion. The relationship is noteworthy, as Baines was
aware he had considerable influence over his more powerfully connected friend. Finch's letters to
his brother-in-law, Lord Conway, regarding his “good friend” Baines makes apparent how strongly
the latter controlled Finch’s opinion on all matters. In one such letter, written in July 1661, Finch
related to his brother-in-law his interest in pursuing marriage with a woman he refused to name.
Known as “Sarah” in surviving letters to her from Finch, the epistles are exceptionally romantic
and filled with superfluous declarations of love that suggest the deep enthrallment the young
anatomist had regarding his paramour. Regardless of his feelings toward her, though, “T.B.”
sabotaged the affair. Baines’ constantly barraged Finch with worst-case scenarios, such as the
“case I had children and died: how was it evident she would not dispose of her estate to her second
husband’s children or person.” 46 Finch informed Conway of his sadness that Baines’ points were
valid concerns and that he intended to break the engagement. With Finch’s attention no longer
divided, Baines maintained his jealous vigil over his companion, never challenged again for
Finch’s ardor.
Baines continued to promote a religiously heterodox, tolerant environment in Pera at the
embassy, having gained Finch’s attentions forevermore. Within Finch’s surviving diary are
passages regarding a continuing game that Baines and he pursued to pass the time in 1675. The
two men began a series of dinners with local Jesuits, inviting the Catholic priests over on multiple
occasions to discuss religion and European politics. Though Finch did not record the exact nature
of these dialogues, he and Baines clearly enjoyed the discussions enough to invite their Jesuit
guests back multiple times. Baines, according the ambassador, was the more vocal of the pair, well
versed in Catholic doctrine and glad to test his mettle against the Jesuits. And, for their part, the

46

Add. MSS 23215, 52; Nicholson, Conway Letters, 182.

125
Jesuits were far from offended by the more doctrinally poignant criticisms made against the
Catholic Church. The fathers seemed to have appreciated an intellectual discourse between the
vying faiths, spending several hours late into the night with pair of Britons. Such behavior by Finch
and Baines is atypical for the period. Fears of popery dominated both political and social discourses
in England and its factories in the Levant, with the Jesuits being one of the most proactively
militant voices in the Church and an expected enemy of any devout English Protestant. 47
Baines’s politics, however, remains relatively unknown. The only incidence one can find
of his political voice comes from an unsolicited letter to Lord Chancellor Heneage Finch, first Earl
of Nottingham. In an extensive June 1676 letter to Nottingham, Baines championed merchants and
trade concerns over other political affairs. Equating the government to a ship that “must be ‘put
into its trim’ to sail aright,” he argued that “customs, above all people, in the world, ought to be
preserved” foremost “unless you would disturb a nest of hornets.” To that end, “the clothier,
merchant, tradesman, husbandman or yeoman, expert mariner and others, may be compared to the
belly of a man, and must be well considered, unless he would take away the wealth, strength and
glory of it. Great policy is to busied in ordering of the ballast or the burthen, that the ship may
navigate well.” Continuing, he asserted that while “the greatest discontents arise from religion,”
confessional strife itself “is not so powerful in bringing in great changes, innovations and
disturbances as men usually judge.” Accordingly, it is religion's invasion of “civil liberty” and its
infringements on trade that cause a weak government, not its promotion of superstitious or false
practices. “Consider too that we are a trading people,” wrote Baines, “unless we are content to be
a weak, poor and contemptible part of the world; for we owe our wealth, strength and honor too,
to the trade.” Baines concludes his tirade with the simple admonition, “And so I finish my
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landscape of government, showing whence a commonwealth may receive from within is change
or ruin, and giving you, who are at sea, a map of the rocks.” 48
What is fascinating in this letter is the fact that Baines was not a merchant. He was an
anatomist associated with the embassy through his companionable relationship with John Finch.
Archive sources further suggest that he rarely participated in the wider commercial speculation
inherent in the Levant. He engaged in the marketplace and exchange of commodities less
frequently than anyone else in the embassy, and kept to a relatively conservative investment plan.
In this unsolicited letter to the Lord Chancellor, Baines is loudly expressing his political voice that
is otherwise absent. Moreover, he is stating such thoughts to an extremely powerful individual.
With his direct connection to Finch established through other personal letters that are not near as
inflammatory, it is clear that Baines did attempt to influence the politics of London despite his
removal from English soil. Baines, and those like him, made their voices heard in Whitehall and
Westminster through whatever means were available to them.
Another prominent party to the embassy who found later success after being abroad in the
Ottoman Empire was Dudley North, as noted previously. Yet, before his future achievements, he
began his life at great disadvantage. He was the fourth son of his father’s second wife and one of
fourteen children overall. As such, he was forced by his birth into a large family to seek a livelihood
independent of his father's financial support. With the field of law overcrowded in the 1650s and
medicine offering fewer openings, mercantile commerce was the only refuge for the young man. 49
Thus, with what little finances his father provided, North bought his way into an apprenticeship
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under Thomas Davies, a Levant Company merchant, in 1658 for £350 plus clothing, but without
additional sureties. 50
His rise in the ranks of Company was near meteoric, as the pragmatic and financially astute
North navigated the Levant business community deftly. Starting in Smyrna, he quickly became
known as efficient in his dealings, as well as for possessing a flash temper and propensity to cursing
fluently in Turkish when interrupted. 51 Even so, his reputation for competence secured him ever
better commissions and, by 1669, attracted the attention of merchant William Hedges. Hedges ran
a successful and large ragione, or merchant-house, in Constantinople and invited North to join him
there in its management. With Hedges departure in 1675, North took over the ragione for himself
and fast became a major commission agent in the Levant. His continuing business acumen soon
won him the position of Treasurer of the Company in the same year. A thankless position, the
Treasurer at Constantinople acted as both paymaster and banker, offering credit to Turks and
English alike while paying out Company salaries. His demeanor and position strained relations
with John Finch. Both men had no liking for one another, with North viewing Finch as conceited
and overelaborate, fanatical with implementing proper procedure. 52 Finch, for his part, felt poorly
paid and debased in his chosen role as an ambassador for traders. He inveighed frequently to
embassy staff that that the Turks should never learn he acted foremost on the behalf of the
Company and not the King. 53 Regardless of the cold feelings between the treasurer and
ambassador, the Capitulations of 1675 owed a great deal to North, even if uncredited by Finch.
For example, it was North who made all the financial arrangements for the grand processional into
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Adrianople that wowed the Turks. It was also North who selected all the interpreters, arranged the
negotiation’s agenda, met with the lower Ottoman officials, and paid the bribes to Sublime Porte
ministers when required. 54 Simultaneous to the unenviable task of pleasing the Turks through the
continual supply of bribes, North also had to appease the Company in London over its demands
for a balanced account book. In that, the Company consistently and bitterly failed to understand
the necessity of bribery in the Turkish system. For example, as early as 1672 the Company
expressed concern with their treasurer’s infrequent correspondence, “his accounts wanting” when
audited. As would be the case throughout his tenure overseas, the Company wrote North regarding
their desire for proper accounting documentation, “we cannot sufficiently wonder at this great
neglect, which you cannot but know renders us ignorant of our own affairs.” 55 Regardless, when
the Company recalled Finch, North ambitiously put forth his own name to fill the ambassador’s
post. The General Court, though, did not consider his appeal worthwhile. The Company selected,
James Brydges, the eighth Lord Chandos, as Finch’s successor, his sole competitor for the post in
the General Election being Sir Thomas Thynn, nephew of Secretary Coventry. 56
Born in 1629 to a Dutch immigrant family in England, Paul Rycaut is another notable of
the 1675 delegation who would not only help ensure the success of the Capitulations, but also hold
a degree of political influence after his time in the Levant. Going to school with Sir Peter Wyche,
ambassador to Russia in 1669 and son of Peter Wyche the Older, ambassador to the Ottoman
Empire 1627-1641, Rycaut developed a love affair for the Near East and Orient early on in life.
Shortly after his thirtieth birthday, he was appointed as secretary to Heneage Finch, third Earl of
Winchelsea and first cousin to Heneage Finch, first Earl of Nottingham and Lord Chancellor.
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Excelling in his position, Winchelsea put Rycaut’s name forth in 1661 at the Levant Company’s
General Court for the position of Company secretary in Constantinople. Winning the post, and
finding his fee of admittance to the Company waived due to Winchelsea, Rycaut went east to join
his master in the latter’s new role as English Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. As secretary, he
would serve dually as chancellor of the factory any time the ambassador was absent. He remained
onboard as secretary, and then Consul of Smyrna, when Daniel Harvey succeeded Winchelsea in
1669. When Harvey died in 1672, the ambassadorship defaulted to Rycaut in the interim, shared
with John Covel, while the two awaited John Finch’s appointment and arrival. 57
Finch found Rycaut indispensable as his cousins had in the past. He wrote his older brother
about Rycaut frequently, describing him in glowing terms that conveyed a closeness mirrored only
by his comments on Thomas Baines. It was to Rycaut that Finch entrusted missions of importance.
When necessary, Finch sent Rycaut home to London on at least six separate occasions to appear
before the General Court or to submit a petition to Whitehall. Determined to write about his
experiences since first arriving in the Levant, Rycaut envisioned his time abroad as both a shrewd
means to fame and income. He hoped to provide a comprehensive study regarding the Ottoman
Turks that otherwise was lacking for travelers and other interested parties. To that end, in his
foreword to his 1667 edition of The Present State of the Ottoman Empire, he wrote that, “I resolved
from my entrance into those countries, to note down in a blank book what occurred in that Empire,
either as to civil or military affairs; with what casualties and changes befell our trade, that so both
one and the other might serve for examples and precedents to future ages.” Broken into three parts,
his monograph covered the Turkish government, the ruling class, and its principals; the Ottoman
Empire’s moral philosophy, various religions and sects; and an exhaustive detailing of Turkish
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armed forces, weaponry, formations, and strategy. Near immediately, the omnibus became a best
seller. Resultantly, Rycaut quickly won an appointment into the Royal Society. Reprinted in
England twelve times in the seventeenth century alone, the text soon published internationally,
with another twenty publications in French, Dutch, German, Italian, Polish, and Russian. For
anyone travelling to the Levant, but especially diplomats, it was a must-read. Ambassador Chandos
would write to Rycaut in 1683, complaining that the book failed to detail the Sultan’s processional
adequately. John Covel, before joining the embassy on its journey to Adrianople in 1675, took
copious notes from the work. William Trumbull contacted Rycaut in 1686 to inquire what to bring
to the Ottoman Empire for his new posting as the English ambassador. Rycaut informed the new
ambassador simply that, “a chair and a horse litter will be useful in all ways and on all occasions.” 58
Essential to the running of the embassy and organizing the efforts toward the 1675 Capitulations,
Rycaut not only gained famed from his time abroad, but ensured the English commercial
ascendency in the theater with his efficient ministrations on the behalf of Finch and others.
Finally, the most important member of the embassy was Sir John Finch. Finch was part of
an extensive, politically influential clan. His older brother was Heneage Finch, first Earl of
Nottingham and Lord Chancellor from 1675-1682 under Charles II. Heneage's son, Sir Daniel
Finch, was a frequent correspondent with his uncle John, and later became Lord President of the
Council under George I. John's first cousin, Heneage Finch, third Earl of Winchelsea, and his other
first cousin, Sir Daniel Harvey, both served as previous ambassadors to the Levant. Indeed, Finch
was replacing Daniel Harvey as ambassador. Rounding out his familial circle of notables was Anne
Conway, his sister and famed Cambridge Platonist philosopher, who had married Sir Edward
Conway, first Earl of Conway and eventual Secretary of State for the Northern Department.
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Needless to state, Finch was extremely well connected and participated in a letter-writing circle
that counted among it some of the most influential scholars, politicians, and luminaries of his
time. 59
Finch, like Baines and Anne Conway, received instruction from Cambridge Platonist
Henry More while in school at Cambridge. 60 As a result, a majority of the scholarship surrounding
Finch has focused on his own philosophy and rendition of Cambridge Platonism. Finch argued
contrary to his mentor’s Platonic views, concluding that all knowledge is sensory and that it “arises
from sense and that what is not sensible is not intelligible.” 61 Like Locke, Finch was skeptical of
metaphysics and acknowledged the limits of human knowledge. His philosophical agreement with
Locke is not surprising, as Locke read the Cambridge Platonists and were in correspondence with
many of the philosophical school’s leading luminaries. 62
Finch’s confidants, such as his sister and brother-in-law, knew that he was continuing to
work on his political philosophy that he began under Henry More. With regular occasion, he
mentioned the enclosure of drafts in his letters to the Conways and inquired on their thoughts with
a promise to send further edits. For example, in a particularly whimsical and melancholic letter to
his sister, Finch mused that the goal of life was not to find happiness, but live life as a passage to
happiness hereafter. Organized religion was a hindrance on this passage, as was politics. Further,
one must remove one’s self from the bindings of the world to be pious and in accord with God. An
impossibility, he laments, for a true philosopher. He continued,
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This great Diana of life, that all adore, seems to me a very contemptible thing upon the
principles of Christianity and reason in its best condition. But then, my dear, if you add
how yet we spend one half of it almost to our best consent when we live not, it is if we are
asleep, and of the remaining part, more of our hours give us regret then satisfaction in
matters of action, or in the delight we count with, how small a portion is what of Him we
can say we lived, so go desire to live is over again.
What is unknown is the effect, if any, his treatise had on his circle of intimates or a broader
community of philosophers. Additionally, Finch frequently worried that his epistles detailing his
philosophy were lost in transit, “I wonder not yet one of mine with a sheet of my philosophical
discourses miscarried; but I wonder yet so many of mine got safe to your Lord [Conway].”
However, the treatise’s existence and his circulating of it does contradict any notion in the
historical narrative that merchants and their representatives for the Company were ill-disposed to
politics or anything beyond commerce. 63
Unfortunately, Finch’s view on English domestic politics remains woefully obscure despite
his treatise and letters to confidants. Though coming prior to his embassy in the Levant, two letters
are provocative in their suggesting Finch was actively involved in the soft-power politics of favor
while abroad in Italy. The first is a June 1665 letter in the archives at Burley-on-the-Hill from Lord
Conway to Finch. In the letter, Conway expresses his continuing friendship with his brother-inlaw. He assured the ambassador that he exerted himself to work in his favor, reminding those in
power of the ambassador’s past assistance in matters unspecified. Conway alluded to favors Finch
had worked for Henry Bennet, first Earl of Arlington, and Roger Boyle, first Earl of Orrery. To
point, he wrote,
I that had no greater passion then to show that your friends could remember you in
your absence made answer, that I could easily make as much pretended friendship
as he [Orrery] wished, but I would not assure him of a real friendship unless he
made satisfaction for an injury he had done to you about two years since, by
promising my brother an employment for you, and afterwards not perform it. 64
63
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However, it is in the letter’s conclusion that one finds the most interesting illustration of soft-power
politics. In his final line, Conway wrote that, “I hope to bring you in to succeed Secretary [William]
Morrice [Secretary of State since 1660] in his office, which I think more eligible than removing
[you] to Constantinople.” Finch’s response is, sadly, unknown. Yet what is apparent is that Finch
was part of a patronage system and an adept enough player to solicit favors of some gravity while
abroad, including a lobby headed by Conway to have Finch appointed Secretary of State.
To point, Finch wrote similarly again to Lord Conway in 1672. He became a matchmaker,
setting up personal marriages for powerful players such as Sir Thomas Osborne, first Earl of Danby
and Lord High Treasurer to Charles II, on the advice of Conway. Finch was quite happy to have
“twice since my return out of the Country” met Danby regarding a “concern in which if all the
interests I leave in England can do anything he shall be served.” Danby wished to have his son,
Edward, Viscount Latimer and Gentleman of the Bedchamber, marry Elizabeth, daughter of Simon
Bennett and Finch's step-brother. Despite his recall from Italy by Charles II to serve in the Levant,
Finch labored with the help of Baines to cement this marriage quickly before departing London.
Writing a letter in November 1672 to Conway again, Finch assured his brother-in-law that though
leaving the country, he left the matter of the marriage in the able hands of a trusted associate of
both himself and Baines to finalize. He signed off with the “hope all our wishes may succeed” and
the humble position that “I will be the least responsible for [the] marriage’s” occurrence. 65
Unfortunately, while in the Ottoman Empire, Finch’s political voice disappears altogether,
his attempts at influence difficult to find. Nonetheless, though quiet in his epistles regarding
politics and the growing Exclusion Crisis among other matters, he did keep actively abreast of the
developing news in England, engaging in London’s ideological conflicts even if an observer from
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afar. His greatest help in these efforts was his nephew, Daniel Finch. For example, in January 1678,
Daniel wrote one of the longest surviving letters to Sir John regarding Titus Oates, the Popish Plot,
and resulting Exclusion Crisis. 66 Daniel’s fears of the collapse of governance are apparent
throughout the letter. He provides his uncle with any scrap of gossip he could offer regarding Lord
Chancellor Heneage’s role in matters, elaborating further when necessary. And, though we do not
have John’s reply, it is clear in his responses to his uncle that the ambassador’s views and opinions
deeply influenced Daniel. 67 Another lengthy letter in May 1680 had Daniel detailing how the
Levant Company had offended Whitehall by appointing John’s replacement independent of royal
approval. Daniel stated that the King reproved the Company’s actions quickly. For example, when
Charles “told the Company when they waited on him that he would give them leave to propose to
him a fit person for his ambassador, [he] bid them take care to name one that he might think fit to
approve.” In both cases, though John’s response no longer exists, the Levantine ambassador
eagerly devoured news regarding politics at home, as each subsequent letter from Daniel discussed
domestic affairs foremost. 68
Finch was, despite his appointment as ambassador, one of the most politically peripheral
of the Levant embassy members. Notwithstanding being the best connected, most powerful, and
best placed for action. What is evident is that he did have true gravitas in dealings of patronage
and connection, championing the English for the general good of the Crown and Commonwealth,
but also aware of what such a cause could bring to his own standing. In that effort, he was joined
by equally skilled men in his bid to win new Capitulations. Each – Covel, Baines, North, and
Rycaut – employed their time in the Levant to profitable ends. Collectively, they influenced
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relations with, and the understanding of, the Turks for the next one hundred years. They were
influential figures and this brief analysis of them is long overdue in accounting for the history of
the Levant Company.

4.4

Conclusion

Capitulations provided the formal diplomatic accord between Islamic powers and Christian
Europe. Despite their origins as dispensations granted by the Sublime Porte, they would serve as
treaty documents that both sides sought to honor accordingly. If not for the men of the 1672 English
embassy, pursuing their own agendas that reflected a period of societal and political change, the
Capitulations of 1675 would not have occurred. Their collective efforts, born out of a myriad of
background experiences, provided the English embassy members with the means to seize on the
period of relative peace as a rare opportunity to expand trade with little rival. Forgoing their innate
xenophobia, embassy members John Covel, Thomas Baines, Dudley North, Paul Rycaut, and John
Finch offer an insight into not only the diverse, cosmopolitan nature of the Ottoman Empire and
how one may employ their time abroad for a profitable self-interest, but also a view into
contemporary English attitudes and the structures of society, religion, and politics. Willing to
engage in religious heterodoxy, revel in the intellectual exchange presented in the Ottoman Empire,
and seek common ground with a completely alien society that viewed the English as subservient,
they would return to England ready to promote an agenda of better economic policy, trade relations,
and even the foment the dawning of the early Enlightenment.
Therefore, the Capitulations of 1675 profoundly defined the relationship between the Turks
and English. With its focus on trade, the Capitulations acted as a powerful catalyst toward gains
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in English trade returns in the immediate aftermath of the agreement. The document additionally
served as the envy of the French and Dutch. It ignited a competition with other European powers
as they too sought, unsuccessfully, to renegotiate their standing to the disadvantage, or same
advantage, as the English. Moreover, the Capitulations acted as a further formalization of relations
between the two powers of England and the Ottoman Empire. They offered a new concerted effort
to fight piracy in the Mediterranean, even if rarely fully realized. Succinctly, the Finch embassy
and the 1675 Capitulations provided a significant step toward the establishment of English
commercialism as a major facet in the later maritime British Empire.
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CHAPTER 5.

AMBASSADORIAL DUTIES

In 1652, Francis Thynne opined that an ambassador,
must be learned, well born, free, no bond-man, of good credit in respect of his honesty, of
good estimation in respect of his calling, that he be no liar, braggart, dissembler, or traitor;
But that he be wise, valiant, circumspect, furnished with diverse languages, eloquent, of
quick capacity, of ready deliverance, liberal, comely of person, tall of stature, and, briefly,
that he be adorned with all virtues required, or commendable, in a good man, and
unfurnished of any vice to blemish his credit, or that may win him the surname of a wicked
man. 1
Other contemporaneous compendiums discussing diplomats agreed. Etienne Dolet argued that
“the duty of the ambassador [was] not merely to explain his message but to support it by arguments,”
and Alberico Gentili believed that ambassadors should always “employ a careful manner of speech,
well-polished and adorned by wise opinions and weighty words.” The ambassador was to be
courtly, the very embodiment of his prince, a reflection of the military shrewdness of the lands he
represented, repeating the opinions of the court of his sovereign, and exemplifying the best from
his civilization. 2
In practice, the ambassadors to the Levant were never able to live up to these ideals of
courtly interactions. The ambassador, and by extension the embassy and all its officials throughout
the Levant, had several official duties to pursue in any given day. These duties rarely consisted of
any interactions with the Sublime Porte or requiring anything beyond the most practical of
characteristics. At its most basic, the embassy in Pera was to manage the consuls throughout the
Ottoman Empire. Its members were to oversee the commerce of the Company, leaving the
ambassador free to pursue any diplomatic matters. In reality, the ambassador and all Company
officials concerned themselves primarily with mercantile concerns. High diplomacy was a distant
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secondary aspect of their occupation. The debasement of currency, specifically the creation of
counterfeited Dutch dollars; the quality of silk imports and their proper storage before export;
ensuring that foodstuffs and cloth orders not being left to rot or illegally traded on the black market;
and the establishment and enforcement of consulage duties formed the larger portion of any
ambassador’s or consul’s daily tasks for the Company. 3 As a result, the men occupying these
official posts were frequently engaged in negotiating and mediating commercial disputes that arose
in the nation. They were far removed from the aforementioned compendiums’ narratives of
princely conduct before a foreign ruler. The disagreements that emissaries managed daily were
diverse, arising from several different conflicts between merchants, the Company, Turkish
officials, and Ottoman subjects. Whether bankruptcies, the reading of probates, the dissemination
of estates, investigating fraud or skimming, or combating the abuses of Turkish officials, the
embassy spent an inordinate amount of time not engaged in the practice of high diplomacy. Yet,
on the rare occasion, a meeting with the Sultan did take place. The resulting audience a grand affair.
Invested with pomp, loaded with gifts, and entailing the most grandiose of processions, these
infrequent meetings with the Sublime Porte were the defining point of an embassy and could
change relations between the two powers dramatically. 4
In addition to daily duties of arbitration or the occasional diplomatic interactions with the
Sublime Porte, the embassy also spent considerable resources on a myriad of other affairs, no less
important to the English nation. The protection of the Latin and Greek Christian communities in
the Levant frequently fell to the English’s responsibility. In particular during the 1670s and 1680s,
as the French and Dutch had waning influence in the theater. Arising from pragmatic and not
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confessional concerns, it made sense to the English to protect those who they could easily employ
as intermediaries – the Christians of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the behavior of English
merchants was also a constant nuisance for embassy officials. The conduct of merchants was a
point of Company interest always mentioned in official correspondence and assiduously
maintained. Licentious behavior – whether drinking, gambling, or “whoring,” as John Covel put
it – caused points of friction between the English and locals, diminishing trading activity and
providing kindling for a potential diplomatic incident. 5
Finally, there was the quieter duties common to any embassy, then and now: information
gathering and spying. During the 1670s, these efforts slowly gained in momentum as they became
institutionalized as part of the English State. By the 1680s, the English embassy in Pera was a
clearinghouse of such covertly collected knowledge. Correspondence with Company and
government officials became primarily concerned with intelligence information. Frequently, the
gathered information displaced any mention of trade and commerce in embassy members’
epistolary narratives. At the forefront of this effort was the ambassador himself. It was he who
collected and shared any knowledge regarding the political situation in eastern Europe and the
Mediterranean. This chapter, then, will reconnoiter these ambassadorial duties. Starting with the
common disputes facing any given embassy, it will proceed to exploring the rarer diplomatic
interactions between the English and Sublime Porte. From there, the chapter provides an overview
of the Latin and Coptic communities, noting how these co-religionists sought out the English for
protection from the abuses of Turks, or even one another. Lastly, the chapter will conclude with
the study of the regulation of members’ behavior and the embassy’s murkier responsibilities as an
apparatus of the State, gathering and processing intelligence from throughout the region.
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5.1

Disputes

Ambassadors to the Levant spent an inordinate amount of time intervening in and
mediating disputes between merchants in the community and merchants interacting with Turkish
officials. Rather than focusing exclusively on the discourse of high politics, the embassy primarily
revolved around these commercial concerns. As established in the Capitulations, the Ottoman
Empire did not readily differentiate between formalized diplomacy and trade during the period in
question. The accords existed to protect the “said Nation, and the English merchants, and any other
Nation or merchants which are or shall come under the English banner and protection, with their
ships small and great, merchandise, faculties, and all other their goods, may always pass safe in”
Turkish seas. 6 Therefore, it is difficult to separate commerce from diplomacy, mercantile from
political concerns.
Accordingly, Turkish officials held the Ambassador, the English merchants, and the
Company itself as the judicator of all complaints originating in the factories of merchants. Acting
on the behalf of investors in London, their own individual interests in the Ottoman Empire, and
the Company’s overall efforts at turning a profit, merchants in the Levant undertook several roles
simultaneously and with great difficulty. In such a busy market, the systems of commerce often
worked successfully with minimal supervision by the embassy. Thus, when disputes did arise, they
were calamitous. Disagreements brought a respective party’s trade to a dangerous halt while
threatening the overall network of commerce. As one of his many duties included the settling of
contested estates when a merchant died, an ambassador became the main investigator in probate
claims. Vying for his attention in the disbursement of these testaments were investors, partners,
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and family members whom all sought to gain the best position from what remained after a factor’s
death. Such claims dominate the archival sources of the period, with the most in-depth examples
stretching on for years. The case of John Temple’s estate serves as one particularly laborious
instance that drew out for such a lengthy period. Temple’s first probate was established on 31
August 1676. As in all such records, the ambassador was the one who was charged with its writing,
becoming the custodian of the estate and responsible for confirming an inventory of goods and
contracts. In that role, Ambassador Finch notes that Temple had no business partner, but had left
behind a poorly written will. From the very start, Finch noted that the bequest was “attended with
many circumstances, that yet may render its validity doubtful: and if it were valid, may occasions
arise with many controversies.” With no heir clearly stipulated, Finch provided copies of the
probate and testament to Benjamin Pickering, Roger Rowell, and William Temple, the former two
parties being claimants via business dealing with the deceased, the latter a relative and possible
heir. Having done such, Finch noted that, “By reason of distance [from William Temple], and
perplexity of the case, we can proceed no further at present.” Finch then directed Paul Rycaut to
liquidate the estate’s clothing and any perishable goods. He entrusted the consul with keeping a
valid accounting of any proceeds from the sales as the embassy awaited responses from those
involved.
In the intervening month, all parties concerned with Temple’s estate wrote Finch,
beginning with William Temple. On 30 September 1676, William Temple’s petition arrived at the
embassy. Appealing to his fraternal relationship with the deceased that he claimed outdid all other
rights to the estate, William insisted he was the only “legitimate and formal heir.” Rather than
immediately agree to this point, Finch merely notated that he had “perused the contents of the
foregoing petition and claim.” He then ordered its entrance into the logs for an upcoming tribunal.
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Having delayed a speedy decision, by October the situation had grown more complex and
worsened. Rowell and Pickering became squatters in John Temple’s house and claimed that any
goods left on the property were theirs’ to do with as they saw fit. Upon hearing of the situation,
William once again petitioned Finch. Temple was, with good cause, utterly incensed by this point
in time. He insisted that the ambassador intervene on his behalf, describing Rowell’s and
Pickering’s actions as “usurping possession and pretending title to the said house, gardens, and
goods.” He continued, “I do think it not reasonable that I should not seek violently to invest myself
in it or any other part of my said brother’s estate without due order of law, so I think it much more
unjust that they, or any of them, should upon any pretenses, without due order, seize thereupon.”
Within two weeks, William wrote Finch again, appointing Christopher Sheere as his representative
in the Levant regarding the estate, with William staying at home in England rather than travelling
to the Levant himself. Sheere, already in the Ottoman Empire, immediately launched a larger
investigation on the behalf of his client. He interviewed several former colleagues of the deceased
and presented his evidence to Finch in extensive letters beginning in November 1676. By January,
Sheere’s efforts paid off. The preponderance of his sworn testimonies compelled Rycaut, who had
worked with Sheere before, to support William Temple’s claim. Having won over the consul, the
affair was quickly settled to the benefit of Temple, the squatters evicted and given only a minor
pecuniary recompense for their efforts. One can imagine Finch’s relief, as simultaneous to this
series of claims over Temple’s estate, the embassy was also embroiled in three other similarly
laborious investigations, claims, and counterclaims. Such responsibilities, while seemingly petty,
continued throughout the 1670s and occupied much of the various consuls’ time in the 1680s. 7
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The Ambassador and embassy staff also had the difficult duty of investigating fraud and
profit skimming, particularly when the Company discovered such activities after auditing the
account books in London and Pera. For example, of interest to Company officials in the 1670s and
early 1680s was Thomas Barnardiston, factor marine in Scanderoon. Barnardiston warranted no
less than six official audits over an eight-year period. Each subsequent audit requested with more
forceful language by the Company than any other instances regarding those who garnered such
attention from officials in London. In one such audit, during October 1681, the Company expressed
that it “was concerned in loading of rice and fruit aboard a Dutch ship in Scanderoon” by a Mr.
Barrow. Prohibited from engaging in the use of other European powers’ shipping and the actual
sale absent in the accounting books, such actions by Barrow could only take place if someone
higher than him ignored the activities. Thus, “although we have some cause to suspect that you are
not wholly innocent [Mr. Barnardiston]… we do expect that you send us by your first opportunity
a full, clear, and perfect account of all your rice and fruit that have been shipped since your coming
to Scanderoon.” Notated in the margins above the Company’s emphatically underlined “full”
within the epistle was a further clarification that the books be “TRUE” [sic]. When the audit by
the embassy exonerated Barnardiston, or more likely made the culpability of his ongoing illegal
trading hard to prove, the Company opted to take the rare measure of sending another factor to
work alongside Barnardiston. Thus, in October 1682 the Company advised Consul Gamliel
Nightingale, Barnardiston’s superior, of the oddity of having to place a dual appointment. “In
regard to Mr. Barnardiston having been in that employment for some time, we have written him
that we think it reasonable,” the Company declared, that he “work alongside [John] Barton.”
Despite this arrangement, however, that following January the Company wrote both factors marine
again concerning fraudulent activities. Complimenting Barton for his work, the Company once
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more strongly censured Barnardiston for his ongoing deficiencies and duplicitous bookkeeping.
Exasperated, the Company stated that they “have not one word of advice thereof regarding your
behavior, nor of any other concerns, which is an unparalleled neglect and we expect you should
never be guilty” in future unapproved expenditures or trade. Barnardiston, and by proxy Barton,
were to “keep [the Company] constantly advised of what passes through your hands relating to us
or our affairs.” Oddly, the General Court did not recall Barnardiston for another two years, despite
repeated censures, embassy inspections, and Company audits. 8
Beyond probates, estates, and fraud, the ambassador also had the lamentable duty of
addressing all complaints regarding overcharges by Turkish officials. Initiated in letters sent to the
embassy from an aggrieved merchant, these claims required the ambassador to research their
validity much in the same manner as probates. Specifically, he gathered witness accounts and
affidavits to provide the preponderance of evidence. If found necessary, these complaints then
would then be lodged with the Sublime Porte via a petition. Or, with the Privy Chamber in England
if external pressure was needed, all evidence enclosed in both routes with the hope for a resolution.
For example, on 23 December 1672, Finch wrote to Henry Bennett, Earl of Arlington, regarding
“extortions by locals imposed on the English” in Cairo. As Arlington served both as the Keeper of
the Privy Purse and as one of the postmasters-general over foreign affairs, it fell to him to
adjudicate the situation. To that end, Finch informed Arlington that the local pasha had already
appointed a Venetian-born trader as the English consul. The pasha supported the appointee, Don
Gasparo di Rizzi, because he felt that taking such unilateral action was necessary due to his
growing “disgust to a great height with the French… who for these last twenty years solely traded
to Alexandria the scale of Egypt against Cairo.” Thus, the pasha sought to gain a portion of the
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profits from that trade by circumventing French duties in favor of English merchants and a
complicit consul. Desiring a new relationship with the English immediately, the pasha felt that the
speedy and independent appointment of di Rizzi would suffice. An efficiently appointed consul
would encourage Egyptian traders who “were frightened from commerce by the frequent and
exorbitant fees imposed upon them after many years” by the French to return. For their part, the
Company protested that the appointee lacked any official standing or proper vetting, having
originally been Venetian before “going native.” In addition, the General Court also feared that
interfering with the French so directly would incite the Sublime Porte. The French may enforce
their own Capitulations and make English merchants “liable for arrest, disquiet, or molestation for
any debts.”
Reluctant of adding to the confused and complicated situation, Finch decided that he “shall
in obedience to your Lord [Arlington] humbly offer my opinion” rather than unilaterally act and
reject the selection of di Rizzi. The ambassador advised that the appointment of an official consul
by the Company would only muddy the waters in Cairo. Worse, such action would likely force the
pasha to cease trade with the English altogether as a rebuke for the Company overriding his
authority with a new appointee. As di Rizzi had been a resident of Cairo “for thirty years” and
“begs your Lord for his confirmation to this charge from His Majesty,” Finch felt an answer was
forthcoming and necessary, so long that it supported the pasha. As the pasha and any merchants in
the region would want to avoid the entanglements of official fees and duties that the Company
required, Finch argued, a middle ground was necessary. A “consul,” then, may provide the best of
both worlds. Therefore, to the benefit of overall trade, it was better to have a disposable, pseudoconsul in place as a pragmatic agent for the English rather than create the trappings of an official
consulship. Any problems arising from complaints regarding the duties would be referred to the
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pasha. Accordingly, this exonerated the Company from any debts, while also ensuring the
diminishment of French returns in the region. For the acquiescence of the Company to this
appointment, the pasha seemed “most agreeable” to maintaining “the covenant of the special
articles with the ambassador” regarding the freedom of movement and safety of English merchants.
In the end, Arlington granted di Rizzi the facility of his unofficial posting. The latter maintaining
the pseudo-consulship until 1684 and the advent of the Morean War. 9
Unfortunately, for the ambassador, some complainants lacked patience with the
overworked embassy and would seek redress individually. The embassy constantly reprimanded
anyone who directly approached Turkish officials. It was their intent to maintain good relations
with Turks and they assured the nationals under their overview that their concerns would be
redressed. Nonetheless, exacerbations brought about by the embassy’s delays would occasionally
reach violent levels, as seen in March 1675 when a merchant armed himself and confronted the
Turks directly. Claiming an extortion of £102 by a janissary, a Mr. Loes felt that the embassy did
not quickly enough address his concerns. Approaching the local cadi, Loes and his manservant
began an argument with the official that quickly escalated. Frustrated, Loes’s manservant pulled
out a firearm, threatened the cadi, and then shot the cadi’s servant, who had attempted to physically
intercede when Loes’s man had threatened his master. Prosaically, the Company “allowed” that
Loes had a valid complaint and the embassy had not addressed it promptly enough. However, they
advised Consul Nightingale, who was overseeing the claim that, “in the future… take effectual
care that no Englishman does harm against the natives upon any account whatsoever; being
sensible of what dangers and inconveniences may arise thereby.” 10 What became of Loes or his
servant is not discussed in future correspondence.
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Conversely, when ambassadorial staff, or the English in general, were the basis of a
dispute, it fell to the Company and its appointed agents on the ground to respond. For example,
when in 1672 Consul George Hayles, Company representative in Venice, independently decided
that the calculation of his commission fees should no longer be based on the number of English
ships arriving in Venice. Instead, the value of the merchandise those ships were carrying should
determine the fees. 11 Responding to this breach in protocol, English merchants sought assistance
from the Venetians rather than the Company. They argued that such an action will adversely affect
everyone’s trade and believed that the Venetians bringing the concern to the Company’s attention
would hold more weight than any individual merchant. On 2 December 1672, the Venetian
Secretary in England, Girolamo Alberti, wrote to the Doge and Senate regarding the convening of
the Council of Trade in London to discuss the matter. Examining Hayles’ petition that put forth
his justifications for his actions, the Council summoned further accounts from not only the
merchants who agreed with Hayles, but also those who opposed his autarchic decision to impose
tariffs. According to Alberti, the meeting was “conducted with so much heat” that he thought it
best to not go “beyond [his] usual cautious insinuations, and will continue to relieve the trade
[revenues] of” the burden of Hayles’ tariff. He went on to state “that unless Venetian firms
establish themselves in London, trade and navigation will make little progress” in rectifying this
matter. 12
To that end, Alberti wrote to the Venetian Board of Trade in May 1673 to inform them on
his progress in the affair. He noted that in his efforts to affect change, he began to work alongside
the leadership of the Levant Company, particularly John Jolliffe, then governor of the Company.
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Having “tried, though far away and in a limited time, to obtain the fullest information and to submit
it to the public authority in respect of the charge which the Consul Hayles pretends to lay upon the
trade of this mart,” Alberti was growing increasingly frustrated. He argued that a joint effort with
the Company made sense. After all, Hayles, “without making any communication to the Levant
Company” had decided to change the duties, and the Company, “which gives the rule in such
matters… shows itself to be of the contrary opinion” of the errant consul. For its part, the Company
expressed to Alberti its strong disagreement with Hayles on 23 December 1672. In his description
of the merchants’ views, Alberti assured the Doge and Senate that the Company found Charles II,
and not the General Court, had granted Hayles the ability “to impose on all effects and merchandise
brought to this mart [Venice] in English ships a charge of half a ducat per ton, in conformity with
an intolerable tariff.” Attached to his correspondence, Alberti included a 6 March 1673 letter
written by Company officers Thomas Vernon, Henry Mordaunt, and John Jolliffe, and other
merchants privy to the affair. In it, the Company members disavowed any knowledge of how
Hayles obtained his writ from Charles. They further explained that, “so far as we are concerned
we have never approved and what he has obtained was not at our instance, indeed directly
opposite.” The General Court concluded their letter stating that Hayles’ action “is a charge that
will injure trade and navigation and as we have never supported a corazzo here so we should wish,
for our part, that it will not be granted over there.” 13
Despite the Company’s blustering denunciation of Hayles and allying with the Venetians,
the Venetians doubted the Company’s sincerity and ability to exact any change. On 2 June 1673,
Alberti wrote the Doge and Senate again. He expressed to them both that he “cannot venture to
hope for success by means of public treaties.” Nevertheless, he promised to “try to accomplish it
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by hints and opportune representations to the parties interested.” He further hedged his bets by
stating, “I do not promise myself equal good fortune in thwarting all the measures taken by the
Consul Hayles to augment the consulage.” The letter concludes, “I suspect that the merchants of
the Levant Company here will not have the courage to say as much as they wrote, but I will stir
them up so that I may be able to give an immediate account of what can be affected by zeal and
diligence.” 14 Alberti’s views of the Company are not surprising. The Company itself was likely
very aware of the need to maintain diplomatic niceties and continuing friendly relations with
Venice for trade purposes beyond the damage done by Hayles. Regardless, the Venetians’
nervousness and continuing venture with the Company over this matter suggests that merchants
and the Company did exert some influence in international relations and politics independent of
Whitehall and/or Westminster.
The dispute that Hayles had provoked remained unresolved for the next two years. By that
point, the Venetian anger over this tariff was strong enough that they loudly opposed the
appointment of Sir Thomas Higgins as envoy extraordinary to Venice, much to the surprise of
Higgins. Once again, Alberti seized upon English and Venetian discontent by reaching out now to
Higgins. He recommended to Higgins, and any others the envoy wished to mention the affair to,
that Hayles’ actions were a continuing determent to international relations. Indeed, his behavior
represented a near full breach of diplomacy and the dawning of a wider incident. Alberti then
proposed that Higgins talk to Company leadership about the issue, particularly, “Mr. Slingsby, late
secretary to the Council for Trade, who would tell him how desirable it is for the English not to
trammel their navigation.” Enclosed in his letter to the envoy, Alberti included a detailing of the
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“true information of the new consulage at Venice” which outlined the Venetians’ ongoing
complaints and the General Court’s past support. 15
Matters with Venice continued without nearing resolution for yet another two years. With
the support of the Venetians, who had found Higgins sympathetic to their complaints, the latter
took over the consulship from Hayles in 1676. Shortly thereafter, the General Court subsequently
ordered him to approach the Senate and propose new legislation to finally end the affair.
Specifically, the new consul was to request the change of several Venetian laws. The enforcement
of these laws against the English, according to the Company, was an “injustice” that disrupted
commerce in Zante beyond the consulage fees dispute. Higgins made little progress in his mission.
Instead, he opted to maintain the fee rate that Hayles had initially instituted, as it had now become
an entrenched tradition in the consulate. The Venetians, taking understandable umbrage at the
customs they were promised originated solely with Hayles, did not entertain the English’s efforts
to further encroach in the currant trade. The Company pressed the issue that the legislation of
Venice needed changing. They ignored Higgins’ protests and writing him with some menace on
28 July 1676 that “you will please be further helpful… appearing before the Senate.” Regardless
of his labors, the Venetians continued in their spite, Alberti’s fears regarding the sincerity of the
General Court proving true, the matter never resolving. 16
Beyond such international disputes, another constant issue for the ambassador and his staff
was the restitution of goods seized by English pirates in the Mediterranean. Preying on Turkish
merchants, these pirates proved a constant annoyance for the Company. For example, in August
and September 1673, Company governor Jolliffe felt compelled to write Finch regarding English
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pirates chasing ships laden with Turkish goods. When the pasha of Tripoli finally grew tired of
inaction on the part of the English Consul in Leghorn, he took the unusual step of seeking redress
from the General Court and Charles II, having written letters to both. Hence, Jolliffe urged Finch
“to make all considerable help to the Consul and the Turks” in fighting pirates, avoiding further
embarrassment at having brought his Majesty into the concern. Yet, Finch found the entire affair
to be exceedingly complex. He concluded that it was not worth the efforts of the embassy to
disentangle or offer further assistance on. His brief investigation determined that the pirates were
operating a ship of Venetian design, the crew equal parts French and English seamen.
Consequently, the ambassador did not feel the matter concerned the English, writing Jolliffe as
much. Ignoring this finding, Jolliffe admonished Finch for his laxity, “your absence of care from
this will be of greatest prejudices to us.” Exasperated, Finch acknowledged that the ongoing
presence of the pirates in the theater was causing Company ships to stay in harbor, their goods
rotting before they could be delivered. Employing this reasoning to justify his further action, Finch
requested an increased Royal Navy presence and offered restitution to the pasha to bring the affair
to a conclusion without involving the Privy Chamber. Satisfied, the pasha did not press his claim
further. For the time being, the issue of English piracy returned to the shadows. 17
Though limited to the waters surrounding Smyrna during the seventeenth century, the
piracy by English brigands and privateers greatly angered the Turks. As Article XIX of the
Capitulations had guaranteed Turkish reparations for any attacks on English shipping, the Turks
felt the agreement was reciprocal, even in the instances of pirates – uncontrollable and
unsanctioned buccaneers – and privateers engaging in activities against other European powers.
The Mediterranean was to be a pirate-free zone, according to Turkish dictate. In practice, though
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the Sublime Porte tolerated Barbary corsairs, the Europeans promoting such activities were an
affront to Ottoman power. Accordingly, the Sublime Porte actively and doggedly pursued
respective European ambassadors for compensation and restitution in cases of piracy. Company
records frequently urged embassy members to fight against Turkish claims. The General Court
describing such requests as “corrupt extortions.” 18 Yet, thanks to the difference in legal practices
between the two powers, claims always fell to the Company, even in cases of legal privateering.
As no English court would recognize Muslim claimants and oaths, the Sublime Porte took
recompense from the embassy and Company officials by threatening trade or impoundments. 19

5.2

Diplomatic Interactions with the Sublime Porte

Even when faced with the more common tasks of mediation and consular duties, the
Ambassador did have the rare occasion to attend formal audiences with the Sultan and his court.
These audiences were elaborate affairs, requiring months of planning. To pave the way for such
encounters, formal gift giving, a common enough practice of exchange between sovereigns in
Europe, took on an exceptional status in the Ottoman Empire. To point, gifts were not merely a
diplomatic formality, but a method of expected bribery necessary to purchasing such audiences.
Indeed, Ambassador Heneage Finch, third Earl of Winchelsea, wrote in 1660 regarding his
interactions with the Sublime Porte, “Here a man may procure a friendship and by corruptions
given create many confidants.” 20 Paul Rycaut also noted the disparity in gift-giving practices
compared to the West. According to him, “the English, French, and Dutch are always admitted
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with their presents, which the Turk by custom calls his right, and judges himself not obliged to
return” the favor. 21 The need for this obligatory gifting eluded the understanding of Company
officials. They were to complain in October 1676 to Finch that, “Your Lord writes us that all the
money expense for obtaining the capitulations hath been only $2000, and that in other presents
you have been very frugal.” However, “yet we find by our accounts from Smyrna that the Treasurer
at Constantinople has drawn hence $35,357. And notwithstanding he has also charged upon us
here $5,800.” Investigating the disparity further, the Company queried the minutiae of the wages
of the hired help, the liveries, and meals bought for private audiences with Turkish officials to
arrange a meeting with the Sultan. Greatly incensed by a continual barrage of information requests,
embassy treasurer Dudley North was at first reticent in replying. Nonetheless, he complied fully
to the requests only under pressure and threat of recall. North was successful in eventually
assuaging the Company’s ire over the cost of doing business with the Sublime Porte, temporarily
diminishing their need for further information regarding the business transacted at their behest.
Although, the Company did send a concluding and harshly worded excoriation to North and Finch,
stating that “negligence and disrespect… that we were never put to account formerly” was
unendurable, with any future poor bookkeeping strongly held as “unreasonable” and would not be
tolerated again. This miserly approach to gifting and the cost of diplomacy in the Levant even
extended to the minor visits between European emissaries. For example, the Company took affront
at the relatively small bill of $75 in 1673 during a visit between Rycaut and his French counterpart.
“We esteem it too extravagant,” wrote the General Court to Rycaut, “in entertaining the French
nation who accompanied you home; we expect future charges be reduced hereafter to more
moderation.” 22
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Even so, with the circumcision of Sultan Mehmed IV’s son in May 1675, the following
month-long festivities offered a grand opportunity to woo the Sublime Porte with gifts even if the
Company were to complain. It was with the knowledge that bribery in the form of gifts greased
the mechanisms of Turkish diplomacy that Ambassador Finch sought out his first official meeting
with the Sultan, three years after his appointment to the embassy. With a baggage train of fiftyfive wagons, Finch set out for the city of Edirne and the festivities. Turkish officials soon noted
the extensive caravan, providing ready and eager support to the English along the route. Covel
took interest in the Turks’ performance. Recalling the procession later in his diary, he noted that
the rigging of the horses provided to the English nation when it came closer had “jewels and pearls
most gloriously” inlaid and “whose bridle, saddle, great stirrups, breast plate, and buttock cloth…
were either all of beaten gold and silver or else most richly embroidered.” 23 However, despite this
grand gesture, the English quickly found out that their meeting would be postponed with the Sultan
until after the celebrations. Conveyed to the most “damnedest, confounded place that ever mortal
man was put into,” the house provided for the Ambassador and his entourage was “not half big
enough to hold half of us… a mere nest of fleas and bugs, rats and mice, and stench, surrounded
with whole kennels of nasty, beastly Jews.” 24 Not dissuaded, Finch did opt to stay in the dwellings,
until a plague broke out in the city. Retreating to a countryside estate, Finch left Dudley North to
conclude negotiating a meeting with the Grand Vizier, and then the Sultan, following celebrations
and the ending of the outbreak. 25
Finch would describe his eventual meeting with the Sultan as a further attempt at
establishing Turkish dominion and superiority over the English. Despite the lavish gifts provided
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to the Grand Signior, Turkish officials thrust the embassy abruptly and rudely into the throne room
of the sovereign. Finch described the monarch as a “most severe, terrible, stately” man who cast a
“scornful eye” to the Capitulations presented by the Grand Vizier. Surrounded by crimson
carpeting and several chests full of jewels, valued by the Ambassador at anywhere between
₶1,000,000 and ₶2,000,000, the encounter was meant to awe and cow supplicants. It was “the
richest room for certain in the whole world.” Given long before the meeting, the court had forgotten
the English presents from weeks before. Thus, even the barest of pleasantries were unnecessary.
The meeting ended quickly, the embassy ushered hurriedly out with the assurances the Sultan
would consider the matters presented. What resulted, the signing of the Capitulations, was well
worth Finch’s efforts at having stayed in such squalor and dealing with future Company complaints
over finances. 26
Finch was not to meet with the Sultan again during his time in the Ottoman Empire. Instead,
he spent much of his semiformal interactions with the court alongside the agreeable Grand Vizier,
Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Pasha, second son in the famous Köprülü clan. The Köprülü family
would come to dominate the later seventeenth-century Sublime Porte. The clan provided the
Ottoman Empire a stewardship that resulted in a period of relative administrative calm and stability
otherwise lacking in the office of the Sultanate itself. 27 Expectedly, like his father, Fazıl Ahmed
was amicable to the English nation. Particularly as they had not objected to ferrying Ottoman
troops during the 1660s and 1670s, even when grounds existed for such in the established
Capitulations. Covel described Fazil as a wonderful drinking partner. In his recollections, he
pronounced the Vizier as a man with a “composed countenance,” walking “a little lamely” due to
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“the sciatica.” 28 The ambassador would describe Fazil as “amicable… a true friend of the
English.” 29 Thus, with his death in 1676 and the rise of the infamous Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa
Pasha to the Grand Viziership, relations chilled, to the great dismay of the English. Kara Mustafa
had none of the kindness toward Europeans his predecessors had presented.
As a result of the sudden deterioration in relations, Finch frequently lobbied the Company
and the Privy Chamber for assistance with dealing with Kara Mustafa. Kara Mustafa had risen
quickly as a famous military leader, with several victories in the Balkans, adding the eastern
Ukraine to the Ottoman Empire. A brash man, used to his demands being complied with and
brokering no disputes against his wishes, Kara Mustafa saw all Christian Europe as an enemy.
Even the English who had been so accommodating to the Turks. 30 Therefore, when meeting with
the English embassy in September 1680, Finch’s recollections were predictably bitter regarding
the abrasive manners of the Vizier in his attempts at garnering restitution of goods seized by
English pirates. As the Vizier quick dismissed the English intermediaries first charged with
handling the claim as incompetent, the affair had escalated to the ambassador himself. Summoned
to an audience with the Grand Vizier, Finch was immediately threatened with arrest. Kara Mustafa
declared to Finch “openly that if he could prove his debt he would find him a paymaster and clap
up the ambassador in the Seven Towers.” 31 Maintaining a calm demeanor that he later professed
was only external, Finch then asked the Vizier for the claimed amount owed by the English.
Accordingly, Kara Mustafa answered Finch with the exorbitant total of “700 purses, which is three
hundred and fifty thousand dollars.” Nonplussed, Finch proceeded to inquire who had seized the
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goods. He cleverly found fault with the Vizier’s assertions that it was the English. The ambassador
countered that the English pirates were likely renegados, or those who had foresworn their
citizenship and religion, serving a local pasha as corsairs. Kara Mustafa did not let this dissuade
his conviction the English nation should pay. In his recollection, Finch notes,
Here the Vizier steps in [toward me] and with his accustomed face of indignation says,
‘Ambassador, you and all other ambassadors sent hither by your respective princes answer
for the lives and estates of all Muslims all over the world that are damaged or suffer by
your respective subjects. You are here a hostage to answer for all damage done by English
all over the world.’
Maintaining a visible calm that he otherwise admitted was becoming even more fleeting, Finch
related to his superiors that he stood his ground in avowing that the pasha, and not the English,
owed restitution. It was only near the end of the meeting that Finch’s placid demeanor started to
crack. Recounting the moment, he “told [Kara Mustafa] that the Grand Signior was a great emperor,
and yet if he could not secure his ships from the pasha of Cairo’s corsairs, nor his caravans by land
from Arabians, both being often robbed, neither could my master secure their own subjects or the
Grand Signior from pirates.” At an impasse and chastised for the Turks’ own failing to protect
caravans bound to/from Smyrna, the Vizier dismissed Finch. Kara Mustafa lacked the evidence
needed to pursue the case further before the Ottoman courts. Nonetheless, days later Finch would
find out that Kara Mustafa merely took what he desired from the English nation. All told, between
increasing custom duties, confiscating goods, imprisonments of factors, and various other
disreputable means, the Vizier garnered about $150,000 from the English alone before departing
on campaign in late 1683. 32
With the recall of Finch in 1681, the Company sought to find a replacement for the
ambassador. Among the applicants, James Brydges, the eighth Lord Chandos, proved the most
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capable. His friendship with George Berkley, first Earl of Berkley and Governor of the Levant
Company, combined with his marriage to the daughter of Sir Henry Barnard, a leading English
merchant in the Levant, to provide him a well-backed campaign for the ambassadorship. Indeed,
it was a position Chandos desired so badly that he grew a large mustache in the style of a janissary
to further a viable claim if appointed. 33 Confirmed in 1682, Chandos immediately departed.
Concocting a scheme to mend relations with Kara Mustafa, Chandos, with the aid of Baines and
Finch, devised a plan to remain incognito until after his arrival in the Levant. He then would meet
in secret with the Grand Vizier. Shortly before his entrance in the Ottoman Empire, the Turks had
begun to ignore the Capitulations granted by the Sultan to the English. Demanding that the English
pay a custom duty of an additional three percent on all silk exported from Smyrna, Kara Mustafa
dared to rebuff merchant protests by retroactively expanding the ban to the preceding five years.
The Sublime Porte, at his direction, even disavowed the Articles of the Capitulations that prevented
such taxation. Moreover, the Vizier went further, claiming it was in actuality an enforcement of
the Capitulations and any protest clearly originated from those who had defrauded the government
of its rightful dues, either by helping locals avoid their own taxes on the product or by English
disdain for previously “agreed” terms. The merchant community quickly stopped complaining to
the Sublime Porte. They realized that Kara Mustafa would not honor the Capitulations so long as
he was in power. Thus, going onshore in a disguise at night, and guided by Baines to the embassy
through a backdoor entrance, Chandos immediately set out to establishing new relations and
improving the situation for the English. Granted an audience with the Vizier, the initial conference
seemed to have gone well. Chandos wrote Finch, expressing his thanks for “putting yourself at his
Majesty’s disposal.” He cheerfully informed the outgoing ambassador that “since [his] last letter I
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have not only discoursed with Kara, and touched upon your laments of the customers innovating
intolerable customs on silk, but have had an audience of great encouragement from him, expecting
good satisfaction in all particulars.” Alas, the warm reception was only a front, Kara Mustafa’s
promises coming to naught only a week later. Seeking further advice from Finch, Chandos wrote
that, “this morning Mr. Coke and Mr. Antonio were with the Turks in the hopes of a favorable
answer from the Vizier regarding the last dispatches... plainly the Vizier demanded no less than
another fifty or sixty purses,” ignoring any waiving of duties on silks that he had promised the new
ambassador. With nothing further to offer regarding the situation, Finch wished Chandos the best
and did not provide additional comment. Matters only continued to worsen. Kara Mustafa began
to imprison the most vocal English factors who refused to pay the duties. To bring the subject to a
peaceful resolution, Chandos eventually had to resort to a bribe of $55,000 to free the men. 34 This
bluff manner, disdainful and overtly threatening, would continue throughout Kara Mustafa’s
tenure. It served as a constant source of concern for the English for years after while dealing with
the Sublime Porte. 35
With Kara Mustafa’s execution in 1683, ostensibly for his failures during the Battle of
Vienna and subsequent loss of Hungary, the English nation was most pleased. Yet, formal relations
between the Sublime Porte and the English ambassador were extremely limited during Lord
Chandos’ tenure. Chandos opted for a lesser role in embassy affairs. Instead, he spent much of his
time fretting over his health. Frequently, he would describe his physical fitness to correspondents
in dramatic terms. Often, he noted in several variations that he had avoided “yet the bitterness of
death… after another desperate fever.” 36 Consuls took over daily consular and diplomatic affairs,
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with Smyrna Consul Gamliel Nightingale becoming the de jure English envoy to the Sublime Porte.
As a result, trade began to slowly decline from its booming growth. The lack of leadership from
the ambassador combined with “the sad truth that the… war against Christendom had been entered
into by the Grand Signior” to the ultimate detriment of less Turkish capital for European goods. 37
Recalled in 1687, Chandos suddenly took a great interest in staying abroad, contrary to his constant
complaints regarding the adversity the position had caused for his wellbeing. Employing every
contact he had in London, Chandos lobbied to remain in the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, he went as
far as to send back the embassy’s register and officials records to London rather than pass them to
his impending successor as was to be expected. 38 Sir William Trumbull, Chandos’ replacement,
soon found after arriving in Constantinople that Chandos had not only disobeyed orders, but had
also exacerbated relations with the French while letting Turkish relations chill. Writing in
September 1687, Trumbull “found this animosity had grown to that point with the French, that
[Chandos] sent word to the French Ambassador, that he would have no more to do with him, and
that all contact was broke between them, insomuch that he insisted to not receive any visit from
him.” Seeking to rectify the situation, the French welcomed Trumbull. They aired their concerns
with him before the latter’s official recognition before the Sublime Porte, rather than make any
continuing overtures to Chandos. According to Trumbull, he approached his predecessor
explaining that “it would appear that my Lord Chandos was in the wrong; however, since the
matter would be before the King, he promised and gave me his word that in case his Majesty
should blame his proceeding in any part of it, he would submit himself to make such satisfaction
as the King should appoint.” 39
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Shortly thereafter, a new dispute soon arose after this settling of the breach between the
European factories. Before leaving the Levant, Chandos insisted that it was his sworn duty to join
Trumbull in making a presentation of the new ambassador to the Ottoman court. Trumbull took
exception at Chandos’ attempt. The two men immediately became embroiled in a bitter letter
writing campaign with Company officials and the Privy Chamber. Striking first, Chandos wrote
directly to James II on 12 September 1687. “With all due humility and obedience,” Chandos began,
“I now presume to tender to your Excellency’s justice and great wisdom this my humble protest
on behalf of the character I lately enjoyed of in your service.” The desire of Trumbull to bypass
Chandos’ “sworn duty” to introduce the new ambassador was “an excess of zeal to serve the Levant
Company.” In addition, such actions were a violation of tradition, “an ancient custom and claim
as right by prescription and practice of almost all nations” which Chandos “should have had the
honor and satisfaction to have introduced your Excellency’s new ambassador.” He continued,
stating that he voiced his objections, both in private and “publicly before the gentlemen of this
factory.” Denied by Trumbull in both appeals, then, Chandos felt obliged to “protest against
aforesaid innovations upon, and hardships to, the character of our Lord… to which I appeal.” No
response from James II ever came regarding the matter. 40
Nevertheless, as such an outcome of the dispute was undecided at the time, Trumbull
immediately addressed Chandos’ apprehensions in a letter to the General Court of the Company
three days later. Trumbull’s reply was an exceptionally long epistle, totaling nine, densely written
pages to Chandos’ two-page letter. After having presented Chandos with his letters of dismissal,
Trumbull noted that his predecessor refused to set about planning his departure. Instead, “My Lord
Chandos insisted upon his having joined me before the Grand Signior before his departure, for he
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pleaded prescription that the old ambassador should introduce the new.” This introduction, “which
was indeed the only argument of weight,” was already planned by Chandos to take place on 25
September. While forgiving the planning of the general audience’s date without his input,
Trumbull did take offense at Chandos’ presumptions, which he detailed at length. First, “in the
interest of the Levant Company (for I had none of my own), I was to procure his dismissal before
another quarter became due.” Keeping Chandos on beyond the point of Trumbull’s arrival, then,
would cost the Company in another month’s pay to the intransigent lord. Moreover, “that his Lord
having stayed so many years, and had not put them to the charge of a presentation audience with
the Grand Signior, it might now bring upon us the unnecessary charge of two presents needed upon
the appearance of two ambassadors.” Further, as was clear during Finch’s embassy, the Company
was exceptionally leery of providing the Sublime Porte further inducements for commercial
relations in the form of required lavish gifts.
Second, Trumbull recalled that he “endeavored to inform [Chandos] of this pretended
prescription: those of the factory here can only remember the contrary, that neither the Earl of
Winchelsea introduced Sir Daniel Harvey, his successor, nor did Sir John Finch introduce Lord
Chandos.” Lacking precedent, and beyond the potential costs to the Company, Chandos claim was
thus implausible. In this point, Trumbull made efforts to play the befuddled individual, denigrating
Chandos before the General Court. Writing in a manner akin to a satirist, he continued, “But how
an ambassador, who had never had any audience, should be proper to introduce another, I humbly
conceive is not easy to be understood.”
In conclusion, Trumbull offered a final lengthy objection. “Notwithstanding this,”
he wrote, “my Lord Chandos at a public meeting of the factory and several other strangers here,
having drawn up a protest, began to harangue against me, with very severe reflection upon the
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injury and injustice of my conduct.” In order to defuse the situation, Trumbull readily accepted the
protest and a petition. He enclosed both as part of his letter to the Company “without any
observations upon what is therein contained: beseeching your Lords (according to your wanted
goodness to me) to afford me herein your countenance and protection.” Though “troubled” by
Chandos’ behavior, Trumbull swore to do his best for the Company and guarantee the matter was
rectified. 41
Regardless of his own personal feelings with having Chandos announce him before the
Sublime Porte, Trumbull quickly concluded that it was better to be seen together than working at
opposite ends. A decision the Company later supported, despite the expense Chandos’ behavior
had incurred in political capital and actual finances. With that resolved, Chandos accompanied
Trumbull to his initial meeting with the Sultan, the first such encounter between the sovereign and
English since Finch’s own audience in 1675. Liveries and horses were promptly purchased. To
save the embassy on some expenses and expected grievance from the Company, the additional
gear provided to Chandos was conditionally used and came from a local covered market “to avoid
buying new.” Adding to the entourage’s desired presence was richly decorated clothing, saddles
of crimson and velvet, horse tacks of silver, and even the refitting of servants equipped with new
boots and dress clothing. A roaring salute, fired from the English ships in the harbor, announced
the procession’s departure from the embassy. A delegation of merchants invited by Trumbull
supplemented the entourage. Twelve strong, the Turks split the merchants across three separate
tables at the meeting, interspersed with interpreters, intermediaries, Turkish officials, and Janissary
corps’ officers. What transpired not only met with the lavishness the English had set out with, but
far exceeded it. A sixty-course meal with over one hundred place settings entertained the gathering.
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Rarely seen Sublime Porte officials pleasantly conversed with the delegation, the Sultan having
withdrawn and the Grand Vizier overseeing the banquet. The affairs of state smoothly blurred into
the realm of the personable, across confessional and lingual divides. 42 And though costly – each
captain of the ships who fired the salute would come for payment in the days to come and Company
officials would complain of the excessive expenses in their correspondence with the embassy,
refusing to repay all claimed expenditures – the duties of an ambassador representing the person
of the monarch called for no less.

5.3

Protecting the Latin and Coptic Communities

Beyond consular duties and high diplomacy, the English embassy also sought to protect
the Latin and Coptic communities of the Ottoman Empire. Though, not solely for religious reasons,
but for pragmatically commercial ones. It was from these communities that the embassy drafted
intermediaries, the translators, and local agents, enabling the trading interests of the factories to
commence as smoothly as possible. With the French in withdrawal during the 1670s and 1680s, it
fell to the English to provide for these communities when complaints arose. For example, in 1675
Finch had to intercede in Greek and Latin affairs near immediately after his arrival in the Levant.
Stemming from a 1673 feud over the proper decorating and maintenance of the Church of the Holy
Sepulcher, the two Christian communities were actively pursuing their respective full oversight of
the tomb at the expense of the other. Having brought the matter before an Ottoman tribunal, the
Greeks sought the support of the English embassy in their claim. Finch instead supported the Latin
faction. However, the Latins thanked him for his offer of assistance, but calmly declined his help.
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Perhaps owing to the fact the tribunal was already favoring the Greeks, or that the Greeks had
somehow offended Finch, his support for the Latins mattered little. The cadis responsible
ultimately determined that the Holy Sepulcher belonged to the Greeks to oversee. Although, the
Latin Church remembered his support. Indeed, the community would petition Finch in the future
for support against the Greeks who had taken to denying all but Coptic Christians access to the
tomb. 43
Eventually, Covel joined with Finch in resolving this ongoing dispute between the Greeks
and Latins. At their first formal meeting with Finch since the Sepulcher incident, the Greek
contingent was eager to remind Finch that the English factory had always looked after Greek
interests in the past. 44 Even though the English had entrenched fears regarding popery and Finch
was an avowed member of the Church of England, he informed the visiting patriarchs that the
aggrieved Greeks should “abide by what was right and reasonable.” The ambassador then further
chastised the patriarchs for their behavior against other Christians, even if Catholics. Finch's call
for temperance resulted in accusations of Catholic bribery of his position from a minority of
English factors and the Greeks. Unfazed, Finch rebuffed the rumors and stood his ground. He
further castigated the patriarchs for their disregard of the wider Christian community. The demands
of the Greeks eventually dissipated. Over time, they did grant access back to the Latins and others.
Yet, the fact Finch refused to adhere to English xenophobia regarding Catholics is notable and
demonstrates that he was aware of the wider ramifications of alienating one confession over
another. His behavior, then, preserved a working relationship with all Christians in the Ottoman
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Empire, simultaneously promoting himself as a fair arbiter of any confessional concerns. Such a
reputation would be of benefit to the merchant community, not only in trade negotiations, but
ensuring easy recruitment of intermediaries and translators. 45 It is with little surprise, then, that by
1680, the orders given to Lord Chandos upon his replacing Finch as ambassador went as far to
enshrine these efforts, with a caveat to favor the Coptic community. Accordingly, he was to
maintain a good correspondence with… to protect… and render yourself useful to them in
all good offices… all Christians in general, of which degree, quality, sect or opinion
whatsoever they be, giving your preference therein still to those of our own profession in
religion, and to those of the Greek Church in procuring them justice and favor in all
things. 46

5.4

Regulating Behavior

Ambassadors were also expected to fill the role of absent fathers and the monarch, living
their public life in the Ottoman Empire dressed as befitted to their station, with codes of behavior
ostensibly enforced to provide a proper model of an English gentleman. His instructions held that
he was to uphold the best of virtues, both in himself and in the larger English community. Similarly
expected to behave accordingly were the consuls and other embassy officials. For example, Finch’s
orders in March 1672 dedicated an entire section to dealing with the “debauched.” The Company
stated, in their commands to him and the consuls, that
It is our further desire that if you shall discover any of our factors or servants or others of
the English nation to be notoriously addicted to gaming, drinking, or any other notorious
course of life, to the dishonor of God, the scandal of our nation, their principals damage,
and other young men’s ill example, you will endeavor to reclaim and reform them by your
good admonitions, or finding them incorrigible, to give the Company speedy notice, to the
end that further course may be taken. 47
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In accord with this, the officials and merchants living abroad were also expected to take various
oaths, written by the Company and enforced by the embassy. These oaths regulated proper
behavior between merchants regarding commerce, shipping, loyalties, and their obedience to the
proper rules of behavior. Failure to adhere to them meant a merchant faced a forfeiture of twenty
percent of their consignment or worse. 48 Expectedly, such efforts at control by the Company
underlie the fact that decorum and behavior were frequently breached by those abroad. As the
frontline, it fell to the ambassador or his consuls to step in and ensure that the English nation acted
with the gentlemanly manners of London, though far-removed from the City and several months
journey away. Complicating the matter further, the embassy officials had no standing hierarchy to
rely upon to implement any relating guidelines. Unlike the East India Company, which held all its
factors and officials abroad to a firm contract supervised by a centralized hierarchal management,
the Levant Company offered its members only the ability to trade freely. Levantine merchants had
no centralized organization beyond the enforcement of paying duties and entrance fees, its
contracts only concerning the exchange of goods. Therefore, the consuls and ambassador in the
Levant relied upon loose assemblies, organized by embassy officials in their respective factories.
Dependent upon charisma, private allegiances, and a form of peer pressure to impose a semblance
of authority while bolstering attendance, such assemblies were only as successful as the topic of
interest and embassy official was at gaining the attention of the English nationals. Often called at
times of strife arising from trading disputes in the community, a shrewd consul would also employ
the gathering to pass joint agreements with the English he represented. For example, in January
1676/7, Consul Nightingale’s call to assembly to address a French boycott against trading with the
English. The assembly he gathered allowed him to simultaneously parlay the discussion into a vote
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granting him the power to issue boycotts against any English factors “procuring by the hands of
any foreigner or interloper” goods on the black market. Naturally, the enforcement of such an
embargo was only as strong as the feelings against any transgressor. Nightingale would continually
have to remain on guard against smuggling, as the Company was recurrent to note in its letters to
him. 49
Finch, writing his brother-in-law in 1675, unsurprisingly bemoaned his inability to control
the wantonness of those merchants under him. As “desire of women being the most prevalent”
concern he faced when regulating the young men adventuring abroad, he understood why some
under him “turn Turk.” After all, as Muslims “of the Empire have the liberty… of having four
wives and as many concubines as he can maintain… it is very inviting to make that a reward of a
belief which Christians hold inconsistent with their belief.” 50 Lacking any means of enforcing
regulations unless a case was egregious enough in its transgressions, Finch and other officials did
their best to discourage factors through verbal censures. For those who took their behavior too far,
however, Company records from the 1670s and 1680s note the occasional disavowal of any
merchant who took to marrying their mistress. The General Court coached these excoriations in
the most extreme and uncompromising language possible. For example, in a 10 October 1681 letter
to Consul Nightingale, the Company took interest in a Mr. Barrow’s marriage. From “some
intimation,” they had learned that Barrow had decided to marry a “subject of the Grand Signior.”
As a result, the Company “think it in no way safe” to continue engaging Barrow’s services.
Moreover, “in such a case we order immediately on receipt here of this letter to distance him from
having any further to do in the affairs” of trade or any English agent in the factories. The embassy
was to take over any of his business interests, ongoing trading contacts, or current projects. Barrow,
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and others like him mentioned in the archive, became disowned and nonexistent. They were
pariahs with no recourse save to return home or assimilate as best as they could manage. The
Company would describe such intermarriages as the propagator of “many evils” that they “pray”
the embassy and its staff would continue “to discourage and discountenance, the practice being
prejudicial to yourselves and the public.” 51
Nonetheless, carnal needs were fulfilled abroad. Embassy staff treaded a thin-line between
enforcing decorum and allowing English nationals to satiate their baser needs. Despite orders to
the contrary, embassy members gladly indulged themselves openly while in the Levant. For a
duration, the Turks and the Company tolerated English liaisons with Greek women, as neither
could find issue with the arrangement so long as Muslim women were not involved and the tryst
did not disrupt business. Foremost among these English Lotharios taking advantage of this caveat
was Dudley North, embassy treasurer. Regaling his conquests to his brother, North “used to say
that a man might gratify himself in anything once away” in the Mediterranean theater. 52 While
traveling to Constantinople, North spent ample time in the bordellos of Venice. Eventually arriving
in Anatolia, he took residence in room over a spassa rather than living with the other merchants in
khans, much to the amusement of his cohorts. However, all good things must end. In 1677 the
General Court succeeded in closing the loophole allowing for relations with Greek or other
Christian women, with English law held that consorting with any Turkish subjects was punishable
by death. Fortunately, for those still caught in flagrante, punishment was without fail commuted
to a fine. 53
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Yet, as noted, such renouncements against wanton behavior were not only to protect
morality, but also to defend trade itself. For example, in the case of an Englishman deciding to
forswear Christianity and become a Muslim to avoid the embassy’s judicial powers, taking a wife
to further cement his position as a Turkish subject. Having defrauded his fellow factors in Smyrna,
the unnamed man would claim the English could not pursue him for his criminality as they had no
authority over Turkish subjects. With the proper bribes to Turkish officials, much to the chagrin
of the accused, janissaries seized the man on the behalf of the Company. Imprisoned on a ship, his
return to London was prompt. 54 Other men, such a John Freeman, could bring their wives from
England. Though, such allowances were exceedingly rare and discouraged by the Company. For
example, when in 1669 it became known that a Mrs. Mason and her daughter had arrived in
Smyrna to join Mr. Mason without Company permission. The General Court wrote to Consul
Rycaut that, “it will be a grateful service to clear the place of both” and remind Mason of his
commercial duties in the Ottoman Empire precluded any familial distractions. Summarily, women
in the Levant were considered a disturbance to the marketplace enterprise, with only the
ambassador being continually granted the ability to travel with his family. Those who sought
“carnal knowledge” while in Turkey did so at their own risk of “either becoming martyrs or
apostates” when found out. 55
When not dealing with the sexual needs of nationals or the threat of men forsaking the
Christian faith, ambassadors and staff were expected to also regulate other disrupting pursuits,
such as drinking and gambling. Writing in May 1681, Consul Thomas Baker noted he had to
replace his English-born interpreter for “conceited, foolish, impertinent, traitorous, base, drunken”
behavior. A man he attacked for “turning Turk” despite coming from “a good family in Norfolk,
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as he pretends.” 56 The General Court also consistently reminded Consul Nightingale to police
“vicious factors… notoriously addicted to gaming, drinking, or any other licentious course of life.”
When found, he was to “reclaim them, or finding them intractable, give [the Company] speedy
notice, that further course may be taken with them.” As discussed above, the flow of liquor in the
Levant was crucial to whetting the appetites of not only Europeans, but Turkish officials and other
intermediaries in the pursuit of trade. Nonetheless, embassy staff quickly dealt with the over
inebriation of English that caught their attention in an unforgiving manner. 57
Such licentiousness is perhaps to be expected among young men, abroad for the first time
in their lives and away from the societal norms of home. In addition to directing embassy staff to
police behavior, the Company also sought outside intercession. Specifically, it recruited chaplains
and sent religious texts to the Ottoman Empire. Regardless of the General Court’s intentions to
keep trade flowing, however, chaplains travelling to the Levant were often eager to journey
eastward for other reasons. These men had more interest in biblical research in the Holy Lands
than tending a flock. One visitor to the Smyrna factory in 1675 would complain that it was a
disgrace “considering the great wealth they heap here” that no dedicated chapel existed. Instead, a
room in the consul’s house served for the purpose when needed. 58 Yet, dedicated chapels seemed
unnecessary, when the paltry attendance on one Sunday in 1676 so impressed chaplain Henry
Teonge to note in his diary, “I preached a sermon in the factory and had an audience of above fifty
Englishmen; a brave show in this wild place.” 59 Noticeably, chaplains such as John Covel spent
most of their time in the Levant traveling amongst the Coptic communities. Covel and his
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colleagues sought holy sites and translated texts, rather than administering to English religious
needs. 60 Roger Frampton, later Bishop of Gloucester, spent his tenure exploring the connections
between Protestants, Catholics, and other Eastern Christians. Of great interest to him was the
respective sects’ formation of thought regarding Islamic apostasy. 61 Nevertheless, time was made
to preach against “evil living” when directly ordered by the embassy. After all, these intrepid
scholars were foremost chaplains, trained and indoctrinated in Anglican ceremony and rising
through the parish system before gaining their positions abroad. Yet the sermons that these men
produced were not typical. Their discourses revolved around commerce and “honorable living,”
reflecting the concerns of the embassy’s and Company’s interest in controlling the behavior of
those in the Levant. For example, one sermon delivered before the factors noted that though it was
“written in haste,” it will “show that the Glory of God may more especially be promoted by travel,
and foreign commerce.” Another, though likely tedious to those men in attendance with its detailed
explanations of confessional doctrine and use of examples from Pliny, urged English nationals to
Raise our minds to eternal vigor, be our hearts inflamed with victorious joys, and our lips
opened in the voice of triumph. Presume your minds with the sweet spices of the East, feed
your eyes with the fair beauties of the morning, the morning after which no evening shall
follow… Value your souls capable of everlasting glories, your bodies improvable beyond
the light of the Sun, and disdain a glance at the deceitful allurements of this transitory life.
Yet another proclaimed those that “go on in their vices, as the ox goes to the slaughter, reflecting
in the meantime no more than that beast does… are tending to the chambers of death. Awake then,
you hardened and secure sinners, from this unthinking stupidity!” Their duty duly rendered, these
chaplains gladly returned to their scholastic pursuits. Seeking an ultimate explanation for all these
regulatory efforts, Finch himself asked the Company what its reasoning was in adhering to such
stringent codes of conduct. In response, the Company admitted that it held its members to such
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high expectations “for the advantage of our interest and trade, and in the meantime to use all
endeavors to prevent any injury to the customer.” 62

5.5

Spying

Abraham de Wicquefort stated it best in his 1682 treatise on diplomacy and the role of an
ambassador when he wrote, “It may be said in general, that his chief function consists in his
entertaining a good correspondence between the two princes… he serves an interpreter to the two
princes and as a broker in the commerce that is between them… a messenger of peace on one side,
and an honorable spy on the other.” 63 To that worthy task, the ambassador and consuls of the
embassy in the 1670s and 1680s gathered intelligence detailed the current political situation in the
Ottoman Empire more than any previous diplomatic mission. These efforts were not novel or the
result of a few overzealous embassy members. It was during these decades that the Stuart regime
became more engaged with the development of its intelligence apparatuses. In turn, these covert
operations proved vital to the art of proper governance in the face of so many internal and external
enemies. Whereas earlier monarchs had pursued such covert activities with a lack of continuity,
relying on the rare dynamic individual such as Thomas Cromwell or George Villiers, Charles II’s
government institutionalized such services. This development took place prominently due to the
exertions of the Secretary of State for the Northern Department. Originally overseen at the behest
of Sir Joseph Williamson, intelligence gathering continued to develop and institutionalize during
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the tenure of subsequent holders of the office. Williamson was initially a secretary to Henry Bennet,
the first Earl of Arlington and a postmaster-general who focused chiefly on foreign affairs.
Williamson’s eventual rise to power, and the growth of the offices of Secretary of State as an
administrative body, was a sluggish development. Nevertheless, thanks in large part to his tenure
in that post, the office became a powerful broker in the Stuart regime. Security and intelligence
operations rose further in prestige under Williamson’s successors, such as Robert Spencer, Earl of
Sunderland, or Edward Conway, first Earl of Conway and John Finch’s brother-in-law.
Williamson established a tradition that among a Secretary’s many obligations, he was required to
oversee a constant stream of correspondence with English diplomats, consuls, and others who were
abroad, all with an appreciation to the Stuart regime’s safekeeping. Wary of plots at every turn,
spying was a required part of any ambassador’s orders during the Restoration. For example,
ambassador William Trumbull’s instructions included an order that,
You shall constantly correspond with our ministers in other foreign courts, for our better
service… you shall also maintain a good correspondence and intercourse with all the other
ambassadors, envoys, and ministers of princes in amity with us, and as far as you can
penetrate into the designs of their respective superiors, and of what you can discover of
this nature, you shall give us a constant account. 64
Armed with the intelligence he gathered, either from volunteers or those ordered to provide such
data, Williamson, and subsequent Secretaries, interacted with Parliament as a spokesman for the
regime’s policies and concerns. Acting in this capacity, the Secretary of State for the Northern
Department became like a spider in the middle of an intelligence web spanning throughout Europe
and into Asia. A web knitted to protect Stuart interests and advance their agenda in domestic and
foreign policy. 65
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Naturally, and despite a removal from Western Europe’s prominent ambassadorial postings,
embassy members in the Levant contributed to Williamson’s and his successors’ ongoing labors.
For example, in July 1675 Paul Rycaut eagerly acknowledged his contacts in the Privy Chamber
for “the great favor I received by your honor in inviting me to correspondence, enjoining me to
transmit what occurrences in this place may yield that may either serve for useful information or
pleasing curiosity worthy of your knowledge.” 66 The power back in England welcomed any
information, even that beyond strictly targeted inquiries into troop and naval moments.
Recognizing his orders to spy from Williamson, Finch wrote to his masters “that the topics of
religion and property gave great insight into affairs, has suggested for hints of information, are
suitable to a person, who is concerned in affairs of importance.” Such points of interest would be
easier to gather, even when other data was lacking in availability. 67 For the most part, archived
instances of intelligence is neither hidden nor written in a convoluted manner. However, some
correspondence is difficult to disentangle, the occasional post written in a lost cipher. Such ciphers
can be laughable at times, though, unoriginal and effortlessly broken. For instance, occasionally
references to John Finch cast him as “Mr. Bird,” Charles II as “Mr. Church,” and James II as “Mr.
James.” Other times, they are complex mathematical variations and written in another language.
These requiring the cipher to unlock any significant meaning beyond the chance name and a
fluency in Latin and Italian. Of the information garnered from these letters, though, one can break
it down roughly into two categories. On one hand was an interest in the status of European rivals
in the Mediterranean, their military power and political standing. On the other hand, these reports
also sought to describe the various conflicts between the Turks and other European powers. 68
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The earliest official noting of other European powers’ standing during the 1670s came from
John Covel in April 1672. In a letter to Williamson, then just a Clerk of the Privy Council, Covel
gave a thorough account of the efforts of the French embassy in Adrianople. Moreover, he detailed
the French’s fleet in the Mediterranean and their pains to enlist Turkish aid against the Dutch.
Simultaneously, he also noted the Turks were preparing for a new war in eastern Europe,
potentially entangling the French despite their efforts to keep the peace. Yet, the delay in
communication between the Levant and England made “for difficulties” that Covel complained
would diminish the value of his intelligence. 69 Rycaut, acting on his orders, sent a lengthy
accounting in 1675 to his handler, again Williamson. The consul’s epistle accounted for the
number of Venetian ships in the harbors of Constantinople, concluding that the establishment of a
new Genovese resident infringed on Venetian trade. In the meanwhile, the French were making
substantial gains at the expense at the of the Dutch. 70 For their part, the Company would thank the
embassy members for their data gathering. The General Court was sensible of their “good
attentions to our navigation, by the continuance of the case in making inquiries… which we hope
will be at length” putting the English well ahead of their competitors and appeasing the Stuart
regime. 71 Even the embarrassments of other European rivals was noteworthy in this sharing of
intelligence. With the arrival of a new French ambassador in 1679, Finch gleefully sent notice to
Williamson that English trade was booming at “three million dollars in goods and ships.” And the
poor etiquette of the French ambassador upon meeting the Sultan was a boon for the English’s
standing in trade and prestige. Particularly as the French ambassador was beaten in front of the
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Ottoman court and locked in a broom closet under the stairs for two days after. 72 The English
predisposition of gathering intelligence on the French continued throughout the 1670s.
Accumulation of such data accelerated in the 1680s as Franco-Dutch and Franco-English relations
deteriorated, all three powers engaging in tariff wars that mirrored the escalation in tensions as
goods between the rivals became increasingly laden with taxes. 73 Knowing they were of particular
interest to rival European observers, the French went so far as to fly false flags in the Mediterranean
to confuse the English and Dutch. Chandos made frequent note of such subterfuges beginning in
January 1683. He provided detailed counts of the number of men-of-war the French were
deploying in disguise, their armaments, and voiced his concerns that the French would eventually
attack the Germans. Such an assault, whether by accident or design, he argued would aid the
French’s “private ends, but give so a fatal a blow to Christendom” as to engulf the entirety of
Europe in a war. 74
Of far more voluminous instance in the archives are the reports by embassy staff regarding
the military disposition of the Ottoman Empire and its respective campaigns against Christian
European powers. On Covel’s part, his travelogues provided extensive information on everything
from the minutiae of armaments that the janissaries carried to the structures of several fortresses
in the regions he visited. For example, in one entry he diagramed a new cannon the Turks had
forged, providing external as well as internal specifications that he planned to share with officials
upon his return. In another, he describes an armory he convinced a local Turkish officer to allow
him to peruse. Making a count of the available arms and armor, he concluded that it could supply
enough weapons for one thousand men and another one hundred mounted cavalries. His personal
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journal went even further, with extremely elaborate and ornately drawn maps of the docks and
fortresses he came across. Of these, several are illustrated with colored ink and an attempt at scale.
While easily overlooked as a standard travelogue of an intrepid chronicler, his notes cannot be
dismissed, as he would write Williamson and others with accounts and promises to provide the
detailed information at his soonest convenience. 75
Beyond even Covel’s pained efforts, it was Ambassador Chandos who would provide the
most detailed correspondence regarding the Turkish disposition in the Mediterranean and Balkan
States. Whereas his predecessors, and immediate successor, wrote their correspondence with an
eye to commerce and ongoing trade relations, Chandos wrote many of his epistles detailing the
Turkish armed forces and international standing. Such activity likely was a result of both his
instructions to do such and the lack of strong commercial rivals to the English in the theater. For
example, Chandos, in a rare discussion of mercantile concerns in 1682, described the French as
conducting “a miserable trade, with caps, paper and other such bagatelli.” Their merchants lived
in mean conditions far below that of other Europeans and unworthy of further consideration. 76
Thus, it was through Chandos that the English learned of the brittle strength of Mehmed IV’s
newly revitalized fleet, laid down in the years preceding the Great Turkish War that began in 1683.
In March 1684, Chandos mused that while “the Venetians gall the Turks most sorely by the sea,
they [the Turks] are exposing their weak and blind side to all the world, for the truth is the Turks
are so contemptibly weak at sea they cannot man so many as ten men-of-war, or even two.” 77 As
the war escalated between the Holy League and the Ottoman Empire, Chandos’ correspondence
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lengthened. By 1685, the entirety of his letters focused on gathering intelligence on Turkish foreign
actions, predominately concerning Hungary and the status of the war. After the loss at the Battle
of Vienna, the Turks were withdrawing and losing significant portions of eastern Europe.
Concentrating on the Siege of Buda in 1686, Chandos became obsessed with what he, and many
other Europeans, envisioned as the destruction of the Turks and Islam. The war’s disruption,
pushing the succession of the Hungarian throne toward the Hapsburgs, had the princes of Europe
fearful as the balance of power shifted. With mixed emotions, wanting the Turks to suffer a loss
while simultaneously fearful of Hapsburgian gains, Chandos noted that the Grand Vizier mustered
30,000 troops, both in effort to end the loss of Turkish territory and redeem the Vizier after the
setbacks during the campaign. Leaving in August, this force, and other rival factions such as the
“Muscovites” and “Tartars” totaling “40,000 or 50,000,” provided further dramatic intelligence
from Chandos regarding the war. This was the first time the Russians had joined other European
powers against Ottoman forces, and Chandos began to refer to his epistles as “intelligence reports”
from September onwards. These reports, supposedly read by the King himself, were ordered to be
continued by Trumbull upon his arrival in the Ottoman Empire. Though Trumbull did return to
predominately mercantile interests in his letters, the ambassador continued to follow the standards
set by Chandos when surveying Turkish military possessions and abilities. Thus, the loss at Buda
in 1687 forced a detailed recounting of the withdrawal of Turkish forces, the Vizier’s disposal, and
the continuance of Turkish troop levels, movements, and standing in eastern Europe. The Ottoman
Empire had become a clearinghouse of intelligence for the Western European powers. 78
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5.6

Conclusion

The duties of the embassy were often varied, wide reaching in their purview, and beyond
the scope of typical diplomatic undertakings as seen in prominent Western European posts. The
disputes between the English nation and Turkish officials, merchants within the community, and
any combination thereof possible between the various peoples of the Ottoman Empire and the
English kept the ambassador and his staff constantly deluged with affairs outside the scope of more
formal diplomatic relations. Such concerns that faced the embassy in the seventeenth century are
today considered consular in nature, delegated to employees in lower stations of any embassy and
unworthy of the time of the ambassador in residence. Yet, as the Ottoman court did not see the
English or any European power as an equal, the fact remained that the ambassador and embassy
staff had little official business to attend to in a traditionally high diplomatic stance.
The rare interactions between Sultan and the English nation were affairs of grand
significance, highlighted by their infrequency. Accounted for in magnificent narratives, the
providing of necessarily opulent gifts secured these assemblies. However, no matter how rich the
gifts, they only juxtaposed with a visible Turkish grandeur that emphasized the nature of English
subservience to the Sublime Porte. Undertaken at crucial times and great expense, these dealings
would guarantee that the men associated with them would return to England with success in hand,
fortunes made, and a new standing for the English in the Levant. When relations between the Turks
and English deteriorated, though, the nation and trade suffered immensely. Unlike any other
theater that the English participated in, it was only tin the Ottoman Empire that their standing was
held to a low enough regard to extort, threaten, and demean their position with no vengeance
against a transgressor forthcoming. Nowhere else did the English tolerate such a base standing. It
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was only with advent of the British Empire in the eighteenth century, coupled with a declining
international position due to the loss of several successive wars, that the Turks were forced to treat
their European counterparts as equals and end such belittling practices.
As for the various Christian denominations of the Levant, the English’s mission to protect
them as intermediaries would shift over time to an imperialistic tendency. A pragmatic undertaking
developed into a justification of expansion into the Holy Land for the defense of fellow Christians
as such locales as Cairo and the Suez Canal became strategically necessary for the British maritime
empire. The behavior of the English abroad, then, became a lesser concern when contrasted with
a mission of territorial gain, control, and global influence. Espionage, of course, would promulgate
in such a worldview. Constantinople maintained its position as a major entrepôt to any European
power’s interest in the Mediterranean theater. Hence, the neighborhoods surrounding Topkapi
Palace became as frequented by men operating in the shadows as the streets of Berlin and Vienna
were in the modern era.
Therefore, a study of English ambassadorial duties in Constantinople during the latter
seventeenth century establishes a better understanding of the interactions between the Ottoman
Empire and Western European powers. Rather than a meeting of binary opposites, two civilizations
clashing and avoiding intermixing with one another, the diplomatic interactions between the
English and the Turks were instead a multifaceted affair highlighting the complex nature of
diplomacy, trade, politics, and cultural exchange. Exploring this overlooked aspect of diplomatic
interactions is necessary. It allows a historian to further understand the mindset of the early modern
diplomat and merchant. Commerce may have predominated these emissaries’ concerns, but it was
only one aspect of a fascinating prism of duties which offers even more profitable insights for any
historian wishing to employ it.

182

CHAPTER 6.

CONCLUSION

In the four years after his arrival in the Ottoman Empire, William Trumbull would go on
to have ten more public meetings with the Sublime Porte after his initial introduction to the Sultan’s
court. An Oxford fellow, successful civil lawyer, and former ambassador to France, Trumbull was
the consummate diplomat, one of the most talented individuals to take the Levant ambassadorship
up until that point. Under his purview, the English embassy became widely known as a friendly
locale for all Europeans and Turkish subjects to meet. Trumbull made sure that “coffee and sherbet
for strangers” was always on hand, his dragoman permanently available on request to anyone who
may have a need. He had a bowling green installed in the embassy’s garden, providing a popular
diversion for the English nationals and others. For his own part, Trumbull viewed the new sporting
venue as a further means of regulating behavior, cutting down on gambling and drinking among
the factory by providing a distraction he could personally oversee in his own residence. With the
ascension of Sulieman II in 1687, the English embassy convinced the Sublime Porte that an envoy
to England and France to announce the new sultan was unnecessary. Instead, a celebration at the
English embassy would be perfectly acceptable and altogether more beneficial for all parties
involved. Agreeing, the Grand Vizier made sure “many considerable Turks” attended the revelry.
Chilled delights, coffee, and even tobacco was provided in ample amounts to entertain all the
guests. 1
Having embedded itself deep into Ottoman high society, the embassy would strengthen its
ties with the Turks further under Trumbull’s watchful tenure. During times of unrest, such as the
1687 minor rebellion over the deposition of Mehmed IV in favor of Sulieman II, the embassy
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became a refuge for Turkish officials seeking to hide their fortunes and jewelry from the unruly
mob. In times of peace, the embassy continued to provide services to Sublime Porte magistrates.
Despite earlier orders from the General Court in the previous decade, Trumbull successfully
lobbied the Company to allow the conveying of Ottoman officials for a surcharge. Even with this
schedule of hefty fees, the case for ongoing good relations with England was furthered by this new
service, the Turks eager to employ the English to their own mutual ends. As he helped Turkish
governors safely navigate the Mediterranean, conveyed by English vessels during a period of
French privateering against the Ottoman state, and aided officials in times of unrest, Trumbull
consistently reminded the Sublime Porte that he was there for them. 2
Nonetheless, as the Nine Years’ War progressed in Europe, relations between England and
the Ottoman Empire did finally begin to sour. United in their hatred of the Habsburgs, the Ottoman
court began to see the French, and not the English, as a natural ally in pursuing their war against
their Germanic neighbors. Writing in July 1690, Trumbull would bemoan the English loss in
standing before the Sublime Porte, “It is certain this empire at present is more governed by the
French than the Turkish interest.” Pressing their advantage, the French would turn opinion further
against the English. In their efforts, they claimed that even if indirectly, the English were
contributing to the Holy Roman Empire’s victories in Hungary by maintaining their neutral stance.
By year’s end, the English were in such poor standing with the Sultan and Grand Vizier that
Trumbull concluded, “as we are looked upon almost as enemies, so all advantages are improved
against us by the French ambassador.” Ottoman officials quickly condemned English efforts to
detain and prevent French ships from landing in Turkish docks. Twisting the Articles of the
Capitulations that Finch had won, the Turks took to blaming the English for their privateering in
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the Mediterranean against French ships. Claiming the seizing of that nation’s vessels was a theft
of Turkish goods, the English had no choice but to provide restitution to the Turks or risk the
Empire’s ire. 3
Simultaneously, the French also established a new factory in Salonica, modern day
Thessaloniki. With Sultan Bayezid II welcoming the commercially skilled Sephardic tribes into
the Ottoman Empire during the late fifteenth century, Salonica became a main resettlement point
for Hispanic Jews in the Levant. The Turks benefitted from the extensive trade network and
technical expertise the Sephardim brought with them. Thus, they would leave the Jews to their
own devices in designing the city’s political and commercial settlement, so long as they remained
loyal to the Sultan and obeyed any official requests by Turkish governors. As a result, Salonica
blossomed by the seventeenth century into a vibrant commercial port, a jewel of commerce on the
routes leading to and from the Black Sea. Realizing that the markets of Salonica offered an
untapped source of trade, and wishing to not allow the French to take sole advantage of it, Trumbull
attempted to convince the Company that they needed a new consul in the Aegean coastal city. The
response that he received was less than enthusiastic for this new venture. The Company replied
that “all new establishments, consuls, or factories are as suckers that draw sap from their main
body.” Moreover, as “the French, in many places, have such mean persons and trade as rather
makes them contemptible,” a consulship at Salonica would only repeat their rival’s foolishness.
Older and established methods, such as reliance on Smyrna, were preferable than a risky new
venture. 4
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Growing disillusioned with his appointment, Trumbull soon received an impossible order:
he was to negotiate a peace between the Turks and the Holy Roman Empire. Unable to make any
progress toward this goal, he requested his recall in 1691. The General Court accepted his entreaty,
thanking him for his service, and elected William Hussey as his replacement. However, Hussey
died before arriving in Constantinople. When news of the death reached him, William III affirmed
that he no longer desired to leave the diplomacy of the State to the Company’s whims. In a final
break from traditional practices established in the latter’s charter, he unilaterally appointed and
approved William Harbord as the new ambassador to the Sublime Porte. From that point forward,
the Company never again would have any voice in its main representative to the Levant.
For his service, Trumbull would rise to loftier standing in the Prince of Orange’s
government after his return to London. Initially offered the position of the Lord Justice of Ireland
in 1693, he was leery of entering once more into public life. Nevertheless, a year later Whitehall
promoted him as a Commissioner of the Treasury Board, where he served with some distinction.
At that time, Trumbull also discovered that Rycaut’s latest publication of Present State of the
Ottoman Empire had incorporated his dispatches home. Amused, he recalled in his memoirs that
he “wondered that [Rycaut] had never sent to [him] for some information of what had passed in
Turkey during [his] embassy there… but now the reason is evident, for he had as much to peruse,
as he had cause to imagine [Trumbull] should have communicated to him.” With Charles Talbot
falling into disgrace the following year, the position of Secretary of State for the Northern
Department stood vacant. As a result, the Earl of Sunderland, a friend of Trumbull, put the former
ambassador’s name forth for consideration. With some hesitance, Trumbull accepted his new
station, concurrently made a member of the Privy Council as well. He set about to continue the
administrative and intelligence gathering duties that his predecessor Joseph Williamson had
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codified a quarter of century before, serving diligently, but with little joy. By 1697, tired of public
life, he retired to his estate in Easthampstead to work on his chronicles. The Levant embassy never
again achieved such heights as that he had overseen. 5

In many ways, the Levant Company’s declining fortunes mirrored that of the Ottoman
Empire’s withdrawal from the world stage. Just as the Company began its last gasps during the
eighteenth century, so too did the Sublime Porte during the tenure of Sultan Abdülhamid I’s reign.
In 1787, near the end of Abdülhamid I’s rule, Russia invaded the western coast of the Black Sea,
then controlled by the Ottoman Empire. Seizing on the opportunity to attack their long-standing
adversaries, the Austrians also declared war against the Turks, hoping to gain Serbia and other
territories in the Balkans. Dying in 1789, the fiasco of two wars fell to Abdülhamid’s heir, Selim
III. While the Austro-Turkish War became bogged down along a stagnant front, ending in 1791 to
no gain for either side, the Russo-Turkish War lasted until 1792, with the Turkish forces exhausted
and unable to retake the Crimea. Facing civil unrest and a mutinous military, the Sultan agreed to
concede the region to Russia. His subsequent suit for peace shook the Turkish belief in their
superiority over Christian Europe. This embarrassing defeat was the first of many major territorial
setbacks for the Ottoman Empire, with the Russians declaring war four more times in the next
seventy years, each successively more taxing on the Ottoman Empire’s ability to cope. Ultimately
Russian aggressions would transform the Black Sea “from a ‘Turkish lake’ to a borderland,
keeping the two rival powers separate” and opening a new potential front for conflicts closer to
the Turkish heartland. 6
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Not long after the disastrous First Russo-Turkish War, on 1 July 1798, the French invaded
Ottoman-controlled Egypt under the command of Napoleon Bonaparte. The French Expeditionary
Force in Egypt quickly massacred any resistance. Infamously, on the orders of Bonaparte, the
French employed cannonades in the narrow streets of Cairo against dissidents, failing to
distinguish between Turkish, Egyptian, or Bedouins in their zealous efforts to institute control. For
the first time in its long history, the Ottoman Empire turned outward for help, asking Western
European powers to aid it against the French threat. Sultan Selim III issued an international decree,
the first ever from the Sublime Porte. In it, he declared that the French violated “the laws and
norms of nations” in subduing resistance in Cairo and as a result the Ottoman Turks sought
“alliances with Russia and Britain, Christian powers, against the secular republic” of France.
Answering the call for help, the English sent a fleet under the command of Horatio Nelson.
Arriving at the mouth of the Nile River, Nelson’s fleet sunk the French fleet, stranding the French
Expeditionary Force in hostile territory. Facing a growing guerrilla resistance movement and never
taken seriously by the Muslim community when claiming to be friends of Islam, the French
situation became untenable. Resultantly, Napoleon abandoned his men to their fate in 1801.
However, the defeat of the French did not return Egypt to Ottoman control. The British forces
responsible for the eventual liberation of Egypt maintained a presence in the state that effectively
– over time – turned Egypt into a British imperial holding rather than an Ottoman possession. 7
After the disasters of the Russo-Turkish War and the French invasion of Egypt, the Turkish
leadership fully recognized that their former military prowess and internal politics were no longer
enough to preserve the Empire. Complicating matters further for the Turks was the advent of a
nascent power in the Mediterranean: the Americans. Shortly after taking the office of the President
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in 1801, Thomas Jefferson received word that the pasha of Tripoli demanded a tribute of $225,000.
The issuance of such a ransom was a practice of longstanding tradition among Barbary powers and
those who sought to ply trade throughout the Mediterranean. Hence, the pasha assured Jefferson
that failure to pay would result in the United States maritime fleet being considered prey for
Tripolitan corsairs. Emboldened by years of corsairing actions against the United States, started in
1785 by the Algerian seizures and ransoms of the Dauphin and Betsey, the pasha believed the
Americans would meet his demand. Yet, Jefferson refused to acquiesce to Tripolitan threats. While
he served as Secretary of State after the Dauphin and Betsey crisis, Jefferson had compelled then
President John Adams to build a small naval squadron of six frigates. As a result of Jefferson’s
intransigence, the pasha of Tripoli formally declared war against the United States in late 1801.
President Jefferson responded by sending the six-frigate naval squadron to blockade the port of
Tripoli and counteract any privateering against American vessels in the Mediterranean.
Unfortunately, for the United States, while blockading the harbor of Tripoli, the U.S. frigate
Philadelphia ran aground and the Tripolitans captured the vessel. Shortly thereafter, American
forces led by Lieutenant Stephen Decatur went on a daring raid. Decatur and his men successfully
entered Tripoli at night and razed the Philadelphia, lest the pasha employ the ship against the
remaining United States’ frigates. After a period of stalemate, in 1805 a joint American land and
sea attack on Tripoli forced the Barbary State to lower the price for peace. The ongoing campaign
had exhausted the resources of both the Americans and Tripolitans. Caving to Tripolitan demands,
the United States ultimately sued for peace at the price of $60,000 – down from the initial demand
of $225,000, but still far from a resounding American victory. Nonetheless, the First Barbary War
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was over and the exploits of Decatur invigorated Americans’ patriotic sense and belief in free trade
notwithstanding the embarrassing ending of the conflict. 8
Despite this display of American will and a resulting decline in corsair activities, during
the War of 1812 Barbary privateering initiated once more against American merchants in the
Mediterranean. For their part, the Turks ostensibly blessed the practice, profiting from a tribute
still supplied by their erstwhile Barbary provinces. In 1814, President James Madison, like
Jefferson before him, sent a naval squadron to the region to counter the corsairs’ activities. The
Second Barbary War, this time against Algiers, was quickly resolved by the blockading of the
harbors of Algiers and the sinking of any corsair vessels that were encountered by American forces.
A subsequent peace treaty forced Algiers to acknowledge American sovereignty and required
Algiers to abandon privateering altogether. The age of the corsairs had finally ended as the United
States was more than willing, unlike European powers, to attack on land and sea any Barbary
nation engaged in privateering against maritime commerce. Corsairing, a lucrative past time in the
wider socio-political system that governed interactions in the Mediterranean world, had finally
ended. Beyond a loss of a de jure fleet in the Mediterranean for the Turks, however, for the British,
Dutch, and French a means to police one another’s respective commercial activities had
disappeared. Before that time, the lesser navies of the United States, Swedes, Portuguese, and
others meant that their respective maritime vessels were at the mercy of the Barbary corsairs –
effectively rendering their commercial competition against the other European powers nonexistent
prior to the advent of the Barbary Wars. Rather than ally themselves with their former British
masters and forgo their declared belief in “free trade,” the Americans decided to pursue the costlier
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approach of attacking the corsairs. The Americans took heart in this course of action. They viewed
it as doing “what the nations of Europe had been unable or unwilling to do: beating the forces of
Islamic despotism.” Until that point, corsairing in the Mediterranean was a condoned, officially
sanctioned activity. European states employed the practice to maintain a balance of power and
regulate competition against any budding commercial powers. For their part, the Barbary States
used corsairing to finance their institutions of government. The Barbary Wars, then, were a
collision of trading systems. Specifically, it was a clash of free market capitalism in opposition to
European mercantilism. The old ways that the Levant Company, Barbary coast, and Ottoman
Empire had clung to were fast approaching an end. 9
Thus, with such losses on land and in the sea, the Turks felt compelled to act. In 1839,
Sultan Abdülmecid I began an extensive series of reforms that would last until 1877. The result
was the so-called Tanzimât Reforms, which revolutionized the Turkish political sphere by
recognizing individual property rights and equality before the law for all religious groups in the
Ottoman Empire. This new practice contrasted with the previously established dhimmi system
which taxed all non-Muslims on an individualized, confessional basis. However, the creation of
an equitable multiethnic, officially recognized religiously heterodox Turkish state only
exacerbated the increasing disillusionment Christian communities had within the Empire. In
addition, the Tanzimât Reforms fomented the beginnings of Arab nationalism as various tribes
won new status in society. As domestic politics deteriorated further, the Sublime Porte became
paralyzed, unable to counter growing public resentment with the Sultanate. By 1908, the
Committee of Union and Progress, known colloquially as the Young Turks, successfully revolted
and deposed Sultan Abdul Hamid II. The Young Turks proved to be brutal rulers themselves. They
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massacred nearly one million Armenians, driving the Empire into a period of particularly bloody
civil war. Only through the efforts of Turkish military officer Ali Rıza Oğlu Mustafa was the
violence ended and peace restored. Declaring himself President in 1923 and adopting the name
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, he would lead the country into a constitutionally dictated secularized
future, free from the Sultanate. The Ottoman Empire was no more. 10

Further study is necessary to delineate the influence companies such as the Levant
Company had on the formation of the State and its exertion of power, the early British commercial
empire, and in training the bureaucrats who served both in Whitehall and Westminster upon
arriving home from abroad. For example, the Muscovy Company would add a further complexion
to the historiography and enrich the arguments put forth in this dissertation. Though an exhaustive
outlining of the Muscovy Company’s structure, initial formation, and fiscal returns is easily
obtainable, neither British nor Russian scholars have explored much of the Company’s history and
ambassadorial staff after 1640. 11 Existing scholarship pertaining to the Company suggests that
Russo-English trade relations began to deteriorate in 1645, with Parliament refusing to allow Tsar
Aleksei’s envoy, Dokhturov, to deliver a message regarding continuance of exemptions to Charles
I. Incensed by the regicide in 1649, the Tsar revoked the Company’s privileges and ceased relations.
As a result, from 1649 until the Restoration, the history of the Company is vague. 12 It is during the
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1660s, seeking to reestablish Company privileges, that Charles II sent Charles Howard, first Earl
of Carlisle, to negotiate with the Russian court. Though well received, the embassy was a failure
at earning back lost privileges. Subsequent embassies in 1668 and 1676 also met with failure.
Sadly, nothing in the limited historiography exists for the Company in the later Stuart era beyond
a study of the magnificent and opulently celebrated arrival of Charles Howard to Russia in 1660. 13
Therefore, the men behind the scenes, the informal players and embassy staff who helped make
such meetings possible remain obscured, removed from the historical context as anything beyond
set pieces of the failed missions.
With a slightly more prominent standing in the existing scholarship, the Royal African
Company would also link together productively with a study of the Muscovy and Levant
Companies. In recent decades, scholars K.G. Davies and William Pettigrew have provided the
most comprehensive studies on the Company. Nonetheless, the Company remains removed from
the wider British diplomatic, political, and social historical context. For example, Davies maintains
that the Company’s existence was merely to serve as a vehicle to counter Dutch trade monopolies
in Africa and that the Company “played no significant part” in international politics or British
domestic concerns. 14 Pettigrew, on the other hand, emphasizes a study that “locates the story of
the Royal African Company and of the transatlantic slave trade within the political history of trade
regulation,” caring little for how Company staff and merchants influenced British domestic or
international affairs. 15 Both scholars investigate the Company’s structure, major players, and
interactions with the marketplace – as is typical of many of the works analyzing the trading
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companies. Of particular note for the Royal African Company, however, is how involved the Duke
of York, Prince Rupert, Sir William Coventry, John Locke, and other notables of the time were in
the venture, being governors, overseers, and shareholders. 16 Indeed, familiar names, such as
Dudley North and John Jolliffe from the Levant Company and Muscovy Company membership,
also reappear in these scholars’ accountings. 17 This overlap of prominent and minor players –
merchants, notables, aristocrats, and ambassadorial staff – provided ample opportunities to foster
both domestic and international initiatives that remains unstudied. The merchants and
ambassadorial staff, tied to powerful men through connections found within these companies,
made their voices heard in Whitehall and Westminster through petitions, bribes, and other
solicitations on issues of not only trade, but also international and domestic politics. They acted,
in short, as agents of the early modern State as well as merchants.

To understand England’s eventual imperial aspirations, one must ask how we can account
for the British Empire if trade was not an essential factor in its foundation and how the English
viewed themselves. The Levant Company embassies of 1672 to 1691 took place concurrent to a
period of English economic gains that saw the dawning of a commercial enterprise that would span
the world by the end of the next century. The men who represented English interests in the Ottoman
Empire did so for a plethora of reasons. Regardless of their individual rewards, however, it is clear
that the Company acted as an institution of the State, complicating the arbitrarily defined line
between the disciplines of economic and political history, as well as public and private spheres.
The Levant Company provided a formal structure in which not only interaction with a foreign
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power was possible, but also a scaffolding for the burgeoning expression of State power outwards.
The embassies of the late seventeenth century trained and developed the men who were involved
in them. While abroad, these intrepid commercial emissaries were equally groomed and prepared
for positions of power upon their return if they so desired it. Some readily accepted such positions,
with the possibility of rising as high as Secretary of State for the Northern Department. Others
pursued equally profitable ventures, serving in the Company’s General Court or further diplomatic
postings. Regardless of the individual course embassy members took upon returning to England,
however, they all ensured that commercial interests coincided with international and domestic
political concerns.
Moreover, the Company itself allowed for the maintenance of a successful Royal Navy
during a period of supposed maritime decline. Its efforts tied the General Court closer to those in
Whitehall and Westminster in overseeing a nascent maritime empire. Although diminished in size
during its peacetime deployment, the Navy still acted efficiently and effectively when guaranteeing
the free movement of English goods, augmented fiscally and numerically by the Company when
needed. The collection of intelligence, for the security of the State and its interests, also reached a
new level of importance concurrent to the Company’s booming period of fiscal returns. Such data
provided the Company not only with the best routes and prices possible, but protected the State
itself from European rivals and diplomatic calamity. Hence, obsessed with providing the best
information regarding the political establishment as it existed in Europe and the Ottoman Empire,
the men who returned to London to run the Company and fill government posts were superbly
suited for the task of crafting an overseas trading empire unlike any other.
This dissertation has studied the emissaries who went to the Levant - the merchants, factors,
ambassadors, chaplains, and embassy staff members - for either bureaucratic, commercial, or
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scholastic motivations in which they sought a posting in a land far removed from the one they were
born. In their time abroad, these men amassed a wealth of knowledge and resources, providing
them with the capital for launching new successful careers at home, or affording them a healthy
retirement, while simultaneously furthering the countless interests of the Levant Company and
Stuart State. Further, this study has emphasized that the Levant Company was yet another facet of
the State, a formalized collective of mercantile agents acting on the behalf of the Stuart regime
simultaneous to the mundane pursuit of trade. To disregard these men and discount their worth in
the wider study of history during the Stuart regime is a disservice to all that they undertook and
our own understanding of the later Restoration era. The Levant Company served as an instrument
of the State. It was an institution of State power, an apparatus of governance and commercial
expansion. Thus, its members held influence both in international economics and the politics of
expanding the State itself. In continuing to pay no heed to traders and their embassies, historians
impede a better comprehension of later Restoration England. Succinctly, this dissertation has
sought to tender an original historiographical complexion that links the sub-fields of political,
diplomatic, and commercial history, proposing new understandings of the very real value
merchants have for all practitioners of history. After all, through the virtue of exchange, the
affluence of one is valuable to the many. 18
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